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ABSTRACT 
Researcher: James Harry Hartman, III 
Title: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF GENERAL AVIATION VISUAL 
TO INSTRUMENT METEOROLOGICAL CONDITION 
CONTEXTUAL FACTORS 
Institution: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy in Aviation 
Year: 2020 
The purpose of this dissertation was to bridge the existing literature gap of outdated 
contextual factor (CF) research through examination and determination of current 
General Aviation (GA) Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 visual flight 
rules (VFR)-into-instrument meteorological condition (IMC) contextual factors.  
Contextual factors are a multifaceted arrangement of pertinent events or occurrences 
contributing to pilot accidents in weather-related decision-making errors.  A total of 46 
contextual factors were identified and examined from the reviewed research literature.  
The study examined and determined the presence of the 46 contextual factors, 
frequencies, and manifestations in the GA VFR-into-IMC Aviation Accident Reports 
(AARs) archived in the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) online safety 
database.  Significant relationships were identified among the contextual factors and pilot 
age, flight experience, weather, flight conditions, time of day, and certification level 
using point biserial and phi correlations.  Contextual factor significant effects on the 
crash distance from departure and crash distance from the planned destination were 
revealed using multiple regression.  A qualitative methodology was used on secondary 
v 
data.  Three subject matter experts (SMEs) for the main study analyzed a sample of 85 
accidents for the presence of the 46 contextual factors.  Raters then reported the presence 
of the contextual factors and provided opinions on how the contextual factors were 
manifested.  Qualitative analysis revealed the presence of 37 out of 46 contextual factors.  
Highest frequency factors included number of passengers on board (CF29), accident time 
of day (CF1), crash distance from the planned destination (CF15), not filing of a flight 
plan (CF21), and underestimating risk (CF43).  Raters described numerous 
manifestations of the contextual factors including 62% of the accident flights had 
passengers on board the aircraft (CF29).  Quantitative analysis discovered several 
significantly weak to moderate relationships among pilot age, flight experience, weather, 
flight conditions, time of day, certification level, and the contextual factors.  Several 
contextual factors had significant effects on the crash distance from departure and crash 
distance from the planned destination.  Findings indicated the contextual factors were 
extensive in GA accidents.  Additional research should focus on all flight domains, 
including further study of GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC accidents.  It is recommended the 
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The purpose of this dissertation was to bridge the existing literature gap of 
outdated contextual factor (CF) research through examination and determination of 
current General Aviation (GA) Title 14 code of federal regulations (CFR) Part 91 
(hereafter referred to as Part 91) visual flight rules (VFR)-into-instrument meteorological 
condition (IMC) contextual factors in the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
safety database.  Contextual factors in Part 91, GA VFR-into-IMC accidents were 
determined and examined in the study.  Identifying research-derived contextual factors 
from the perspective of the Subject Matter Expert (SME) pilot was the focus of the 
research.  Approaching the identification of research-derived contextual factors from the 
expert point of view is important and has the main advantage of getting the pilot 
perspective over a more general point of view.  A determination and examination of 
visual flight rules VFR-into-IMC, GA pilot-accident contextual factors in the single-pilot 
CFR Title 14 Part 91 environment was completed.  Part 91 regulates the operation of 
small non-commercial aircraft within the United States (electronic code of federal 
regulations [e-CFR], 2018a).  The most recent (27th) Joseph T. Nall Report (2018) 
describes the most currently determined statistics on GA aviation accidents in 2015 and 
found VFR-into-IMC, or VFR-into-IMC events, caused 21 (20 fatal) weather accidents 
with a 95% fatality rate.  The investigation of contextual factors influencing weather-
related decision-making can assist researchers to change the GA flight system in order to 
increase safety.  More research is needed to discover contextual factors contributing to 
GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC accidents, including qualitative exploratory research using 
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secondary data in the current study, so hazards can be mitigated, and the number of GA 
accidents can be reduced.   
The GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC accident type includes the John F. Kennedy, Jr. 
crash of a Piper Saratoga into the Atlantic Ocean after he developed spatial disorientation 
during a flight in marginal weather while acting as pilot-in-command (PIC) of a PA-32R-
301, tail number N9253N, on July 16, 1999, to Martha’s Vineyard in Massachusetts.  A 
determination was made by the NTSB that the pilot was not proficient at flying the 
aircraft by reference to the instruments alone, was not instrument rated, and relied on 
visual references to fly the aircraft.  On this night, there was no visible horizon due to the 
haze and dark night.  The NTSB determined the probable cause of the accident to be 
spatial disorientation and failure to maintain control of the aircraft while descending over 
water on a dark night with haze (NTSB, 2000).   
Contributory factors have been identified in Part 91, VFR-into-IMC accidents.  
The factors include initiating or continuing VFR-into-IMC, flight into clouds, controlled 
flight into terrain (CFIT), spatial disorientation, loss of aircraft control, unrecoverable, 
unusual flight attitude such as a spin, graveyard spiral, or inflight structural failure, and 
inadequate instrument flight training (Wilson & Sloan, 2003).  Human error has also been 
identified as a factor in Part 91, VFR-into-IMC accidents (e.g., Gallo et al., 2015; Ison, 
2014a).  Studies have been conducted on human error to improve understanding of 
situational behavior (e.g., Hunter, Martinussen, Wiggins, & O’Hare, 2011; Ison, 2014b).  
Hunter et al. (2011) explained situational behavior assumes a person's behavior is 
influenced by an external influence from the environment or culture.  The results can 
assist in mitigating the Part 91, VFR-into-IMC accident rate attributed to human error.   
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Contextual factors have been identified in Part 91, VFR-into-IMC accidents.  The 
factors are generally defined as the degrees of challenge, uncertainty, predictability of 
outcome, time pressure, threat, emotionality, and situational understanding in classifying 
decisions (Boyes, & Potter, 2015).  In the aviation domain, contextual factors are a 
multifaceted arrangement of pertinent events or occurrences contributing to pilot 
accidents in weather-related decision-making errors.  The context term has been 
explained as “… contributes to General Aviation pilot errors in weather-related decision 
making … considered as a complex configuration of relevant events or phenomena that 
may be considered the domain within which the pilot makes the weather-related 
decision” (McCoy & Mickunas, 2000, p. 1).  A total of 46 contextual factors have been 
identified in the reviewed literature on GA VFR-into-IMC accidents.  The results of the 
studies showed more research is needed, including database research, to understand the 
context of pilot actions resulting in VFR-into-IMC accidents, as there are gaps in 
understanding among context, pilot characteristics, policy violations, weather information 
assessment, perception of display information, training, accident analysis, and associated 
decision-making. 
Significance of the Study 
The Part 91, GA VFR-into-IMC events have been a part of accident and fatality 
statistics for over 50 years and identified as a continuing challenge by the most recent 
(27th) Joseph T. Nall Report (Nall, 2018).  Nall (2018) report findings describe the most 
currently determined statistics on GA aviation accidents in 2015 and found VFR-into-
IMC, or VFR-into-IMC events, caused 21 (20 fatal) weather accidents with a 95% 
fatality rate.  New approaches are needed to help reduce these statistics.  The presence of 
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research-identified, contextual factors in Part 91, GA VFR-into-IMC accidents was 
revealed and resulted in a greater understanding of how contextual factors affect both GA 
pilot decision-making in the cockpit and flight safety.  Awareness of these contextual 
factors in the GA pilot community could help improve risk management in decision-
making through implementation in scenario-based training.  A knowledge of the 
contextual factors in GA pilot actions in the flight environment can improve the 
identification of hazardous behaviors and implementation of alteration techniques for the 
hazardous behaviors during ground and flight training.   
Statement of the Problem 
A very limited number of dated Part 91, GA studies have explored the contextual 
factors contributing to VFR-into-IMC accidents (Goh, & Wiegmann, 2001; Goh, & 
Wiegmann, 2002; McCoy & Mickunas, 2000; O'Hare, & Owen, 2002; Orasanu, & 
Martin, 1998; Orasanu, Martin, & Davison, 1998; Orasanu, Martin, & Davison, 2001; 
Wiegmann, & Goh, 2000; Wiegmann, Goh, & O'Hare, 2002).  The studies have 
identified the presence of contextual factors occurring for this accident type, as well as 
the existence of unsafe pilot behaviors negatively affecting judgment and increasing the 
probability for error.  The lack of a significant number of contextual studies for these 
types of events has created a knowledge gap contributing to a failure to resolve the 
problem of reducing or eliminating the occurrence of these events despite years of 
constant Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and NTSB reported fatality statistics 
(Aviation Data & Stats, 2016; FAA, 2018b; NTSB, 2014; NTSB, 2015; NTSB 2016; 
NTSB, 2017c; NTSB, 2017d; NTSB 2017-2018; NTSB, 2018).  The reporting of FAA 
and NTSB statistics may raise awareness of the existing VFR-into-IMC problem, but 
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without some form of intervention, behavior change is unlikely.  The identified studies 
emphasized the need for additional research, including database research, to improve 
understanding of how context contributes to GA pilot errors in weather-related decision-
making through assessment of currently known contextual factors and identification of 
yet unknown contextual factors. 
Purpose Statement 
The study determined and examined contextual factors in Part 91, GA VFR-into-
IMC accidents.  A focus was placed on identifying research-derived contextual factors 
from the perspective of the Subject Matter Expert (SME) pilot.  The scope of the study 
was from the SME pilot point of view.  Approaching the identification of research-
derived contextual factors from the expert point of view is important and has the main 
advantage of getting the pilot perspective over a more general point of view.  The 
investigation of contextual factors influencing weather-related decision making can assist 
researchers to change the GA flight system in order to increase safety.  More research is 
needed to discover contextual factors contributing to GA VFR-into-IMC accidents so 
hazards can be mitigated, and the number of GA accidents can be greatly reduced.  The 
data analysis technique the researcher utilized included assessment of the relationships 
between the rater-identified contextual factors and factors including pilot age, flight 
experience, weather, flight conditions, time of day, and certification level.  The 
qualitative analysis included a description of how each of the 46 contextual factors is 
manifested within pilot actions described in the NTSB online safety database sample of 
85 GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC AARs from the rater perspective.  Descriptive statistics 
were used to report the rater-identified contextual factors and frequencies in the GA 
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VFR-into-IMC accidents archived in the NTSB safety database.  These statistics were 
also used to report pilot age, flight experience, weather, flight conditions, time of day, 
and certification level for the identified sample.  The quantitative analysis used point 
biserial and phi correlations to determine if there are statistically significant relationships 
between the previously mentioned 46 contextual factors and pilot age, flight experience, 
weather, flight conditions, time of day and certification level.  The quantitative analysis 
also included multiple regression using dummy variables to determine if there are any 
significant effects from the 46 contextual factors on crash distance from departure and 
crash distance from the planned destination. 
Research Questions 
The contextual factors related to Part 91, GA pilot intentions and behavior 
resulting in VFR-into-IMC accidents were explored.  The specific research questions for 
this exploratory study are as follows: 
1. What contextual factors contribute to Part 91, GA pilot VFR-into-IMC 
accidents in the reviewed NTSB AARs? 
2. What is the frequency of occurrence for the contextual factors in Part 91, 
GA pilot VFR into-IMC accidents in the reviewed NTSB AARs? 
3. How are the contextual factors manifested in Part 91, GA pilot VFR-into-
IMC accidents in the reviewed NTSB AARs? 
Delimitations 
Research-identified contextual factors exhibited during United States aviation 
accidents for Part 91, GA VFR-into-IMC operations were the focus of the current 
research.  VFR-into-IMC transpires when GA pilots, flying in accordance with VFR, fly 
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into IMC.  VFR-into-IMC can be either intentional or unintentional.  A list of 46 
contextual factors was derived from an exhaustive literature search.  The contextual 
factors chosen were identified by recognized experts in Part 91, GA pilot VFR into-IMC 
accidents.  Specific search criteria were used to focus on only these types of accidents.  
The entire NTSB database was queried using specific coding identifying this accident 
type in the complete dataset.  The specific codes used to filter out only these accidents 
included Code 401 for VFR encounter with IMC from 2008 to 2014 and Code 24015 for 
pre-2008 accidents for VFR encounter with IMC in the old NTSB coding schema.  The 
factual reports from the NTSB to explore only Part 91, GA pilot-related accidents were 
utilized.  All other accident groups were excluded from the analysis.  This research 
utilized Part 91, GA VFR-into-IMC aviation accidents from this dataset occurring in the 
United States during a specific timeframe.  The selected accidents were determined by 
NTSB investigators as being attributed to pilot error resulting in VFR-into-IMC accidents 
occurring during the 1991 to 2014 timeframe.  This specific timeframe was selected as 
these reports were completed with NTSB investigator’s final probable cause 
determinations given.  The identified timeframe was selected because the NTSB began 
including investigator-determined probable causes in the AARs on January 1, 1991.  The 
identified timeframe stopped at December 31, 2014, because the researcher was informed 
by NTSB personnel the investigative process can take five or more years.  The accidents 
occurring from January 1, 2015, to the present may not be completed and may not yet 
include NTSB investigator’s final probable cause determinations.  Therefore, accidents 
occurring during this timeframe were not selected for use in the study.   
8 
 
Limitations and Assumptions 
A limitation of the study was the 46 research-derived contextual factors were 
obtained from only a few out-of-date GA Part 91 studies assessing these factors 
contributing to VFR-into-IMC accidents (Goh, & Wiegmann, 2001; Goh, & Wiegmann, 
2002; McCoy & Mickunas, 2000; O'Hare, & Owen, 2002; Orasanu, & Martin, 1998; 
Orasanu, Martin, & Davison, 1998; Orasanu, Martin, & Davison, 2001; Wiegmann, & 
Goh, 2000; Wiegmann, Goh, & O'Hare, 2002).  The findings in the dated studies might 
overlap somewhat with the present research.  It is possible the dated studies also looked 
for the presence of the identified contextual factors in a limited number of the same 
accidents selected for the study between 1998 and 2002, as the current research selected 
specific accidents between January 1, 1991, and December 31, 2014.  However, it is not 
possible to determine if any of the same accidents were assessed in the 1998 and 2002 
timeframe, as the specific datasets were not identified by the researchers in their 
respective journal articles. 
The researcher assumed the reviewed research articles chosen to provide the 46 
contextual factors were valid in their assessments since the studies were based on what 
these authors wrote, each recognized as an SME in the field.  The researcher assumed the 
raters understood the contextual factors, and their backgrounds were representatives of 
those of the pilots involved in the AARs, validating their judgements.  It was assumed the 
AAR narratives were accurate.    
The contextual factors taken from the identified studies were assumed to be 
mutually exclusive.  However, it is possible there was overlap considering these factors 
were taken from a relatively small set of research articles.  Plan Continuation Error (PCE) 
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could, for instance, overlap with Goal Conflicts.  The problem was resolved by 
identifying the overlapping contextual factors and counting the overlap for each 
applicable factor.  The raters were informed of this possibility and instructed the 
contextual factors could overlap and to identify all applicable factors in each AAR.  No 
overlapping contextual factors were reported by the raters.  It was also assumed the 
sample of 85 selected AARs was representative of the GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC 
population of interest cases in the United States, as these cases were used to make some 
generalizations about this accident type. 
The raters have many years of flight experience and associated knowledge related 
to adverse weather conditions, including VFR-into-IMC.  This level of subject matter 
expertise could potentially be a limitation of the study and may bias the rater assessment 
of pilot decision-making behavior (expert versus novice), as it could be challenging for 
the rater to set aside expertise and assume the role of the deceased GA pilot.  This 
situation could make it difficult for the raters to determine the applicability of the 
identified contextual factors in the 85 NTSB AAR sample.  In order to minimize the 
potential of this type of SME bias affecting the validity of the results, multiple expert 
raters were used to identify the presence of the 46 contextual factors in the sample.  The 
results for all expert raters were reviewed by the researcher to determine if the 
identification of contextual factors between the raters was reasonable.  It was assumed the 
use of the provided 46 research-identified contextual factor definitions mitigated any bias 
resulting from prior exposures (familiarity) to the accident types.  The researcher 
provided instruction, testing, and an inter-rater reliability assessment to reduce the 
potential for this bias.   
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Another assumption of the study was the choice made by the rater was not 
influenced by stress and/or anxiety, as would have likely been the case with the GA pilots 
in the AARs.  The stress factor could account for some differences in the decisions 
between raters and the pilots in the AARs.  The replication of the exact scenarios 
experienced by the deceased GA pilots for the raters was not possible and would be 
considered unethical research to expose the raters to the same stress and/or anxiety and 
would not be approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB).  The researcher was 
therefore reliant on the subject matter expertise of the raters.   
The 23-year period selected between 1991 and 2014 for the study could create 
confounding variables related to changes in safety regulations and/or standards and 
technology.  The use of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
defined climate regions was used by the researcher to reduce the adverse effects of the 
outside influence of confounding variables on the phi and point biserial correlations 
(NOAA, 2018).  The sample of 85 NTSB AARs for the main study was selected based on 
these NOAA defined climate regions.  The stratification method was used to break down 
the data set into a manageable number of subsets, or strata, corresponding to the levels of 
the potential confounding variables among age, flight experience, weather, flight 
conditions, time of day, and certification level.  A comparison was made of the overall 
cross-tabulations for the associations between exposures and outcomes.  A 2 x 2 table for 
specific NOAA defined climate regions and percentage of VFR-into-IMC accidents was 
compared among stratum-specific age, flight experience, weather, flight conditions, time 
of day, and certification level cross-tabulations to determine whether these factors 
introduce confounder variables in the analysis.  It was determined the stratum-specific 
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associations did not deviate markedly from the overall association.  Therefore, age, flight 
experience, weather, flight conditions, time of day, and certification level did not 
introduce confounder variables into the point biserial and phi correlation analyses.   
 
Definitions of Terms 
14 CFR Part 91 The regulations defining the operation of 
small non-commercial aircraft within the 
United States (FAA, 2018a). 
Accident  “An occurrence associated with the 
operation of an aircraft that takes place 
between the time any person boards the    
aircraft with the intention of flight and all 
such persons have disembarked, and in 
which any person suffers death or serious 
injury, or in which the aircraft receives 
substantial damage” (e-CFR, 2018a, p. 1). 
aircraft_key  The basic NTSB Aviation Accident Incident 
Database Architecture with Key Fields 
diagram “. . . shows the logical relationships 
among data elements in the NTSB Aviation 
Accident/Incident Database.  At its highest 
level, the database is organized around 
EVENTS (i.e., accidents or incidents). 
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Associated with events are date, location, 
weather, etc.  Because an EVENT may 
involve multiple AIRCRAFT (as would be 
the case in collisions), the AIRCRAFT table 
is logically structured under the EVENTS 
table” (NTSB, n.d.-b., p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-c, p. 
1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1).  Associated with 
aircraft is the aircraft_key (aircraft key). 
AKey  The basic NTSB Aviation Accident Incident 
Database Architecture with Key Fields 
diagram “. . . shows the logical relationships 
among data elements in the NTSB Aviation 
Accident/Incident Database.  At its highest 
level, the database is organized around 
EVENTS (i.e., accidents or incidents). 
Associated with events are date, location, 
weather, etc.  Because an EVENT may 
involve multiple AIRCRAFT (as would be 
the case in collisions), the AIRCRAFT table 
is logically structured under the EVENTS 
table” (NTSB, n.d.-b., p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-c, p. 
1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1).  Associated with 
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aircraft are the aircraft_key (aircraft key) 
and AKey (aircraft key). 
Controlled Flight into Terrain “An accident whereby an airworthy aircraft, 
under pilot control, inadvertently flies into 
terrain, an obstacle, or water” (FAA, 2016, 
p. G-2). 
Change blindness “… when human observers fail to perceive 
changes in their field of view, like when 
new objects appear in an image or when 
objects change color and/or shape.  This 
phenomenon is particularly strong during 
multitasking situations, such as those 
experienced during single pilot operations” 
(Ahlstrom, et al., 2015, p. 1). 
Contextual Factors The degrees of challenge, uncertainty, 
predictability of outcome, time pressure, 
threat, emotionality, and situational 
understanding in classifying decisions 
(Boyes, & Potter, 2015). 
DAWN  The basic NTSB Aviation Accident Incident 
Database Architecture with Key Fields 
diagram “. . . shows the logical relationships 
among data elements in the NTSB Aviation 
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Accident/Incident Database.  At its highest 
level, the database is organized around 
EVENTS (i.e., accidents or incidents). 
Associated with events are date, location, 
weather, etc.” (NTSB, n.d.-b., p. 1; NTSB, 
n.d.-c, p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1).  Associated 
events are light_cond (light condition) and 
DAWN (dawn). 
DAYL  The basic NTSB Aviation Accident Incident 
Database Architecture with Key Fields 
diagram “. . . shows the logical relationships 
among data elements in the NTSB Aviation 
Accident/Incident Database.  At its highest 
level, the database is organized around 
EVENTS (i.e., accidents or incidents). 
Associated with events are date, location, 
weather, etc.” (NTSB, n.d.-b., p. 1; NTSB, 
n.d.-c, p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1).  Associated 
events are light_cond (light condition) and 
DAYL (daylight). 
Distance to Diversion The distance flown by the GA pilot until a 
specific point and time the weather began to 
deteriorate.  “. . . pilots who frame diverting 
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from the planned flight as a loss (e.g., loss of 
time, money, and effort) will tend to 
continue with the flight, whereas those who 
frame the diversion as a gain (e.g., in 
personal safety) will tend to divert” 
(Wiegmann, Goh, & O'Hare, 2002, p. 190). 
DUSK  The basic NTSB Aviation Accident Incident 
Database Architecture with Key Fields 
diagram “. . . shows the logical relationships 
among data elements in the NTSB Aviation 
Accident/Incident Database.  At its highest 
level, the database is organized around 
EVENTS (i.e., accidents or incidents). 
Associated with events are date, location, 
weather, etc.” (NTSB, n.d.-b., p. 1; NTSB, 
n.d.-c, p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1).  Associated 
events are light_cond (light condition) and 
DUSK (dusk). 
ev_date  “In the NTSB database, an event is 
classified as an accident or an incident. 
“Aircraft accident" means an occurrence 
associated with the operation of an aircraft 
which takes place between the time any 
16 
 
person boards the aircraft with the intention 
of flight and all such persons have 
disembarked, and in which any person 
suffers death or serious injury, or in which 
the aircraft receives substantial damage.  
  The NTSB defines "Incident" to mean an 
occurrence other than an accident, 
associated with the operation of an aircraft, 
which affects or could affect the safety of 
operations” (FAA, n.d.-a, p. 1).  “At its 
highest level, the database is organized 
around EVENTS (i.e., accidents or 
incidents).  Associated with events are date, 
location, weather, etc.” (NTSB, n.d.-b., p. 1; 
NTSB, n.d.-c, p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1).  
Also associated with events is the ev_date 
(event date). 
Event  “In the NTSB database, an event is 
classified as an accident or an incident. 
“Aircraft accident" means an occurrence 
associated with the operation of an aircraft 
which takes place between the time any 
person boards the aircraft with the intention 
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of flight and all such persons have 
disembarked, and in which any person 
suffers death or serious injury, or in which 
the aircraft receives substantial damage.  
The NTSB defines "Incident" to mean an 
occurrence other than an accident, 
associated with the operation of an aircraft, 
which affects or could affect the safety of 
operations” (FAA, n.d.-a, p. 1).  “At its 
highest level, the database is organized 
around EVENTS (i.e., accidents or 
incidents).  Associated with events are date, 
location, weather, etc.” (NTSB, n.d.-b., p. 1; 
NTSB, n.d.-c, p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1).  
EventID  The EVENTID (event identification) is a 
“Unique identification for each event; each 
event is assigned a unique 14-character 
alphanumeric code in the database.  This 
code, used in conjunction with other primary 
keys (if applicable), are used to reference all 
database records” (NTSB, n.d.-a, p. 1; 
NTSB, n.d.-b, p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-c, p. 1; 
NTSB, n.d.-d, p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1). 
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Events_Sequence The basic NTSB Aviation Accident Incident 
Database Architecture with Key Fields 
diagram “. . . shows the logical relationships 
among data elements in the NTSB Aviation 
Accident/Incident Database” (NTSB, n.d.-b., 
p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-c, p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1).  
The Events Sequence is associated with 
ev_id (event identification), Aircraft_Key 
(aircraft key), Occurrence_No (occurrence 
number), Occurrence_Code (occurrence 
code), Occurrence_Description (occurrence 
description), phase_no (phase number), 
eventsoe_no (event operating experience 
number), Defining_ev (defining event), 
lchg_date (change date), and lchg_userid 
(change user identification). 
ev_id  “Unique Identification for Each Event; Each 
event is assigned a unique 14-character 
alphanumeric code in the database.  This 
code, used in conjunction with other primary 
keys (if applicable), are used to reference all 
database records” (NTSB, n.d.-a, p. 1; 
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NTSB, n.d.-b, p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-c, p. 1; 
NTSB, n.d.-d, p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1). 
ev_state  The basic NTSB Aviation Accident Incident 
Database Architecture with Key Fields 
diagram “. . . shows the logical relationships 
among data elements in the NTSB Aviation 
Accident/Incident Database.  At its highest 
level, the database is organized around 
EVENTS (i.e., accidents or incidents). 
Associated with events are date, location, 
weather, etc.” (NTSB, n.d.-b., p. 1; NTSB, 
n.d.-c, p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1).  Events is 
also associated with ev_id (event 
identification) and ev_state (event state). 
ev_type  The basic NTSB Aviation Accident Incident 
Database Architecture with Key Fields 
diagram “. . . shows the logical relationships 
among data elements in the NTSB Aviation 
Accident/Incident Database.  At its highest 
level, the database is organized around 
EVENTS (i.e., accidents or incidents). 
Associated with events are date, location, 
weather, etc.” (NTSB, n.d.-b., p. 1; NTSB, 
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n.d.-c, p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1).  Events is 
also associated with ev_id (event 
identification) and ev_type (event type). 
Experience  “A pilot’s total flight hours, total solo hours, 
actual IFR hours, total VFR cross-country 
hours, and flight hours in the last 30 and 90 
days” (Wiegmann, Goh, & O'Hare, 2002, p. 
194). 
far_part  The basic NTSB Aviation Accident Incident 
Database Architecture with Key Fields 
diagram “. . . shows the logical relationships 
among data elements in the NTSB Aviation 
Accident/Incident Database.  At its highest 
level, the database is organized around 
EVENTS (i.e., accidents or incidents). 
Associated with events are date, location, 
weather, etc.  Because an EVENT may 
involve multiple AIRCRAFT (as would be 
the case in collisions), the AIRCRAFT table 
is logically structured under the EVENTS 
table” (NTSB, n.d.-b., p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-c, p. 
1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1).  Associated with 
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aircraft is the far_part (Federal Aviation 
Regulation part). 
FATL   The basic NTSB Aviation Accident Incident 
Database Architecture with Key Fields 
diagram “. . . shows the logical relationships 
among data elements in the NTSB Aviation 
Accident/Incident Database (NTSB, n.d.-b., 
p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-c, p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1).  
Associated with injury are injury_level 
(injury level) and FATL (fatal). 
Federal Aviation Administration “An agency of the United States Department 
of Transportation with authority to regulate 
and oversee all aspects of civil aviation in 
the United States” (FAA, 2016, p. G-2). 
General Aviation “All flights other than military and 
scheduled airline flights, both private and 
commercial” (FAA, 2016, p. G-2). 
Human behavior “The product of factors that cause people to 
act in predictable ways” (FAA, 2016, p. G-
3). 
injury_level  The basic NTSB Aviation Accident Incident 
Database Architecture with Key Fields 
diagram “. . . shows the logical relationships 
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among data elements in the NTSB Aviation 
Accident/Incident Database (NTSB, n.d.-b., 
p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-c, p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1).  
Associated with injury is the injury_level 
(injury level). 
Instrument Flight Rules “Rules and regulations established by the 
Federal Aviation Administration to govern 
flight under conditions in which flight by 
outside visual reference is not safe.  IFR 
flight depends upon flying by reference to 
instruments in the flight deck, and 
navigation is accomplished by reference to 
electronic signals” (FAA, 2016, p. G-3). 
Instrument Meteorological Conditions The weather conditions given in relation to 
visibility, distance from clouds, and ceiling 
less than the minimums specified for visual 
meteorological conditions that require 
operations to be conducted under IFR (FAA, 
2016, p. G-3). 
light_cond  The basic NTSB Aviation Accident Incident 
Database Architecture with Key Fields 
diagram “. . . shows the logical relationships 
among data elements in the NTSB Aviation 
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Accident/Incident Database.  At its highest 
level, the database is organized around 
EVENTS (i.e., accidents or incidents). 
Associated with events are date, location, 
weather, etc.” (NTSB, n.d.-b., p. 1; NTSB, 
n.d.-c, p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1).  Associated 
with events is light_cond (light condition). 
NBRT  The basic NTSB Aviation Accident Incident 
Database Architecture with Key Fields 
diagram “. . . shows the logical relationships 
among data elements in the NTSB Aviation 
Accident/Incident Database.  At its highest 
level, the database is organized around 
EVENTS (i.e., accidents or incidents). 
Associated with events are date, location, 
weather, etc.” (NTSB, n.d.-b., p. 1; NTSB, 
n.d.-c, p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1).  Associated 
with events are light_cond (light condition) 
and NBRT (bright night). 
NDRK  The basic NTSB Aviation Accident Incident 
Database Architecture with Key Fields 
diagram “. . . shows the logical relationships 
among data elements in the NTSB Aviation 
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Accident/Incident Database.  At its highest 
level, the database is organized around 
EVENTS (i.e., accidents or incidents). 
Associated with events are date, location, 
weather, etc.” (NTSB, n.d.-b., p. 1; NTSB, 
n.d.-c, p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1).  Associated 
with events are light_cond (light condition) 
and NDRK (dark night). 
ntsb_no  The basic NTSB Aviation Accident Incident 
Database Architecture with Key Fields 
diagram “. . . shows the logical relationships 
among data elements in the NTSB Aviation 
Accident/Incident Database.  At its highest 
level, the database is organized around 
EVENTS (i.e., accidents or incidents). 
Associated with events are date, location, 
weather, etc.  Because an EVENT may 
involve multiple AIRCRAFT (as would be 
the case in collisions), the AIRCRAFT table 
is logically structured under the EVENTS 
table” (NTSB, n.d.-b., p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-c, p. 
1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1).  Associated with 
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events and aircraft is the ntsb_no (NTSB 
number). 
Pilot error  “An accident in which an action or decision 
made by the pilot was the cause or a 
contributing factor that led to the accident” 
(FAA, 2016, p. G-4). 
seq_of_events  The basic NTSB Aviation Accident Incident 
Database Architecture with Key Fields 
diagram “. . . shows the logical relationships 
among data elements in the NTSB Aviation 
Accident/Incident Database.  At its highest 
level, the database is organized around 
EVENTS (i.e., accidents or incidents). 
Associated with events are date, location, 
weather, etc.  Because an EVENT may 
involve multiple AIRCRAFT (as would be 
the case in collisions), the AIRCRAFT table 
is logically structured under the EVENTS 
table” (NTSB, n.d.-b., p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-c, p. 
1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1).  Associated with 
events, aircraft, and occurrences is the 
seq_of_events (sequence of events). 
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Situational Awareness “Knowledge of where the aircraft is in 
regard to location, air traffic control, 
weather, regulations, aircraft status, and 
other factors that may affect the flight” 
(FAA, 2016, p. G-4). 
subj_code  The basic NTSB Aviation Accident Incident 
Database Architecture with Key Fields 
diagram “. . . shows the logical relationships 
among data elements in the NTSB Aviation 
Accident/Incident Database.  At its highest 
level, the database is organized around 
EVENTS (i.e., accidents or incidents). 
Associated with events are date, location, 
weather, etc.  Because an EVENT may 
involve multiple AIRCRAFT (as would be 
the case in collisions), the AIRCRAFT table 
is logically structured under the EVENTS 
table” (NTSB, n.d.-b., p. 1; NTSB, n.d.-c, p. 
1; NTSB, n.d.-e, p. 1).  Associated with the 
seq_of_events (sequence of events) is the 
subj_code (subject code). 
Title 14 CFR  “Includes what was formerly known as the 
Federal Aviation Regulations governing the 
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operation of aircraft, airways, and airmen” 
(FAA, 2016, p. G-5). 
Visual Flight Rules “Flight rules adopted by the FAA governing 
aircraft flight using visual references.  VFR 
operations specify the amount of ceiling and 
visibility the pilot must have in order to 
operate according to these rules.  When the 
weather conditions are such that the pilot 
cannot operate according to VFR, he or she 
must use instrument flight rules (IFR)” 
(FAA, 2016, p. G-5). 
Visual Meteorological Conditions Meteorological conditions expressed in terms 
of visibility, cloud distance, and ceiling 
meeting or exceeding the minimums 
specified for VFR (FAA, 2016, p. G-5). 
 
 
List of Acronyms 
 
AAR  Aviation Accident Report 
AFSS  Automated Flight Service Station 
AGL  Above ground level 
AIRMET  Airmen’s Meteorological Information 
AMSL  Above mean sea level 
ANOVA  Analysis of variance 
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AOG  Acts of God 
ATC  Air Traffic Control 
ATP  Air transport pilot 
BFR  Biennial flight review 
CAMI  Civil Aerospace Medical Institute 
CFI   Certified flight instructor 
CFIT  Controlled flight into terrain 
CFR    Code of Federal Regulations 
DOT    Department of Transportation 
DUATS  Direct User Access Terminal Service 
ERAU   Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
FAA    Federal Aviation Administration 
FBO   Fixed Base Operator 
FSS   Flight service station 
GA    General aviation 
GMN   Gorman 
GPS   Global Positioning System 
GWIS    Graphical Weather Information System 
HITS    Highway in the sky 
HIWAS  Hazardous In-Flight Weather Advisory Service 
HSV   High-speed videoendoscopic 
IBM   International Business Machines 
IFR    Instrument flight rules 
29 
 
IFV   In-flight volitional 
IMC    Instrument meteorological conditions 
IRB   Institutional Review Board 
METAR   Meteorological Aerodrome Report 
MIS   Meteorological Impact Statement 
NEXRAD   Next-Generation Radar 
NDM   Naturalistic decision-making 
NOAA   National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
NTSB    National Transportation Safety Board 
PABAK   Prevalence Adjusted Bias Adjusted Kappa 
Part 91    14 CFR Part 91 General Operating and Flight Rules 
PCE    Plan continuation error 
PIC   Pilot in command 
SA    Situational awareness 
SBT    Situational based training 
SPSS   Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
SVS    Synthetic Vision System 
TAF   Terminal Aerodrome Forecast 
VALI   Voice-Vibratory Assessment with Laryngeal Imaging 
VFR    Visual flight rules 
VIF  Variance inflation factor 
VMC   Visual meteorological conditions 
VOR  Very high frequency omni-directional range 
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REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
Continued flight from VFR-into-IMC has claimed the highest number of fatalities 
every year in GA accidents (Nall, 2018).  According to the most recent Nall (2018) 
report, GA VFR-into-IMC events caused 21 (20 fatal) weather accidents in 2015.  The 
statistics for 2015 also reported a 95% fatality rate for this accident type.  Baron (2011) 
has also emphasized the greatest number of GA accidents with fatalities occurred because 
of VFR-into-IMC events.  Despite these grim statistics, industry has been lacking in 
relevant, recent studies about this specific type of weather accident.  Some factors 
believed to be contributory to VFR-into-IMC flights were discovered roughly two 
decades ago.  There have been very few, if any, studies conducted after this time.  VFR-
into-IMC fatality statistics have remained steady.  Orasanu and Martin (1998) and 
Orasanu, Martin, and Davison (2001) have stated Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM), 
or the context in which pilots make their decisions, must be better understood to learn 
how to reduce GA VFR-into-IMC accidents.   
VFR-into-IMC occurs when GA pilots, flying in accordance with VFR, fly into 
IMC.  VFR-into-IMC can be either intentional or unintentional.  Accidents resulting from 
such occurrences have taken place after pilots fly under controlled flight into terrain 
(CFIT), or they have found themselves in unrecoverable low altitudes after experiencing 
spatial disorientation (Wilson & Sloan, 2003).  Studies investigating the VFR-into-IMC 
phenomenon in GA Part 91, to this point, have focused on the pilot, the aircraft, and the 
flight environment.  The intention of this research has been to gain better understanding 
of these contextual factors and accident type to potentially reduce related fatalities.  The 
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most recent research, while somewhat dated, has addressed the aforementioned areas.  
However, the results of these studies showed more research is needed, including database 
research, to understand the context of pilot actions resulting in VFR-into-IMC accidents.  
There are gaps in understanding of decision-making, pilot characteristics, policy 
violations, weather information assessment, training, and contextual factors in GA 
weather and non-weather accidents identified in the literature.   
Decision-Making 
Simulation has been used to investigate the influence of motivation and 
investment on the length of time pilots fly into degraded weather.  A study conducted by 
Saxton (2008) examined the influence financial motivation and time investment had on 
the length of time a pilot would fly into degraded weather conditions.  Sunk cost refers to 
the financial aspects of what might motivate pilots to take greater risks by continuing 
farther into adverse weather, when IMC was encountered later into a flight.  Saxton’s 
(2008) study found sunk cost to be a valid concept, as the participants of the study who 
were financially motivated did, in fact, continue longer into poor weather conditions than 
the participants who were not financially motivated and came upon hazardous weather 
earlier in the flight.  Saxton (2008) recognized the results of the research were in support 
of both the situation assessment hypothesis and cognitive anchoring, suggesting the ways 
pilots process information before flight has an impact on decisions during flight.  It might 
be argued this is congruent with an accelerating decision-making function, where a pilot 
making a decision is more willing to divert earlier in the flight and less likely as the flight 
progresses.  The proposed accelerating decision-making function would be a decision-
making process involving more than linear decision making where the GA pilot carries 
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the decision through to the end without assessing circumstances as they arise, and less 
than adjusting decisions accordingly, in a way that helps to best achieve the desired goal, 
a process taking place in circular decision-making (Balog, 2013; Balog 2016). 
Similar to sunk cost, based on a study by Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare (2002), it 
seems, generally speaking, when adverse weather is encountered later in flights, pilots are 
more likely to continue, as they might be more optimistic about the possibility of positive 
outcomes than they are when they encounter poor weather early in flights.  The 
Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare (2002) study used simulation to expose different groups of 
pilots to adverse weather early and late into flights.  The results were consistent with 
more optimism during poor weather encounters occurring later into flights, and less 
optimism when hazardous weather was present earlier in flights.  
In addition to identifying contributory factors, simulation has also been used to 
improve pilot decision-making in IMC situations.  Johnson and Wiegmann (2015) 
endeavored to allow pilots the opportunity to develop decision-making experience and 
improve their skills in navigating adverse weather conditions.  The researchers used 
weather simulation to re-create historical weather events, helping pilots to find 
opportunities for better, weather-related training.  The study used 16 VFR and 16 
instrument-rated pilots in a simulation of a VFR cross-country flight in marginal weather 
and IMC.  They found the only statistically significant difference was for the group of 
pilots who had previous experience with actual instrument weather were safer and more 
likely to use in-cockpit weather information during flight, allowing them to detect and 
avoid instrument weather. 
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Johnson, Wiegmann, and Wickens (2006) also used a simulation to study 12 
pilots in a VFR cross-country flight with worsening weather.  The pilots used either 
control/standard instruments, synthetic vision system (SVS), or SVS highway-in-the-sky 
(HITS)/electronic with a moving map display depicting weather.  Somewhat contrary to 
the Johnson and Wiegmann (2015) research, the participants in the Johnson, Wiegmann 
and Wickens (2006) study, who were receiving in-cockpit weather information, did not 
avoid hazardous weather conditions.  In fact, 60% of both SVS conditions breached the 
clouds and continued into conditions with zero visibility.  The researchers noted there 
was head-down scanning, accounting for the fact the participants did not notice 
worsening weather conditions.  The moving weather map did not seem to make a 
difference in pilot attentional tunneling (focusing disproportionate attention or time on 
one task or risk to the disadvantage of awareness of other risks).  It might also be the case 
the pilots did not trust the timeliness of the weather information, as it was not from 
Hazardous In-Flight Weather Advisory Service (HIWAS) or Flight Watch. 
Researchers have used simulation to test the ways new technology might enhance 
or diminish pilot decision-making and behavior.  Ahlstrom, Ohneiser, and Caddigan 
(2016) assessed GA pilot use of portable weather applications.  Participants were 
separated into a control group and an experimental group.  The experimental group flew a 
simulated flight in VMC with a portable weather device, a receiver allowing in-flight 
access to subscribed weather products viewable on the device.  It was found the weather 
device did improve situational awareness (SA), weather related decision-making in 
diverting or continuing to the planned destination, and distances in route deviation from 
the hazardous weather.  Pilots in both groups still flew less than 20 statute miles from 
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hazardous weather.  However, those in the experimental group maintained greater 
distances than those in the control group.  While newer technologies can improve cockpit 
performance, proper design can make the difference between helping and hindering 
pilots.  Beringer and Ball (2004) used simulation to study the effects of Next-Generation 
Radar (NEXRAD) on pilot direct weather viewing, severity judgments, and willingness 
to continue VFR-into-IMC flight.  The delay between the occurrence of the actual 
weather and when the radar image is displayed to the pilot in the cockpit can be 
misleading due to the lag in obtaining the current weather conditions.  The researchers 
programmed heavy precipitation in the simulated flight, requiring participants to utilize 
the data and display of NEXRAD to make the decision to divert or continue.  It was 
found pilots spent more time viewing the higher-resolution images, causing them to defer 
their decisions longer than the other groups in the study.  The findings support the idea 
that higher-resolution images might encourage pilots to continue to fly in hazardous 
weather based on posttest NEXRAD image judgements.  No potential countermeasures 
were discussed by the researchers.  Fortunately, it was possible to conduct such a study in 
the safety of a simulated environment. 
Linear versus circular decision-making.  Pilots can potentially commit to one 
decision without reevaluation after actions have been implemented using linear decision 
making.  Current decision-making theory identifies two processes: circular decision-
making and linear decision-making.  Circular decision-making is comprised of 
assessment, decision, and consolidation; consolidation being the point at which a person 
evaluates the direction of implementation to determine if the action is working to achieve 
the goal, and if not, corrections are made.  Linear decision-making encompasses only 
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assessment and decision.  Once the decision is made, the action is implemented without 
reevaluation.  If the decision was poor, the goal will not be met, and there is no 
opportunity to make corrections.  Circular decision-making, then, is considered to be 
superior to linear decision-making, especially when stakes are high (Bell & Mauro, 
2000). 
In an aviation environment, the potential exists for the necessity of the use of 
linear, rather than circular, decision-making.  Research has documented the tendency of 
the novice pilot to utilize linear decision-making and the expert pilot utilization of 
circular decision-making (Adams & Ericsson, 1992; Dogusoy-Taylan & Cagiltay, 2014; 
Schriver, Morrow, Wickens, & Talleur, 2008).  During the point at which a pilot chooses 
to continue into questionable weather conditions, circumstances including invested time, 
money, and energy; passenger pressure; and get-there-itis may influence a pilot to 
continue, rather than divert.  If the decision is made too late, there may not be time to 
reevaluate and make corrections.  Once a pilot is flying in poor weather, if an emergency 
arises, depending on the time available to decide, the pilot might again be faced with only 
one option: to choose a direction and commit to it.  Without time for 
consolidation/evaluation, if the linear decision made was not adequate, an accident or 
incident might result.  
Decision-making and judgement.  Simulation studies have been used to explore 
additional aspects of pilot decision-making regarding VFR-into-IMC events.  Goh and 
Wiegmann (2001) used a cross-country simulation to determine if participants chose to 
continue or to divert from VFR-into-IMC, examining pilot situation assessment, risk 
perception, and motivation.  Their study found the aspects distinguishing the two groups 
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were a matter of accuracy of visibility estimates, appraisal of personal skill, judgment, 
and the frequency a given pilot was accustomed to participating in risky behavior.  Pilots 
who overestimated personal abilities and inaccurately diagnosed visibility were more 
likely to continue into adverse weather.  
Decision-making in flight does not begin the moment bad weather is encountered.  
Walmsley and Gilbey (2016) explained anchoring (information processed before flight 
affecting decision-making while in flight), adjustment, confirmation, and outcome could 
contribute to the development of cognitive biases.  It was further clarified by the 
researcher, cognitive biases could potentially affect pilot weather-related decision-
making in negative ways.  The study used simulation to assess the possibility of 
anchoring, adjustment, confirmation, and outcome leading to cognitive biases, potentially 
negatively affecting pilot weather-related decision-making.  The researchers conducted 
three separate studies and found pilot anchoring occurred.  Specifically, researchers 
found in the first study the presence of anchoring and adjustment when weather reports 
were reviewed by the pilot before the flight and discovered this affected how weather 
cues were interpreted during the flight.  In the second study, there was no evidence found 
pilots favored disconfirmatory evidence over confirmatory evidence in the case of 
environmental cues and confirmation when making the decision to continue the flight.  In 
the third study, researchers discovered pilots more heavily weighted other pilots’ 
decisions to continue into poor weather when their outcomes were successful than when 
they experienced negative outcomes.  In this part of the study, researchers provided flight 
scenarios including current weather, area forecast, and outcome information from third-
party flights to pilot study participants.  Pilot participants in the negative outcome 
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condition read a scenario ending where the pilot flew into a cloud resulting in aircraft loss 
of control and crashing with serious injuries.  The pilot participants in the positive 
outcome condition read a scenario ending where the pilot landed safely at the intended 
destination.  The pilot participants in the control group read the common information 
with no additional ending.  The pilot participants were then asked to rate dimensions 
based on the scenarios they had read using a nine-point scale, including if the pilot study 
participants would conduct the same third-party flight given in the researcher-presented 
outcome scenarios.  The researchers discovered pilots interpreted the decisions of pilots 
who flew into deteriorating weather conditions more favorably when the outcome was 
positive than when the outcome was negative.  The researchers suggested using the three 
cognitive heuristics, anchoring and adjustment, confirmation, and outcome, may lead to 
pilots continuing the flight into deteriorating weather conditions when it would have been 
safer to divert to an alternate location or return to the departure point.   
Flight simulation and pilot decision-making behavior.  In order to learn more 
about pilot behavior, Wiegmann, Goh, and O'Hare (2002) conducted research into GA 
VFR-into-IMC accidents, focusing on flight time, distance, diversion, VFR-into-IMC, 
experience, and situation assessment contextual factors.  The researchers identified VFR-
into-IMC as a major safety hazard in GA.  The study utilized a cross-country flight 
simulation to assess GA pilot decision-making to continue or divert from IMC during a 
VFR flight.  GA pilots were given simulation scenarios to fly where they encountered 
IMC either early or later into the flight.  The researchers documented the amount of time 
and distance GA pilots flew into the IMC weather before deciding to divert.  The study 
findings identified pilots who encountered the deteriorating weather earlier in the flight 
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flew longer into IMC before diverting and were more optimistic about the weather 
conditions.  The GA pilots who encountered the IMC weather later in the flight flew 
shorter distances into IMC before diverting and were not optimistic about the weather 
conditions.  It was discovered the time and distance GA pilots flew into the weather 
before deciding to divert were negatively correlated with previous flight experience.  The 
findings of the study suggested VFR flight into IMC may be caused, in part, by poor 
situation assessment and experience rather than motivational judgment, encouraging risk-
taking behavior as the GA pilot invests more time in the flight.  More research is needed 
to improve understanding of pilot behavior and VFR-into-IMC accidents.  
 Decision error and cognition.  According to Orasanu and Martin (1998), 
Orasanu, Martin, and Davidson (1998), and Orasanu, Martin, and Davison (2001), the 
focus of NDM is to become aware of the ways people, and in this case, pilots, use their 
domain knowledge in their decision-making processes.  The authors have studied 
cognitive and contextual factors in aviation accidents using NDM, with the viewpoint 
decision error may be unavoidable as people with extensive domain knowledge apply 
their understanding while performing tasks.  The researchers conducted their studies with 
the objective of reducing the frequency of GA accidents by gaining a better 
understanding of the factors leading up to the unfortunate outcomes.  The study included 
a broad review of NTSB accidents.  The results found several cognitive and contextual 
factors contributed to GA aviation accidents.  These factors included (1) ambiguity, (2) 
underestimating risk, (3) goal conflicts, and (4) unanticipated consequences (Orasanu, & 
Martin, 1998; Orasanu, Martin, and Davidson (1998); Orasanu, Martin, & Davison, 
2001).   
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NDM and contextual factors.  The consideration of context, or NDM, can be 
used to understand pilots’ actions when investigating accidents (FAA, 2008; Klein, 2008; 
Orasanu, Martin, & Davidson, 2001).  The NDM framework developed as a way of 
assessing how people make decisions and perform cognitively complex functions in 
dynamic, real-world situations involving limited time, uncertainty, high stakes, team and 
organizational constraints, unstable conditions, and varying amounts of experience.  In a 
general sense, NDM describes human intuition as based on large numbers of patterns 
gained through experience, resulting in different forms of implied knowledge.  In 
retrospect, as O’Hare and Owen (2002) clarified, pilot contribution to cross-country VFR 
crashes cannot be explained by flight-time alone.  There are other factors at play, 
ultimately comprising pilot circumstances, including but not limited to over-confidence, 
faulty risk-perception, lack of awareness, flight circumstances leading to risky decisions, 
decision-making, risk assessment, SA, proximity of the goal/planned destination, and 
time already invested in the flight/sunk cost.  Orasanu, Martin, and Davidson (2001) used 
NDM to examine expertise and decision-making within context.  The research topics 
identified in the applicable literature addressed areas related to the pilot, aircraft, and 
flight environment.  Specifically, relevant studies to date have covered contextual factors 
related to decision errors, cognition, historical accident analysis, PCE, flight simulation, 
and pilot behavior.  More research is needed to improve understanding of how NDM and 
context impact VFR-into-IMC accidents.  The results of these studies showed more 
research is needed to understand the context of pilot actions resulting in VFR-into-IMC 
accidents, as there are gaps in understanding between context and decision-making on the 
following factors related to the length of time a pilot would fly into degraded weather 
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conditions: (1) financial motivation, (2) time investment, (3) sunk cost, (4) situation 
assessment, (5) cognitive anchoring, (6) novice and expert use of linear versus circular 
decision-making, (7) when IMC weather is encountered during the flight, (8) use of in-
cockpit weather information during flight, (9) moving weather map and attentional 
tunneling, (10) timeliness of weather information and perceived reputable source, (11) 
use of portable weather device/application and low versus higher-resolution weather 
image, (12) lag in obtaining the current weather conditions, (13) accuracy of visibility 
estimate, (14) appraisal of personal skill, judgment, comfort level participating in risky 
behavior, (15) anchoring (information processed before flight affecting decision-making 
while in flight), and (16) cognitive biases.  
Pilot Characteristics 
Studies utilizing simulation technology have addressed pilot factors likely 
contributing to VFR-into-IMC events.  It was observed passengers are on board in more 
of these types of accidents than any other accidents in GA.  Barron (2011) investigated 
how pressure from passengers might have contributed to pilots’ decisions to continue into 
adverse weather conditions by using passenger social pressure in flight.  The study used 
passenger social pressure in flight to convince pilots to continue or divert from hazardous 
weather.  The study found the pilot participants tended to concede to the pressure of the 
passenger, whether they were positively or negatively motivated to continue into poor 
weather conditions.  At the conclusion of the study, pilot participants were informed of 
the results.  The participating pilots stated they were unaware of passenger influence on 
their decision-making.  The study results found private pilots who were instrument rated 
were more likely to continue farther into IMC than their low time VFR, or high time 
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commercial, and/or Air Transport Pilot (ATP) counterparts, a finding pertaining primarily 
to the pilot’s ratings.   
The Coyne, Baldwin, and Latrorella (2008) study used simulators to assess pilot 
ability to determine ceiling and visibility.  It was found there was no difference between 
the abilities of instrument rated and non-instrument rated pilots to assess ceiling 
accuracy, but when it came to visibility, the non-instrument rated pilots were more 
accurate.  However, all pilots assumed higher ceiling with better visibility.  When 
comparing these two studies, it seems to be the case, while instrument rated pilots are 
more likely to continue into adverse weather, they are, according to Coyne, Baldwin, and 
Latrorella (2008), less proficient in accurately determining true visibility. 
Studies investigating the demographics of GA pilots who encounter VFR-into-
IMC events were limited.  Bazargan and Guzhva (2011) explored whether pilot age and 
experience were factors in VFR-into-IMC occurrences.  The results indicated male pilots 
over 60 years of age with more experience were more likely than other pilots to be 
involved in a fatal accident.  There was no significant pilot gender difference for the 
likelihood of an accident attributed to pilot error.  The explanation for this result was 
given by the researchers as “One plausible explanation for such a result could be older 
pilots typically are more experienced and fly more difficult flights, where a mistake or 
malfunction could have severe consequences” (Bazargan, & Guzhva, 2011, p. 967).  
Huster et al. (2014) completed a study on the medical risks of older pilots.  These 
findings identified in-flight incapacitation of pilots occurring in 0.19-0.45 times/10(6) 
flight hours.  The study results also identified professional pilots older than 60 years 
having an age-depending increase in incapacitation. 
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Training with simulators has been found to be useful when helping VFR pilots 
with anti-disorientation.  Since spatial disorientation following VFR-into-IMC has been 
shown to be a frequent cause of accidents, Tropper, Kallus, and Boucsein (2009) 
evaluated pilot psychophysiological spatial orientation in a moving base simulator.  
Following pilot exposure and training in simulation, the study found the groups with anti-
disorientation training performed better and experienced less psychological distress when 
carrying out complex maneuvers to recover from unusual attitudes.  
Wiggins, Hunter, O’Hare, and Martinussen (2012) studied pilot characteristics of 
deliberate versus inadvertent-VFR-into-IMC events.  For their study, the researchers 
recruited pilots who shared recollections of deliberate and inadvertent-VFR-into-IMC 
encounters.  It was reported 145 of the 251 pilots entered IMC unintentionally during a 
VFR flight, and 93 had continued into IMC intentionally.  Those pilots who were 
instrument-rated who also deliberately entered into hazardous weather were likely to 
have experienced similar conditions in the past, tolerated risk well, reported low anxiety 
during previous encounters, and believed the risks of VFR-into-IMC were low.  More 
research is needed to improve understanding of pilot characteristics related to deliberate 
and inadvertent VFR-into-IMC.  The results of these studies showed more research is 
needed to understand the context of pilot actions resulting in VFR-into-IMC accidents, as 
there are gaps in understanding between context and pilot characteristics on the following 
factors related to the length of time a pilot would fly into degraded weather conditions: 
(1) passenger social pressure, (2) ratings, (3) ceiling and visibility determination versus 
rating, (4) pilot gender, (5) pilot age, (6) pilot flight experience, (7) spatial disorientation, 
and (8) deliberate and inadvertent flight from VFR-into-IMC.  
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Policy Violations   
Jackman’s (2014) study investigated pilot policy violations to assess fatal VFR-
into-IMC accidents in an ex post facto, quantitative analysis.  Violations including flight 
plan, ratings, flight currency, and medical status were reviewed.  The need for training, 
regulatory modifications, or enforcements was explored.  Information between the years 
of 1998 and 2013 for NTSB GA VFR-into-IMC accident data was analyzed using binary 
logistic regression.  The findings revealed flight plan violations and pilot medical status 
violations were not statistically significant predictors of fatality.  It was discovered 
through the results of the binary logistic regression analysis, pilot ratings violations and 
pilot currency violations were statistically significant predictors of fatality (Pilot Ratings 
Violations, Wald statistic =13.824, SE = .050, df = 1, p = .000, OR = .832, 95% CI [.755, 
.917] and Pilot Currency violations, Wald statistic = 15.065, SE = .185, df = 1, OR = 
.488, p = .000, 95% CI [.339, .701].  The Jackman’s (2014) study recommendations 
included not allowing non-instrument rated pilots to fly from VFR-into-IMC, and the 
restricting of instrument rated pilots with inadequate flight time to fly from VFR-into-
IMC.  The study indicated stronger policy enforcement is needed.  However, there are 
difficulties in consistently and reliably detecting such violations.  The results showed 
more research is needed to understand the context of pilot actions resulting in VFR-into-
IMC accidents, as there are gaps in understanding among context, policy violations, and 
on the following factors related to the length of time a pilot would fly into degraded 
weather conditions: (1) flight plan, (2) ratings, (3) flight currency, (4) medical status, and 




Weather Information Assessment 
The most recent literature has found some similarities in the way weather displays 
might be affecting pilots’ assessment of the current weather.  Weather information 
assessment studies reviewed focused on GA pilot risk assessment and decision-making 
leading to VFR-into-IMC accidents.  A study conducted by Ahlstrom et al. (2015) 
investigated weather display symbology and its effects on pilot behavior and decision-
making.  Twenty-four participants, who were instrument rated pilots, were instructed to 
avoid hazardous weather in a simulator.  The researchers manipulated the weather 
displays, altering weather symbols and colors.  It was found pilot behavior was affected 
by the variations in symbols and colors presented on the weather displays, specifically, 
these variations contributed to perceptual asymmetries affecting pilot behavior and 
decision-making.  These pilot perceptual asymmetries in weather display symbols and 
colors could affect GA pilot behavior in the diversion to an alternate or continued VFR-
into-IMC to the planned destination decision.  It was suggested within the study 
development of automated cockpit applications, tracking hazardous weather and warning 
pilots of potential problems may help to mitigate the types of effects different displays 
might have upon pilot decision-making, leading pilots into hazardous terrain.  
Similarly, Ahlstrom et al. (2015) studied effects of weather state-change 
notifications on GA pilots’ behavior, cognitive engagement, and weather situation 
awareness.  According to their results, the participants did not detect symbol changes 
very well when it came to Meteorological Terminal Aviation Routine Weather Report, or 
Meteorological Aerodrome Report (METAR) displays.  This was attributed to the change 
blindness phenomenon.  The change blindness phenomenon has been defined as “… 
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where human observers fail to perceive changes in their field of view, like when new 
objects appear in an image or when objects change color and/or shape.  This phenomenon 
is particularly strong during multitasking situations, such as those experienced during 
single pilot operations” (Ahlstrom et al., 2015, p. 1).  The pilots in the study also flew 
more closely to hazardous weather than what was suggested in the rules, indicating a 
possible effect of the symbol changes on pilot behavior and decision-making.  Rather 
than the automation of weather alerts, it was recommended the optimization of visual 
symbols through weather state-change notifications be used to help pilots discriminate 
among them, reduce cognitive workload, and improve weather situational awareness 
(WSA).     
At the time of their study, Coyne, Baldwin, and Latrorella (2005) mentioned 
VFR-into-IMC activity is responsible for over 10% of GA fatalities every year.  The 
researchers also explored GA pilots’ use of graphical METARS.  Twenty-four 
participants were asked to use a graphical weather information system (GWIS) to make 
estimates regarding visibility and ceiling limits in different simulated weather conditions.  
It was found the GWIS influenced the judgments of the participants; pilots tended to 
overestimate weather conditions.  Coyne, Baldwin, and Latrorella (2005) also explained, 
on average, pilots overestimated visibility when ceilings were higher, and overestimated 
ceilings when visibility was better.  It was suggested by the researchers the interaction of 
ceiling and visibility shows pilots may be inappropriately assessing weather conditions.  
The researchers recommended disseminating information to help some pilots better 
understand VFR-into-IMC.  A recommendation was also given for utilization of decision-
making modeling of the interaction between ceiling and visibility and the design of 
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GWIS technology and GA pilot accurate weather assessment to improve understanding 
of this accident type.   
The studies all found pilots’ decision-making and behaviors were likely affected 
by visual displays.  It is well documented in the aviation community the limitations of 
human perception, particularly visual sensory, are major contributors to human error.  
Since environments tend to remain in unchanging states, they might believe something 
not there has been seen, or something was not seen that was in plain sight.  Humans may 
not be able to fully process sudden changes in what they are seeing (Sternberg & 
Sternberg, 2016).  Visual displays are not always working to reduce human error in the 
cockpit.  There are limitations to the current visual display technology.  There may be a 
delay in reception of weather information from the source to the cockpit, combined with 
the weather depiction on the visual display may not be to the correct scale.  This situation 
may lead the pilot to believe the weather is good along the selected flight path when in 
reality it is deteriorating, contributing to pilot continue to destination decision-making 
errors and a potential fatality.  Coupled with linear decision-making, where pilots commit 
to one decision without reevaluation after actions have been implemented, industry still 
relies heavily upon visual displays, when pilots are making life and death decisions based 
on their ability to interpret the weather at any given time (Balog, 2013; Balog, 2016).  
The results of these studies showed more research is needed to understand the context of 
pilot actions resulting in VFR-into-IMC accidents, as there are gaps in understanding 
between context and weather information assessment and on the following factors related 
to the length of time a pilot would fly into degraded weather conditions: (1) weather 
display symbology and color and the perceptual asymmetry effects on pilot behavior and 
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decision-making, (2) risk assessment, (3) decision making, (4) weather state-change 
notifications/symbol change detection on GA pilots’ behavior, (5) cognitive engagement, 
(6) weather situation awareness, (7) change blindness, (8) ceiling and visibility 
determination, (9) use of graphical METARs, (10) delay in reception of weather 
information from the source to the cockpit, and (11) weather depiction on the visual 
display may not be to the correct scale. 
Training 
Nicolai et al. (2017) endeavored to discover accident trends and perceptions of 
deficiencies in training, by examining VFR-into-IMC accident reports between 2003 and 
2012.  The researchers also sought current information through a survey.  The study 
found there remains a lack of proper training in the areas of weather and weather 
technology concepts.  The authors argued it is difficult for pilots to improve their SA and 
decision-making because of this insufficient training.  Whitehurst et al. (2017) conducted 
a study to identify causal factors and gaps in training leading to VFR-into-IMC aircraft 
accidents.  A mixed methods approach with NTSB VFR-into-IMC accidents between 
2003 and 2012 was used.  A national survey was also disseminated to obtain data on pilot 
self-identified training deficiencies.  The results reported SA is connected to decision-
making.   
A possibility for training to improve pilot decision-making, suggested by Nicolai 
et al. (2017), might be found in a study conducted by Wiggins and O’Hare (2003).  The 
research utilized a computer-based training system for VFR pilots, and provided a cue-
based training program, designed to teach pilots how to recognize deteriorating weather 
conditions while in flight.  The cueing variables used in the study were associated with 
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deteriorating weather conditions during flight and included darkening clouds, terrain 
clearance, cloud base, visibility, concentration, rain, cloud type, wind direction, and wind 
velocity.  The training system helped pilots to practice skills necessary for recognizing 
and responding to declining weather cues in VFR-into-IMC conditions during flight.  The 
study found self-reporting pilots were more likely to respond to weather cues following 
the training program.  Performance-wise, it was evident cue-based training may improve 
the speed of pilot weather-related decision-making.  In order to improve SA in training, 
Ball (2008) sought to understand why pilots fly too closely to hazardous weather.  Using 
a graphical weather display and instructional training, the study found training improved 
pilots’ ability to maintain safe distances from poor weather conditions.  It might not be, 
necessarily, an ability to maintain safe distances, but rather, a conscious choice 
influenced by level of experience and quality of training.  Sawyer and Shappell (2009) 
investigated the ways experience and training affect the weather identification accuracy, 
response bias, and visual scan paths of pilots.  Their results found training did not 
improve decision accuracy, but it did indicate there was a shift in bias toward a decision 
to not continue into IMC. 
Keller (2015) found VFR pilots who flew into IMC did so because they 
misperceived the severity of the weather and the associated risks.  Pilots who turned, or 
diverted, did so because they became aware of the danger and sought to return to safety.  
Additionally, O’Hare and Smitheram (1995) found pilots who viewed risk from a gain 
standpoint were less likely to continue into IMC, and those who considered risk from a 
loss viewpoint were more likely to continue.  The difficulty to train for accuracy found in 
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the Sawyer and Shappell (2009) study might indicate it is also difficult to improve the 
accuracy of pilot risk assessment with training. 
The Knecht, Ball, and Lenz (2010) study utilized video weather training, web-
based preflight weather briefing, and pilot weather knowledge/flight behavior of local 
versus non-local pilots.  Participants were given pre-tests and post-tests to measure 
knowledge acquisition because of the training.  It was found both video trainings 
significantly improved pilot scores.  However, both the online preflight weather briefing 
and the weather knowledge of local versus non-local pilots had no important differences, 
implying Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI) studies could be generalizable to the 
United Stated population of GA pilots.  These studies emphasized the deficiency in 
adequate training for weather and weather technology concepts.  This creates a difficult 
situation for pilots to acquire the needed knowledge, skills, and abilities during flight 
training and experience acquiring flight hours.  
Historical GA adverse weather accident studies have utilized comprehensive 
statistics to help discover possible factors contributing to VFR-into-IMC events.  Ison 
(2014a) used logistic regression to investigate potential pilot-related, and situational 
factors including accident time of day, terrain, receipt of weather briefing, 
communication with air traffic control, filing of a flight plan, pilot certification, pilot 
experience, and pilot age.  It was found two factors were significant contributors to VFR-
into-IMC accidents: terrain and weather briefing.  Three significant relationships were 
also found: accident type and flight plans, terrain and pilot flight time, and terrain and 
flight plan.  The study indicated a need for improvement in pilot training, including flying 
into mountainous areas and the proper interpretation of weather data. 
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The Ison (2014b) study found similar and additional information.  The research 
concluded safety benefits could be achieved if lower-certification pilots completed 
situational-based training (SBT), received specific training prior to flying in mountainous 
terrain, and were provided with better weather briefing training including an emphasis on 
warnings and hazards.  The results of these studies showed more research is needed to 
understand the context of pilot actions resulting in VFR-into-IMC accidents, as there are 
gaps in understanding among context, training, and on the following factors related to the 
length of time a pilot would fly into degraded weather conditions: (1) lack of proper 
training in the areas of weather and weather technology concepts, (2) situational 
awareness and weather-related decision-making, (3) cue-based training, (4) flight 
distance from poor weather conditions, (5) level of flight experience, (6) quality of 
training, (7) weather identification accuracy, (8) response bias, (9) visual scan paths, (10) 
decision accuracy, (11) perception of the severity of the weather and the associated risks, 
(12) gain versus loss risk perception, (13) risk assessment, (14) video, web-based 
preflight weather briefing, and weather knowledge, (15) accident time of day, (16) 
terrain, (17) receipt of weather briefing, (18) communication with air traffic control, (19) 
filing of a flight plan, (20) pilot certification, (21) pilot experience, (22) pilot age, (23) 
mountainous areas flight training, (24) proper interpretation of weather data, (25) 
situational-based training, and (26) weather briefing training including an emphasis on 






Contextual Factors GA Weather/Non-Weather Accidents 
O'Hare and Owen (2002) researched GA cross-country VFR crashes and 
contextual factors.  The research involved the study of database historical archives of 
cross-country weather-related accidents in New Zealand from 1988 to 2000.  A total of 
1,308 records were retrieved for the time frame, and 77 accidents were identified as 
cross-country flights.  A primary comparison found several contextual factors 
contributing to the accidents including the following: 
Visibility.  There was a marginally significant difference (F [1, 28] = 8.3, p = 
0.07) in the estimated visibility at the time of the crash.  The visibility was reported as 20 
km for all the Acts of God (AOG) crashes and 5 to 20 km for In-Flight Volitional (IFV) 
crashes (seven IFV crashes occurred below 5 km visibility). 
Altitude.  There was a statistically significant difference in the height above sea 
level of the crash site for IFV crashes at a mean 2,970 feet above mean sea level (AMSL) 
and 150 feet AMSL for the AOG crashes (F [1,20] = 6.3, p = .02). 
Pilot characteristics.  The pilot mean age in IFV crashes was 37.8 years.  The 
AOG pilots were 47 years of age.  It was determined the difference of 9.2 years between 
the groups was statistically significant (F [1, 43] = 3.9, p = .05).  The mean hours flown 
in the IFV group during the previous 90 days was determined to be 59.8 hours.  It was 
also determined the AOG group flew a total of 31.9 hours.  No statistically significant 
relationship was found for the flight hours of the two groups (F [1, 54] = 3.7, p = .06).  
Additionally, no statistically significant differences were found for any of the other pilot 
characteristics assessed in the study. 
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A second comparison of weather-related and non-weather-related crashes 
revealed weather-related crashes took place later into cross-country flights and closer to 
planned destinations than other types of GA accidents.  Additionally, the second 
comparison found age and flight to be contextual, contributing factors to weather-related 
GA accidents.  GA pilots who were involved in weather-related accidents tended to be 
younger and possessed more recent flight time than other pilots.  The results showed 
more research is needed to understand the context of pilot actions resulting in VFR-into-
IMC cross-country accidents, as there are gaps in understanding for contextual factors 
derived from accident analysis related to the length of time a pilot would fly into 
degraded weather conditions: (1) visibility, (2) altitude, (3) age, (4) hours flown, (5) time 
into cross-country flights and distance to planned destinations, and (6) flight. 
Summary of GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC Contextual Factors 
The 46 contextual factors identified in the literature and used in the study are 
provided in Appendix D (Table D1).  This table provides each of the 46 contextual factor 
names, descriptions, and sources for the factors identified in the research literature.  The 
46 contextual factors selected for the study were taken from a limited number of dated 
Part 91, GA studies exploring the contextual factors contributing to VFR-into-IMC 
accidents.  These studies have identified the presence of contextual factors occurring for 
this accident type, as well as the existence of unsafe pilot behaviors negatively affecting 
judgment and increasing the probability for error.   
Expert raters and inter-rater reliability 
Inter-rater reliability studies, in fields such as medicine and the social sciences, 
have used models rated by experts with the guidance published by Cohen (1960) and 
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Fleiss (1971) to determine the degree of rater agreement for nominally scaled data (Gwet, 
2008; Joslin, 2014; Oakleaf, 2009; Stemler, 2004).  Applicable, statistical literature 
included research for rating categorical data using multiple raters, although no required 
number of raters was specified, and measuring inter-rater reliability using Fleiss’ kappa.  
Inter-rater reliability has also been examined and determined with other measures 
including Cohen’s kappa, Cohen’s weighted kappa and the equivalent Intraclass 
Correlation Coefficient (ICC), and the particular inter-rater reliability measure chosen by 
the researcher depends on the number of raters and whether the data is nominal, ordinal, 
or continuous (Fleiss, 1971; Fleiss & Cohen, 1973; Joslin, 2014).  The statistics kappa 
and weighted kappa apply only to Cohen’s kappa measuring the extent two raters agree 
on rating a sample of subjects on a nominal scale, and Fleiss’ kappa is a generalization of 
unweighted kappa measuring the degree three or more raters agree on rating a sample of 
subjects on a nominal scale (Fleiss, 1971).  Cohen’s kappa can only be used in assessing 
agreement for one rater against himself and two raters against each other, and the Fleiss’ 
kappa measure is a variation of Cohen’s kappa (Fleiss, 1971).  Fleiss’ kappa has been 
used in studies where any number of raters assign categorical ratings to a fixed number of 
items (Fleiss, 1971; Singendonk et al., 2016).  Fleiss’ kappa can only be used with binary 
or nominal scale ratings.  Cohen’s kappa has the same two raters rating a set of items and 
Fleiss’ kappa allows a fixed number of raters to rate different items (Fleiss, 1971).  
Agreement among raters has been determined through a fixed number of raters assigning 
numerical ratings to several items.  The kappa (κ) is a measure of the rating consistency 
among raters and specifies the amount of agreement beyond what is expected by chance 
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(Kiliç, 2015).  The κ measure has been defined as the following in equation 1 (Fleiss, 
1971): 
 
The denominator identifies the level of agreement achievable above chance.  The 
numerator provides the level of agreement actually achieved above chance.  If all raters 
are in total agreement, then the κ measure will be equal to one.  If there is no agreement 
among raters, other than expected by chance, then the k measure will be less than or 
equal to zero.  The specified number of raters, n, assign subjects, N, to a determined 
number of categories, c.  The value of P (bar) is calculated by determining the sum of all 
data rows and then multiplying by one over the total number of rows for the entire 
spreadsheet.  The value of Pe (bar) is calculated by determining the sum of each column, 
dividing by N multiplied by n assignments, then squaring and summing the result of each 
column.  Fleiss’ kappa (κ) can then be determined by completing the calculation using 
the equation given in equation 1.   
The value of N is the total number of accidents.  The value of n is the number of 
raters identifying the presence of the particular contextual factor from the 46 research 
identified contextual factors.  The value of k is the 46 contextual factors used by the 
raters for identification of the presence of the individual contextual factors (1 through 46) 
in the 85 accident sample.  The accidents are indexed by i = 1 to N, and the 46 contextual 
factors are indexed by j = 1 to k.  The value nij represent the number of raters who 
assigned the ith accident to the jth contextual factor.  The first step is to calculate pj, the 




step is to calculate Pi, the extent the raters agree on the ith accident.  The second step 
involves determining the number of rater pairs who agree out of the total number of all 
possible rater pairs.  The third step is to compute P (bar), the mean of the Pis, and Pe (bar) 
to calculate Fleiss’ kappa (κ). 
The four raters (pilot study) and three raters (main study) (n) assign 9 (pilot study) 
and 85 (main study) GA VFR-into-IMC accidents (N) to a total of 46 contextual factor 
categories (k).  The 46 contextual factor categories (k) are presented in columns, and the 
GA VFR-into-IMC accidents are presented in rows.  Each cell identifies the number of 
raters who assigned the particular accident (row) to the presence of a particular 
contextual factor (column) (i.e. 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4 in the pilot study or 0, 1, 2 or 3 in the main 
study).  The example shown in Table 1 (not actual data) illustrates how the data is used to 
determine Fleiss’ kappa for the main study using three raters (Fleiss, 1971; Gwet, 2014; 














Determination of Fleiss’ Kappa   




Factor 1 … … … 
Contextual 
Factor 46 Pi 
A1 - ANC12FA009 3 … … … 2 Pi1    
A2 - ANC12FA066 2 … … … 2 Pi2    
A3 - ATL07FA038 0 … … … 3 Pi3    
A4 - ATL03FA062 3 … … … 0 Pi4    
A5 - ATL07FA081 1 … … … 3 Pi5    
A6 - ATL91FA043 2 … … … 1 Pi6    
… … … … … … …    
A80 - SEA96FA021 3 … … … 1 Pi80    
 A81 - WPR10FA142 0 … … … 0 Pi81    
A82 - WPR11FA147 1 … … … 2 Pi82    
A83 - WPR11FA241 2 … … … 1 Pi83    
A84 - WPR12FA031 3 … … … 3 Pi84    
A85 - WPR14FA172 2 … … … 2 Pi85    
Total 22 … … … 20     
Pj Pj1 … … … Pj46     
Note. Adapted from “The kappa statistic in reliability studies: Use, interpretation, and 
sample size requirements,” by J. Sim and C.C. Wright, 2005, Journal of the American 
Physical Therapy Association, 85(3), 257-268. 
 
The calculation to determine Fleiss’ kappa (κ) uses the data in Table 1, including 
N = 85 (accidents), n = 3 (raters), and k = 46 (contextual factors), the sum of all cells, and 
the sum of Pi.  The value of Pj is calculated using the number of total N accidents 
multiplied by the number of total raters.  In the main study, the value of Pj is calculated to 
be 85 accidents multiplied by 3 raters = 255 total accident ratings made by the three raters 
to the jth contextual factor.  The values for Pj and Pi are then calculated.  The value of Pj is 
determined for each column by calculating the sum of the column and then dividing by 
255.  The value of Pi is then determined for each row by dividing one by the sum of the 
column multiplied by the sum minus one then multiplying the value by the squared value 
of each rater rating in the row and then subtracting the total number of 3 raters.  The 
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value of P (bar) is then calculated by taking the sum of all Pi values and then dividing by 
85, the total number of accidents in the main study sample.  The Pe (bar) value is then 
calculated by taking the squared value of each Pj value and then calculating the sum of all 
values.  Fleiss’ kappa (κ) is then calculated by subtracting the Pe (bar) value from the P 
(bar) value and then dividing by the Pe (bar) value subtracted from one.   
Landis and Koch (1977) developed a table to enable the interpretation of κ values 
(Table 2).  The κ values are identified from -1.0 to +1.0.  A κ value of -1.0 should be 
interpreted as the agreement between the raters was worse than expected by chance.  A κ 
value of zero should be interpreted as the agreement between the raters was no better than 
by change.  A κ value of 1.0 should be interpreted as the agreement between the raters 
was perfect (i.e. the raters all agreed the contextual factor was present in the accident).  
The table appears to be the most widely accepted for κ agreement. 
 
Table 2  
Generally accepted standards of agreement for kappa (κ) 
Kappa (κ) Interpretation 
< 0 Poor agreement 
0.01 – 0.20 Slight agreement 
0.21 – 0.40 Fair agreement 
0.41 – 0.60 Moderate agreement 
0.61 – 0.80 Substantial agreement 
0.81 – 1.00 Almost perfect agreement 
Note. Adapted from “Measuring nominal scale agreement among many raters,” by J. 
Fleiss, 1971, Psychological Bulletin, 76(5), 378-382. 
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The research literature has identified various κ values and the associated 
interpretation of acceptable levels of agreement.  McCoul et al. (2012) used unweighted 
Fleiss’ Kappa statistic (Kf) and the prevalence-adjusted bias-adjusted kappa (PABAK) to 
report interrater agreement of nasal endoscopy in patients with a prior history of 
endoscopic sinus surgery.  Researchers reported interrater agreement values of excellent 
(Kf = 0.886), moderate (Kf = 0.543; Kf = 0.443; Kf = 0.593; Kf = 0.429), fair (Kf = 0.314; 
Kf = 0.257; Kf = 0.229), and poor (Kf = 0.148; Kf = 0.126).  Smith et al. (2012) used the 
Fleiss’ kappa test and PABAK for categoric data to report interrater reliability of 
endoscopic parameters following sinus surgery.  The researchers also reported interrater 
agreement values of strong agreement (kappa = 0.499, prevalence index = 0.925; kappa = 
0.364, prevalence index = 0.829).  Green (1997) identified interrater agreement values for 
kappa statistics using multiple raters and categorical classifications of high agreement 
(kappa = greater than 0.75), low agreement (kappa = below 0.40), and fair to good level 
of agreement (kappa = 0.40 to 0.75).  It has been explained kappa corrects for chance 
agreement and reports lower interrater agreement values where classification of 
agreement levels are opinions of the researchers and are therefore arbitrary (Landis & 
Koch, 1977).  The Landis and Koch (1977) table was used to determine the κ values for 
the four raters (pilot study) and three raters (main study) as it appears to be the most 
widely accepted for κ agreement.   
Percentage agreement and Fleiss’ kappa for four (pilot study) and three (main 
study) raters was used to measure inter-rater consistency as the consensus in the reviewed 
research literature was a recommendation to use a minimum of two measures due to the 
advantages and disadvantages of the available measures.  The percentage agreement is 
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the simplest measure of inter-rater reliability but does not consider the agreement 
expected by chance alone and is strengthened by using measures indicating proportion of 
agreement beyond chance including Fleiss’ kappa for multiple raters rating nominal data. 
The use and reporting of the Fleiss’ kappa statistic for the pilot and main studies 
is the only statistic needed if the totals from the four (pilot study) and three (main study) 
raters do not vary by large amounts.  Falotico and Quatto (2015) emphasized the Fleiss' 
kappa statistic is a well-known index for assessing the reliability of agreement for raters 
used in the psychological and psychiatric fields.  The study used IBM© SPSSTM software 
to determine Fleiss’ kappa.  It has been determined, through a review of the Sim & 
Wright (2005) research, if all the raters respond to the presence of a particular contextual 
factor, it is possible the Fleiss’ kappa statistic could show a low level of interrater 
reliability despite a high observed agreement.  In order to reduce bias, some researchers 
recommend using a prevalence-adjusted bias-adjusted kappa (PABAK) to adjust for 
prevalence and bias (Byrt, Bishop, & Carlin, 1993; Sim & Wright, 2005).  The PABAK 
takes into consideration the prevalence index (PI), high chance rater agreement on 
presence of contextual factors leading to low Fleiss’ kappa values/low chance rater 
agreement on presence of contextual factors leading to increased Fleiss’ kappa values.  
The PABAK also considers the bias index (BI), large rater disagreement on presence of 
contextual factors leading to a higher Fleiss’ kappa value/low rater disagreement on 
presence of contextual factors leading to lower Fleiss’ kappa value.  The PI and BI were 
used in the study to adjust the Fleiss’ kappa interrater agreement statistic to account for 
the described potential biases by calculating average values and substituting the results 
for the actual values.   
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The use of more than two raters providing nominal ratings and measuring 
agreement with the Fleiss’ kappa statistic has been identified in the reviewed research.  
Zapf et al. (2016) measured inter-rater reliability for nominal data using percentage 
agreement and Fleiss’ kappa using a simulation study investigating the influence of four 
factors including number of observations, number of raters, number of categories, and the 
strength of agreement (low, moderate, and high).  In order to show what was learned 
from the simulation study, the findings were applied to a case study consisting of 81 
scenarios of histopathological assessment of patients with mamma carcinoma rated by 
four raters focusing on the interrater agreement.  Researchers produced nominal data 
using the multinomial distribution with N subjects, n raters, and k categories due to 
utilization of the unweighted Fleiss’ kappa being only appropriate for nominal data.  The 
researchers identified, through observed agreement, considerable differences between the 
parameters investigated ranging from 10% (MIB-1 proliferation rate) to 96% (estrogen 
receptor group).  The corresponding Fleiss’ kappa values ranged from 0.20 (low rater 
agreement) to 0.74 (medium rater agreement).  It was concluded, when considering 
nominal data with no missing values, the Fleiss’ kappa is recommended for use in 
determining interrater reliability.  Poburka, Patel, and Bless (2016) investigated the inter-
judge and intra-judge reliability of raters using the Voice-Vibratory Assessment with 
Laryngeal Imaging (VALI) rating form developed for assessing video stroboscopy and 
high-speed videoendoscopic (HSV) recordings.  Researchers used nine raters trained to 
use a data collection form for rating a sample of 66 voice disorders.  The study assessed 
nominal data factors including glottal closure, vertical level, and free edge contour using 
percentage agreement and Fleiss’ kappa.  Nominal parameter results included 
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correlations ranging from 0.18 to 0.35 for stroboscopy and from 0.13 to 0.33 for HSV 
and percentage of concordance ranged from 44% to 78% for stroboscopy and from 52% 
to 89% for HSV.  It was concluded the rating form developed for the study incorporating 
visual-perceptual ratings of both stroboscopy and HSV can be used to make reliable 
visual-perceptual judgments related to features of vibratory motion from stroboscopy and 
HSV.  McCoul et al. (2012) completed a study using 14 endoscopic nasal examinations 
recorded using digital video capture software.  A total of five raters reviewed the 
inflammatory and anatomic video findings.  The study compared the results between the 
Kf and the PABAK.  The research specifically used the Kf and PABAK to report 
interrater agreement of nominal inflammatory and anatomic attributes examined in 
patients with a prior history of endoscopic sinus surgery.  The study reported interrater 
agreement values of excellent (Kf = 0.886), moderate (Kf = 0.543; Kf = 0.443; Kf = 0.593; 
Kf = 0.429), fair (Kf = 0.314; Kf = 0.257; Kf = 0.229), and poor (Kf = 0.148; Kf = 0.126).  
It was concluded, due to the interrater agreement variability for the rater nominal 
inflammatory and anatomic attributes assessed in the study examined, additional 
standardization of nasal endoscopy interpretation could increase procedure reliability in 
clinical practice.  Smith et al. (2012) completed a study on the interrater reliability of 
endoscopic parameters following sinus surgery.  A total of 120 video‐endoscopic 
evaluations for 20 subjects were rated by four sinus surgeons.  The nominal categories 
used by the raters were related to adhesion formation and middle turbinate position.  The 
researchers used Fleiss’ kappa and PABAK to report interrater reliability of endoscopic 
parameters following sinus surgery.  The results showed interrater values of strong 
agreement (kappa = 0.499, PABAK = 0.925; kappa = 0.364, PABAK = 0.829).  It was 
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concluded middle turbinate position and adhesions have acceptable reproducibility 
appropriate for evaluating endoscopic sinus surgery (ESS) postsurgical period outcomes.   
Metric Reliability and Validity 
The usefulness of any measure depends on the demonstrated benefit determined 
by valid metrics (Joslin, 2014).  Zapf et al. (2016) explained validity is defined in terms 
of how well a study captures the interested measure, and high reliability means a measure 
is reproducible over time in changing settings and by different raters.  The quality of a 
rater opinion can be measured using credibility, dependability, transferability, and 
confirmability testing (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Velázquez, 2016).  Similarly, the quality 
of a rater opinion on the presence of the 46 research identified contextual factors in the 
NTSB GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC accident sample can be measured using these four 
tests.  Credibility was achieved by using a recognized authoritative source of NTSB 
database descriptions of the accidents selected for the pilot and main study samples as 
well as using expert rater opinions for the presence of the 46 research-identified 
contextual factors (Appendix M).  Dependability was achieved during communication 
between the raters when assessing the pilot study materials including the data collection 
form, contextual factor definitions, and NTSB database sample of AARs.  Transferability 
was achieved by providing detailed descriptions of the research methodology and 
procedures so other researchers could complete studies using the information (Creswell, 
2005; Velázquez, 2016).  Confirmability was achieved through utilization of objective 
NTSB AAR data and rater data meaning agreement.  All of the raters identified the 
presence of the 46 research-identified contextual factors from the same GA Part 91 VFR-
into-IMC accident sample narratives selected from the NTSB AARs.  The raters were 
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provided drop down selections for the 46 research-identified contextual factors on the 
data collection form during the pilot study.  During the pilot study, the raters 
communicated with each other and the researcher and identified discrepancies with the 
drop down menus of the factors to the researcher for correction before the main study 
was disseminated.   
Summary 
Continued flight from VFR-into-IMC accident statistics have consistently 
identified GA with the highest number of yearly fatalities.  Historical research has 
focused on improved understanding and reducing the fatality causes and statistics for this 
pilot group and accident type.  The review of relevant literature identified dated GA 
research concentrating on pilot characteristics, policy violations, weather information 
assessment, perception of display information, training, accident analysis, and associated 
decision-making.  An assessment of the pertinent literature also identified dated GA 
contextual factor research focusing on decision errors, cognition, historical accident 
analysis, PCE, flight simulation, and pilot behavior.  The dated studies identified 
knowledge gaps and the need for additional research, including database research, to 
improve understanding among context, pilot characteristics, policy violations, weather 
information assessment, perception of display information, training, accident analysis, 
and associated decision-making.  The current research improved on deficiencies in 
previous research by utilizing four raters in the pilot study, and ultimately three raters in 
the main study due to one rater being unable to participate.  These improvements were 
based on the most frequently used raters in the reviewed similar studies rating 
nominal/categorical data.  Raters identified the presence and frequencies of the 46 
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reviewed research-identified contextual factors and manifestations of the contextual 
factors in recently completed GA VFR-into-IMC AARs archived in the NTSB online 
safety database.  The researcher examined and determined the statistically significant 
relationships between the contextual factors present in the NTSB AARs and other factors 
including pilot age, flight experience, weather, flight conditions, time of day, and 
certification level using point biserial and phi correlations.  Contextual factor effects were 
also examined and determined for the crash distance from departure and crash distance 
from planned destination using multiple regression.  A review of the literature also 
specified precedents in research for utilizing multiple raters and measuring inter-rater 





A total of four SME pilot raters (hereafter referred to as raters) were used in the 
pilot study and three raters in the main study.  Four raters were originally chosen for the 
pilot and main studies based on the most frequently used number of raters identified in 
similar studies rating nominal/categorical data.  The pilot study was completed by four 
raters.  It was anticipated the same four raters would be used in the pilot and main studies 
in adherence to the recommendations given by Thabane et al. (2010) and van Teijlingen 
and Hundley (2001).  However, three of the four raters ultimately completed the main 
study due to one rater being unable to participate.  The guidance was given from the 
Committee Chair to complete the study reporting the four raters’ data for the pilot study 
and three raters’ data for the main study.  Raters were used to standardize the 
classification of the 46 research-identified contextual factors during the pilot study and 
determine the presence of the factors in the sample of 85 NTSB AARs in the main study.  
The raters assessed pilot actions representative of the contextual factors and identified the 
presence of the contextual factors in the accident sample.  The selected raters are 
experienced pilots (Appendix M).  Results were reported from the aviation perspective.  
This standardized classification of the contextual factors reduced the possibility of 
misperception when studying contextual factors with similar definitions, as the findings 
could be used in the aviation industry for future investigations. 
The NTSB archival AARs of GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC accidents, and the 
associated final probable cause report data, were reviewed by four expert raters (pilot 
study) and three raters (main study).  Although the raters may have been acquainted with 
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the VFR-into-IMC accidents assessed, the focus was on identifying the presence, 
frequency, and manifestation of 46 research-identified contextual factors in these types of 
accidents.  Definitions of the contextual factors and sources of these definitions were 
given to the four (pilot study) and three (main study) expert raters to review in 
completing the study.  Raters were instructed to use the contextual factor definitions to 
aid them in their task.  Therefore, any previous familiarity with these types of accidents 
would likely be mitigated.  Definitions of 46 research-identified contextual factors were 
applied by the raters to determine if any of the factors were present in a sample of 85 
accidents.  The raters were instructed to indicate whether the factors were present for 
those factors with a yes/no outcome.  Some of the factors did not have binary outcomes, 
including time of day, altitude, height of crash site, light condition, passengers on board, 
and terrain.  Non-binary options for these factors were able to be selected by the raters.  
Where possible, contextual factors were converted to yes/no outcomes.  The ‘time of day’ 
was converted to ‘day’ and ‘night,’ and ‘passengers on board’ converted to ‘yes’ and ‘no’ 
so these contextual factors could be incorporated into the previously described analyses.  
Frequencies among the altitude, height of crash site, terrain, ‘time of day/light condition’ 
and passengers on board/total number of passengers contextual factors where a yes/no 
conversion was not possible were reported separately from the point-biserial and phi 
correlations and multiple regression analyses.  The first part of the study was completed, 
utilizing a qualitative approach with the raters, to identify the presence of these 
contextual factors, frequencies, and how the factors were manifest in the accident sample.  
Percentage agreement, PABAK, and Fleiss’ kappa (κ) were used to determine inter-rater 
reliability for the raters.  The second part of the study was accomplished utilizing a 
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quantitative approach to examine the relationships between the contextual factors and the 
selected variables including pilot age, flight experience (total flight hours), weather 
(inclement/non-inclement), flight conditions (VMC/IMC), time of day (day/night), and 
certification level (instrument-rater/non-instrument rated).  Quantitative analysis included 
the use of point biserial and phi correlations to determine if there was a statistically 
significant relationship between the contextual factors and pilot age, flight experience, 
weather, flight conditions, time of day, and certification level.  A determination was 
made as to the specific contextual factors, if any, associated with what effects on Part 91 
GA VFR-into-IMC pilot weather-related decision-making error.  The researcher used the 
crash distance from departure and crash distance from planned destination as outcomes in 
the multiple regression analyses.  The approach of using expert raters to identify accident 
contextual factors, frequencies, and manifestations is generalizable to other fields of 
study.  
Research Approach 
Qualitative research methods on secondary data were utilized to examine and 
determine the contextual factors present in GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC accidents.  The 
research assessed a sample of 85 NTSB United States aviation accidents from the 
population of 691 NTSB aviation accidents attributed to GA pilot error from 1991 to 
2014.  NTSB AARs were used to explore exclusively GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC pilot-
related accidents.  Forty-six research-identified contextual factors were identified and 
correlated within the sample of 85 NTSB AARs to explore the relationships between the 
contextual factors and other factors involved in these events.  The other factors involved 
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in the VFR-into-IMC accidents included pilot age, flight experience, weather, flight 
conditions, time of day and certification level. 
NTSB GA VFR-into-IMC AAR narratives were reviewed by four expert raters 
for the pilot study and three expert raters for the main study.  All four raters are 
recognized flight instructor subject matter experts with GA VFR-into-IMC accidents 
(Appendix M).  Raters identified the presence of 46 research-identified contextual factors 
in a pilot study sample of nine accidents and main study sample of 85 accidents.  Expert 
opinions were provided by the raters about how the factors were manifested in the pilot 
study and main study accident samples.  Research-identified contextual factor definitions 
were applied to each accident in the pilot study and main study by all raters (Table D1).  
The researcher reported the presence, frequency, and manifestation of the contextual 
factors in the sample of pilot and main study NTSB AARs as identified by the expert 
raters. 
The selected four raters for the pilot study and three raters for the main study were 
samples representative of the experienced pilot population.  Raters were selected based 
on precedent research conducting similar studies and using similar numbers of raters 
(Smith et al., 2012; Zapf et al., 2016).  Criteria used to determine the qualifications for 
rater selection to participate in the study included GA flight instruction experience, flight 
experience level, and demographics.  Selection criteria included the possession of the 
FAA Certified Flight Instructor (CFI) and ATP certificates.  Raters were selected based 
on their respective possession of these qualifications.  This flight instruction experience, 
combined with flight experience level, indicated the raters were proficient in VFR-into-
IMC flight operations, as well as instructing GA pilots, and gave them an ideal 
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background for being receptive to the 46 research-identified contextual factors connected 
to this accident type.  It was assumed the rater training and instruction by the researcher 
provided adequate familiarization with the 46 research-identified contextual factors to be 
used in the study.  All raters possessed significant flight time in GA and commercial 
aircraft as well as expert level knowledge related to VFR-into-IMC.  The raters were 
recruited through professional affiliation.   
Pilot Study.  A pilot study, or feasibility study, was completed to establish data 
collection instrument validity and inter-rater reliability.  The pilot study sample included 
nine NTSB AARs from fatal GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC accidents.  A sample size of nine 
was determined to be the minimum required sample size for inter-rater reliability as 
explained by Connelly (2008).  The sample of nine NTSB AARs for the pilot study, as 
well as 85 separate NTSB AARs for the main study, were taken from the population of 
691 accidents previously described (Appendix K; Table K1; Appendix L; Table L1).          
The data from the pilot study were consolidated to compare the respective 
contextual factor selections for each of the four raters.  This data was used to develop a 
table including descriptive statistics.  The pilot study was used to check the provided 
instructions for understanding by the raters, confirm all four raters were able to view the 
NTSB AAR narratives through the provided hyperlinks, ensure the documentation was 
accessible, and evaluate the instruction form, data collection database file, procedures, 
and data analysis approach to determine if any modifications were needed.  It was 
anticipated the same four raters would be used in the pilot and main studies in adherence 
to the recommendations given by Thabane et al. (2010) and van Teijlingen and Hundley 
(2001).  However, one of the raters was able to complete the pilot study but not the main 
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study.  Guidance was given by the Committee Chair to complete the study reporting the 
four rater’s data for the pilot study and three rater’s data for the main study.  A Human 
Subjects Protocol application was not submitted to the Embry-Riddle Aeronautical 
University (ERAU) Institutional Review Board (IRB) for study exemption since the 
research used existing secondary data from deceased individuals.  A determination was 
made using the IRB Decision Tree #1 and Decision Tree #2 (Appendix A; Figure A1; 
Figure A2).  The pilot study has been utilized in research to determine statistical 
significance and main study sample size (Thabane et al., 2010).  Main study sample size 
was calculated to be 85 cases (Appendix I; Figure I1).  The main study sample size of 85 
out of a total of 691 VFR-into-IMC cases was determined using the percentage of VFR-
into-IMC accidents occurring in each of the NOAA defined climate regions (NOAA, 
2018; Figure 1; Figure 2).  Guidance by Connelly (2008) established the pilot study 
sample should be at least 10% of the sample for the actual study.  The pilot study sample 
size was calculated to be 8.5 or 9 cases.       
The raters were emailed the instructions, contextual factor definitions and 
references, and Microsoft® AccessTM database collection form (Table D1; Appendix B, 
Figure B1; Appendix F; Figure F1; Appendix J).  Four raters then rated the nine VFR-
into-IMC accidents one at a time.  All raters were permitted to complete the ratings at a 
time and place of their respective choosing.  Each rater completed the Microsoft® 
AccessTM database collection form within two weeks and returned his respective ratings 
of the nine pilot study accidents via email to the researcher.  Modifications were made to 
the main study Microsoft® AccessTM database collection form from data received from 
the four raters in the pilot study (Appendix B; Figure B1; Appendix C; Figure C1).  The 
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pilot study was assessed to ensure the contextual factors were consistently rated and any 
discrepancies corrected.  In some of the accidents, the raters were unsure of selecting a 
particular contextual factor due to confusion with some of the definitions, such as with 
Contextual Factor 23, Flight Plan Policy Violation, if filing IFR when required was part 
of the definition.  The raters were referred to the detailed definitions of the contextual 
factors, including the sources of the definitions, and provided a copy of the definitions for 
reference in rating the 46 research-identified contextual factors in the pilot and main 
studies (Appendix D; Table D1).   
 
 
Figure 1.  NOAA defined climate regions (NOAA, 2018).  Adapted from the NOAA 
website (https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/monitoring-references/maps/us-climate-regions.php) 
 
Design and Procedures.  A Human Subjects Protocol Application was not 
submitted to the ERAU IRB for approval as the researcher used existing secondary data 
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from not living individuals.  The ERAU IRB guidance provided in Decision Trees #1 and 
#2 was used by the researcher to determine use of existing secondary data does not 
constitute human subject research and does not require approval (Appendix A; Figure 
A1; Figure A2).  Guidance from the decision trees was to proceed with the research.  The 
raters were not required to complete an Informed Consent Form per guidance given to the 
researcher directly from the ERAU IRB.   
The four raters (pilot study) and three raters (main study) were provided the 
instructions, contextual factor definitions and references, and Microsoft® AccessTM 
database collection form (Table D1; Appendix B, Figure B1; Appendix C; Figure C1; 
Appendix F; Figure F1; Figure F2; Appendix J).  The Microsoft® AccessTM database 
collection form provided the raters with hyperlinks to the NTSB AARs.  Raters reviewed 
the instructions, contextual factor definitions, and references.  Individual GA VFR-into-
IMC NTSB AARs were then reviewed by each rater one at a time.  The 46 research-
identified contextual factors were then reviewed one at a time by each rater to examine 
and determine if any of the contextual factors were present in the sample of NTSB AARs.  
Raters identified the presence of each contextual factor by selecting the appropriate 
option from the provided drop-down menu in the Microsoft® AccessTM database 
collection form (Appendix B; Figure B1; Appendix C; Figure C1).  Results for each 
accident were saved in the respective rater’s Microsoft® AccessTM database collection 
form for review by the researcher.  Instructions in Appendix F were given to the three 
raters for the pilot study and four raters for the main study (Appendix F; Figure F1; 
Figure F2).  The following instructions were also provided to each rater: 
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1. Each rater will receive an email including study completion instructions from 
the researcher, the GA VFR-into-IMC contextual factor definitions, the NTSB 
AARs for the accident sample, and a Microsoft© AccessTM data collection form.  
The rater will review the GA VFR-into-IMC contextual factor definitions and 
then identify the presence of the contextual factors in the GA Part 91 VFR-into-
IMC fatal accident sample and return the data collection form to the researcher 
when completed. 
2. The rater will not reproduce or share any of the items and will return them to 
the researcher along with a completed rater Microsoft® AccessTM database 
collection form. 
3. The rater will identify the 46 literature-identified contextual factors 
independently using the provided definitions without discussion with any other 
person or reference to any other information. 
4. The rater will not be expected to travel to any location but will require a 
personal computer with word processing (.doc and .docx) and the ability to view 
textual files.   
5. The Main Study is provided in the attached Microsoft® AccessTM database 
under the ‘Main’ table.  Once you are in the program, click on the ‘Main’ table 
from the list of tables located on the left of the screen.  The ‘Main’ table has 9 GA 
VFR-into-IMC fatal accidents selected from the NTSB Aviation Accident 
Database (pilot study).  The ‘Main’ table has 85 GA VFR-into-IMC fatal 
accidents selected from the NTSB Aviation Accident Database (main study).  The 
respective NTSB AAR numbers are given as well as hyperlinks to the NTSB 
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Aviation AARs that can be clicked when the pointing hand icon appears while 
hovering over the respective links.  Once clicked, the respective NTSB final 
reports will open at this point for your review.   
6. After reviewing the final reports and definition sheet for the 46 research-
identified contextual factors, please identify the applicable contextual factors 
present for each of the 9 GA VFR-into-IMC accidents (pilot study)/85 GA VFR-
into-IMC accidents (main study).  This action can be accomplished by clicking 
the down arrow on the right side of each cell for each of the 46 contextual factors 
in moving from left to the right in the ‘Main’ table.  If none of the drop-down list 
of options applies to the particular contextual factor, then select the NA (Not 
Applicable) option.  If, in your opinion, there is not enough information provided 
in the NTSB factual report to identify a specific contextual factor, select the ‘Not 
enough information provided to identify the contextual factor’ in the drop-down 
options (select this option if there is a narrative to review and after reviewing, you 
feel there is not enough information to select a specific contextual factor).  The 
NTSB report may lack a narrative to decide.  If this is the case, select the 
‘Unknown’ option in the drop down list (select this option if there is no narrative 
to review). 
7. The hyperlink is provided for skyvector.com (https://skyvector.com/).  This 
publicly available website includes United States sectional charts for rater 
determination of the accident site from the departure and destination points for 
DDLCF14 and DDLCF15.   
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8. Also, provide any comments in the rater comments cell related to how, in your 
opinion, the contextual factors were manifested considering the presence of the 
specific contextual factor(s) identified in the last cell of the Microsoft® AccessTM 
‘Main’ table. 
9. These instructions should be completed for each of the 9 accidents (pilot 
study)/85 accidents (main study) one at a time.         
Apparatus and materials.  The researcher familiarized the raters with the 46 
contextual factors identified in the reviewed research to correctly identify the presence of 
the factors in the accident sample through review of contextual factor definitions and 
reviewed literature sources (Table D1; Appendix J).  Familiarization developed the 
rater’s skill in recognizing the presence and manifestation of the contextual factors in GA 
Part 91 VFR-into-IMC flight scenarios in NTSB AARs.  Raters were provided the 
instructions, contextual factor definitions and references, and Microsoft® AccessTM 
database collection form including the sample of NTSB AARs to review (Table D1; 
Appendix B, Figure B1; Appendix C; Figure C1; Appendix F; Figure F1; Figure F2; 
Appendix J; Appendix K; Appendix L).  An example of an NTSB GA VFR-into-IMC 
AAR from the NTSB database website is depicted in Appendix E (Figure E1; Figure E2). 
Population/Sample 
The source of the data for the study was the NTSB AARs and factual reports. 
These documents provided the information needed for the exploratory study of the 46 
research-identified contextual factors contributing to GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC 
accidents.  NTSB AARs and factual reports between 1991 and 2014 were selected as 
these reports were completed with NTSB investigator’s final probable cause 
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determinations given.  The identified timeframe was selected because the NTSB began 
including investigator-determined probable causes in the AARs on January 1, 1991.  This 
timeframe stopped at December 31, 2014, because the researcher was informed by NTSB 
personnel it takes five or more years to complete an accident investigation.  The NTSB 
AARs and factual accident reports were downloaded from the NTSB website (Appendix 
E; Figure E2).  These reports were then analyzed by the raters for the presence of the 46 
research-identified contextual factors.    
The sample set used for the main study was comprised of 85 GA Part 91 VFR-
into-IMC accidents involving the 46 research-identified contextual factors reported by the 
identified authors.  This 85 accident sample set was representative of the GA Part 91 
VFR-into-IMC accidents occurring in the United States, including Alaska, Guam, 
Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands (Figure 1; Figure 2).  A minimum sample 
size of 85 was determined using stratified random sampling and taken from the 
population of 691 NTSB GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC AARs and factual accident reports.  
The sample set was retrieved using NTSB filter codes 401 and 24015 specifically for this 
accident type from the NTSB database between January 1, 1991, and December 31, 2014 
(Appendix E; Figure E1: Figure E2; NTSB, n.d.-d., p. 49).  The sampling frame was all 
691 NTSB GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC accidents for this period, and relevant 
stratification was the specific GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC accident type.  All 691 GA Part 
91 VFR-into-IMC accidents in the NTSB database were retrieved and identified with 
completed AARs and factual accident reports including final probable cause 
determinations.  A consecutive number was assigned to each of the GA Part 91 VFR-
into-IMC accidents occurring in the specific NOAA defined climate region stratum 
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(Figure 1).  A proportionate stratification was calculated from the 691 accident cases.  
Systematic random sampling was used to select accidents directly from the sample frame.  
In order to ensure the number of accidents randomly selected for the sample from each 
NOAA defined climate region stratum was proportionate to the number of accidents in 
the population, the sample size was multiplied by the proportion of accidents occurring in 
each stratum (Figure 2).  Therefore, the number of accidents required in the sample was 
calculated by multiplying the total number of GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC accidents 
occurring in each NOAA defined climate region by the percentage of GA Part 91 VFR-
into-IMC accidents occurring in each region (i.e., 34 Alaska GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC 
accidents (AK total) x 0.049% GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC accidents (AK proportion) = 
1.66 or 2 accidents).  A total of two accidents was randomly selected from the 34 total 
accidents occurring in Alaska.  This process was followed to determine the sample set of 
85 accidents randomly selected from each of the NOAA defined climate regions 
(Appendix I; Table I1).  This sampling frame and method ensured the generalizability of 





Figure 2.  NOAA defined climate regions including percentage of accidents (NOAA, 
2018).  Adapted from the NOAA website (https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/monitoring-
references/maps/us-climate-regions.php). 
 
Sources of the Data 
The research data source was taken from the January 1, 1991, to December 31, 
2014, population of completed NTSB United States AARs attributed to VFR-into-IMC 
pilot error where an investigator final probable cause ruling was established.  The 
identified timeframe was selected because the NTSB began including investigator-
determined probable causes in the AARs on January 1, 1991.  This timeframe stopped at 
December 31, 2014, because the researcher was informed by NTSB personnel it takes 
five or more years to complete an accident investigation.  Accidents occurring between 
January 1, 2015, and the present may not yet be completed and may not yet include 
NTSB investigator final probable cause determinations.  Therefore, accidents occurring 
during this timeframe were not selected for use in the study.  The number of qualifying 
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reports meeting the GA Part 91 pilot entry into VFR-into-IMC criteria for the specified 
date range totaled 691.  As this number of qualifying reports was abundant, the number 
of NTSB AAR reports used in the study was methodically narrowed down by selecting 
the 85 cases representative of all United States where the GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC 
accident type occurred.  NTSB AAR accident reports were used to explore exclusively 
GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC accidents.  Accident reports were downloaded from the 
NTSB Aviation Accident Database and Synopses online archives of AARs (Appendix E; 
Figure E1; Figure E2).  These reports were analyzed by the raters to determine the 
presence and manifestation of the 46 research-identified contextual factors.  The sample 
list creation involved the following seven steps: 
1. The NTSB’s complete aviation accident dataset was downloaded onto a 
computer as a Microsoft® AccessTM file from the NTSB website at 
https://app.ntsb.gov/avdata/ (Appendix E; Figure E2).  The file "avall.zip" (in the 
Access folder) contained all records for NTSB aviation investigations from 1982 
to present, updated on the first day of each month. 
2. After the avall database was downloaded, unzipped, and opened in Microsoft® 
AccessTM , the following tables were identified: 
a. Events (one record per accident; contains accident date, fatalities, 
weather conditions, etc.) 
b. Aircraft (one record per accident aircraft; contains CFR part that aircraft 
was operated under) 
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c. Events_Sequence (one record per event in the accident sequence per 
aircraft for accidents occurring in 2008 or later as the NTSB changed its 
database structure and coding scheme during this timeframe) 
3. A query was created in Microsoft® AccessTM joining these tables on the ev_id 
and aircraft_key fields, which uniquely identified each accident and accident 
aircraft, respectively. 
4. The query was filtered for the following attributes: 
a. Events.ev_type = ‘ACC’ (just accidents) 
b. Aircraft.far_part (just Part 91 and Part 91K) 
c. Events_Sequence.eventsoe_no = ‘401’ (The post-2008 accidents were 
retrieved using the Events_Sequence, and filtered for the eventsoe_no = 
‘401’ (the NTSB code for VFR encounter with IMC in the post-2008 new 
coding schema) 
5. The pre-2008 accidents were retrieved by repeating the above steps but using 
the seq_of_events table instead of Events_Sequence, and filtered for 
seq_of_events.subj_code = ‘24015’ (the NTSB code for VFR encounter with IMC 
in the pre-2008 old coding schema). 
6. The specific Part 91, GA accident reports were then reviewed by searching for 
the desired report on the NTSB website (using the value in Events.ntsb_no) and 






a. Replaced the value after “EventID=” with Events.ev_id 
b. Replaced the value after “AKey=” with Aircraft.aircraft_key 
c. Replaced the value after “IType=” with the 6th and 7th characters of 
Events.ntsb_no 
7. Any additionally available Part 91, GA VFR-into-IMC accident information 
was obtained through the NTSB accident docket system containing electronic 
copies of supporting materials for investigation reports such as photos, transcripts, 
and specialist reports.  The public accident docket was accessed through the 
NTSB website at https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/ and was searched using the 
Events.ntsb_no. 
The data collected from the NTSB Aviation Accident Database and Synopses 
online AARs conformed to the following seven criteria: 
1. United States GA Part 91 accidents attributed to VFR-into-IMC pilot decision 
error. 
2. The accident involved the death of the pilot.  
3. Accidents attributed to unknown causes were excluded from the study.  
4. Only those Part 91 GA VFR-into-IMC accidents where the investigation was 
completed and accident cause determined were included in the analysis. 
5. The GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC accidents were sorted out of the entire list of 
all accidents in the NTSB database using the following codes: 
a. ev_date 








1. VFR encounter with IMC from 2008 to 2014 in the new 
post-2008 NTSB coding schema 
d. subj_code 
i. 24015 
1. VFR encounter with IMC from 1991 to 2007 in the old 
pre-2008 NTSB coding schema 
e. ntsb_no 
i. NTSB accident number assigned to each case 
f. far_part 
i. 091 
1. Part 91, GA 
g. ev_state 










1. dark night 
iv. NBRT 






6. The total number of GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC accidents retrieved from the 
entire NTSB database was 691 cases. 
7. The final 85 cases were determined by selecting from the NOAA climate 
regions in defined United States geographic areas (Figure 1; Figure 2; 
Appendix I: Figure I1).  Cases were selected for identified lighting conditions 
from the 691 GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC accident occurrences.  A total of 52 
United States and territories had these qualifying NTSB VFR-into-IMC 
AARs, including Alaska, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. 
Data Collection Device 
Several data collection devices were used to complete the study.  These devices 
included various forms the researcher and raters used to collect responses.  The 
researcher provided the raters with documentation explaining the 46 research-identified 
contextual factor concepts.  Raters became familiar with the 46 contextual factors 
through instruction provided by the researcher before the data was coded and analyzed 
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(Appendix J).  The rater familiarization included review of the researcher-prepared list of 
definitions for the 46 research-identified contextual factors taken directly from the 
reviewed research articles (Appendix D; Table D1).  Raters used the aforementioned 
researcher-prepared list of definitions document for the 46 research-identified contextual 
factors to aid in identifying the presence of the specific contextual factor(s) in the nine 
NTSB AARs for the pilot study and 85 NTSB AARs for the main study (Appendix K; 
Table K1; Appendix L; Table L1).  The raters were evaluated by the researcher on their 
individual understanding of identifying the presence of the 46 research-identified 
contextual factors and manifestations of these factors during the pilot study (Appendix J).  
A Microsoft® AccessTM database collection form was given to each of the raters 
(Appendix B; Figure B1; Appendix C; Figure C1).  The Microsoft® AccessTM database 
form was used by the researcher to collect the raters’ identification of the presence of the 
46 research-identified contextual factors and manifestation of the factors in the 
representative sample of 9 NTSB AARs for the pilot study and 85 NTSB AARs for the 
main study.  Other factors related to the GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC accidents were also 
evaluated by the researcher pertaining to the pilot and main study NTSB AARs including 
pilot age and flight experience, as well as weather, flight conditions, time of day, and 
certification level.  The results were reported in tables. 
At the conclusion of instruction and evaluation provided by the researcher, the 
main study representative sample of 85 NTSB AARs was assigned to each of the three 
raters so all three raters were able to independently analyze each accident (all three raters 
reviewed and rated all 85 AARs).  The three raters were given a Microsoft® AccessTM 
database collection form to record the presence of the 46 research-identified contextual 
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factors and manifestations of the factors in the representative sample of 85 NTSB AARs 
(Appendix C; Figure C1).  The researcher then entered the completed Microsoft® 
AccessTM database collection form information from the raters into the International 
Business Machines (IBM®) Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS™) software 
for contextual factor analyses.   
Instrument reliability.  Instrument reliability is defined as the extent an 
instrument consistently measures what it is supposed to measure.  The Microsoft® 
AccessTM database collection form was filled out based on the rater examination and 
determination of the presence of the 46 research-identified contextual factors in the 
representative sample of 85 NTSB AARs.  The layout of the data collection form 
contributed to the instrument reliability, as it guided each of the raters through the same 
data input process each time.  Reliability of the instrument for the study was determined 
through a pilot study.  The pilot study asked the raters to identify the presence of the 46 
research-identified contextual factors and their opinion about how these factors were 
manifested in the accident sample.   
The pilot study established whether or not an acceptable inter-rater agreement 
with percentage agreement and Fleiss’ kappa (κ) was achieved.  A standard score (Z-
score) for Fleiss's kappa was also calculated and converted into a P-value.  This P value 
indicated whether the agreement for the four raters was significantly better or not 
significantly better than would be expected by chance.  The Z-score and P-value were 
reported (Table D2).  The reliability of the data collection form for the main study was 
tested in the pilot study and established a percentage agreement of 86% and statistically 
significant (p ≤ .000) inter-rater reliability (k = 0.519; PABAK = 0.422).  As the pilot 
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study Fleiss’ kappa (κ)  was in the moderate agreement range between 0.41 and 0.60 on 
the Fleiss (1971) scale of agreement, modifications were made to the main study 
Microsoft® AccessTM database collection form based on rater feedback from the pilot 
study Microsoft® AccessTM database collection form (Appendix B; Figure B1; Appendix 
C; Figure C1). 
Instrument validity.  Instrument validity is defined as the extent to which an 
instrument measures what it is supposed to measure.  Raters completed the Microsoft® 
AccessTM database collection form by applying the researcher instruction and 
demonstration to the main study representative sample of 85 Part 91, GA VFR-into-IMC 
accidents retrieved from the archived accidents in the NTSB database (Appendix C; 
Figure C1; Appendix L).  The layout of the Microsoft® AccessTM database collection 
form contributed to the instrument validity as it identified all of the 46 research-identified 
contextual factors and the respective NTSB AAR numbers identifying the representative 
sample of 85 Part 91, GA VFR-into-IMC accidents.  This layout identified all 
information needed by the researcher from the three raters.  An identical Microsoft® 
AccessTM database collection form was given to all three raters as each rater evaluated all 
85 Part 91, GA VFR-into-IMC accidents in the representative sample.  Consistency in 
each of the three raters using the same Microsoft® AccessTM database collection form 
increased the probability of collecting the correct data from each rater.  This consistency 
increased the validity of the data collection form.  The pilot study was completed to 
establish the Microsoft® AccessTM database collection form instrument validity. 
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Treatment of the Data 
The raters were selected using specific experience criteria.  Each of the raters was 
selected for their possession of the FAA CFI and ATP certificates.  These ratings 
indicated each rater’s possession of the requisite VFR-into-IMC knowledge and flight 
experience needed to successfully complete the identification of the 46 research-
identified contextual factors and manifestations of these factors in the representative 
sample of 85 NTSB AARs.  The 46 contextual factors were derived from the established 
research literature. The three raters identified the presence and manifestations of these 
factors in a sample of 85 fatal Part 91 accidents for the main study.  
The following instructions involving nine steps were given to the three raters for 
the main study: 
1. The rater will not reproduce or share the information contained in the e-mailed 
rater package and will return all identified documentation, including the 
completed data collection form, to this researcher via e-mail at 
hartmaj7@my.erau.edu when completed. 
2. The rater will complete the required actions for each NTSB AAR one at a 
time until all 85 NTSB AARs have been assessed.  The rater will not begin the 
required actions for a new NTSB AAR until all actions are completed for the 
currently assessed NTSB AAR. 
3. The rater will first read, one at a time, the narrative provided in the NTSB 




4. The rater will identify the presence of the 46 contextual factors taken from the 
reviewed literature in the sample of 85 NTSB AARs after reviewing all 
provided instructions and documentation and return to the researcher when 
completed via e-mail at hartmaj7@my.erau.edu. 
5. The rater should only rate whether or not the 46 research-identified contextual 
factors are present in the currently assessed NTSB AAR. 
6. The rater will identify the presence of the 46 research-identified contextual 
factors in the currently assessed NTSB AAR by recording the identified 
contextual factor(s) and manifestation(s) of these factors on the data collection 
form (Appendix C; Figure C1). 
7. The rater will identify the 46 research-identified contextual factors in the 
representative sample of 85 NTSB AARs without discussion with anyone else 
or reference to any additional information other than provided in the rater 
package. 
8. The rater will require a personal computer with word processing ability. 
9. The rater will repeat steps one through nine for each of the representative 
sample of 85 NTSB AARs. 
The following is a chronological order of the five steps that were taken: 
1. The researcher provided the raters instruction on definitions of the 46 
research-identified contextual factors taken directly from the respective 
reviewed research articles, examples of identification of the 46 research-
identified contextual factors in NTSB AARs not used in the main study, and 
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showed the raters an example of how to complete the Microsoft® AccessTM 
database collection form based on the example NTSB AARs. 
2. The researcher provided the raters a testing session using an NTSB AAR not 
used in the main study.  Each rater was required to demonstrate a minimum 80 
percent proficiency in correctly identifying the applicable 46 research-
identified contextual factors in the provided NTSB AAR.  A total of 46 
questions were asked corresponding to the presence or absence of the 46 
contextual factors.  Therefore, a total of 40 correct responses out of a total of 
50, or 80% accuracy, were required for each rater.  In the event a rater did not 
pass with the required accuracy, remediation and retesting sessions would 
have been conducted between the rater and researcher until a passing score 
had been achieved. 
3. The three raters were first asked to read the narratives provided for each of the 
85 NTSB AARs, including the analysis, factual information, and probable 
cause and findings.   
4. The three raters were then asked to identify the 46 research-identified 
contextual factors and manifestations of the factors in each of the 85 NTSB 
AARs.  
a. The rater coding process included a complete review of the NTSB 
AAR for significant text identifying GA pilot errors where one or 
more of the 46 research-identified contextual factors applied.  The 
NTSB AARs were independently coded and cross-checked by the 
researcher to ensure coding consistency between raters.  This process 
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involved confirming with each rater their provided responses were 
accurate to ensure the data coding was correct.  
b. The results for each accident were recorded on a Microsoft® AccessTM 
database collection form (Appendix C; Figure C1).   
5. The three raters determined which of the 46 research-identified contextual 
factors, if any, were present in the representative sample of 85 NTSB AARs.  
The researcher determined the contextual factor frequencies and the way these 
factors manifested reported by the raters from the Microsoft® AccessTM 
database collection form drop down menu selections and comments.  The 
researcher then entered the contextual factor data provided by the raters into 
the IBM® SPSS™ program.  The IBM® SPSS™ program was used to 
generate the frequencies of the 46 research-identified contextual factors in the 
sample of 85 AARs reported by the raters.  The researcher then reported the 
contextual factor presence, frequency, and rater reported manifestation of the 
contextual factor in the sample of 85 AARs.  
The data collected from the three raters was coded as part of the process of 
converting the 46 research-identified contextual factors, pilot age, flight experience, 
weather, flight conditions, time of day, and certification level qualitative information into 
frequency of occurrence quantitative information that was analyzed by IBM® SPSS™.  
Treatment of the data included descriptive statistics establishing the frequency of each of 
the 46 research-identified contextual factors and contextual factors manifestations present 
in the representative sample of 85 NTSB AARs.  Frequency data, along with the rater 
provided comments, was used by the researcher to determine how the 46 research-
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identified contextual factors were manifested in the representative sample of 85 NTSB 
AARs.  Statistical analysis was performed using IBM® SPSS™ computer software.  The 
Microsoft® AccessTM database collection form containing the aforementioned qualitative 
data for each of the raters was transferred to a Microsoft® ExcelTM spreadsheet.  Raters’ 
data was imported into IBM® SPSS™ from the Microsoft® Excel™ spreadsheet.  A rater 
frequency table was generated in IBM® SPSS™ for the completed Microsoft® AccessTM 
database collection form information submitted by each of the three raters for the 
presence of contextual factors, pilot age, flight experience, weather, flight conditions, 
time of day, and certification level in the representative sample of 85 NTSB AARs by 
running the frequencies procedure (Analyze > Descriptive Statistics > Frequencies).  The 
IBM® SPSS™ frequencies were then reported in tables.  The reported IBM® SPSS™ 
point biserial correlation, phi correlation, and multiple regression data utilizing dummy 
variables was then used by the researcher to examine and determine any significant 
relationships between the contextual factors and other factors in the representative sample 
of NTSB AARs.  Contextual factor manifestation results were then reported in tables.  
The percentage agreement was manually calculated and reported.  The Fleiss’ kappa (κ) 
was computed with IBM® SPSS™.  A computed Fleiss’ kappa (κ) statistic for the 
agreement among the raters beyond what was expected by chance was reported.  The Z-
scores and P-values were also reported to identify the agreement among the raters beyond 
what was expected by chance.  PABAK was calculated and reported to determine inter-
rater reliability.   
Descriptive statistics.  The three raters determined which of the 46 research-
identified contextual factors were present in the 85 NTSB AAR main study representative 
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sample.  Frequencies of the 46 research-determined contextual factors, pilot age, flight 
experience, weather, flight conditions, time of day, and certification level were 
determined and reported using the aforementioned IBM® SPSS™ frequency table 
procedure.  The most prevalent research-identified contextual factors present in the 
representative sample of 85 NTSB AARs were also calculated.  Contextual factor 
manifestations, determined by rater provided comments and contextual factor 
frequencies, were then determined.  Overall percentage agreement between raters was 
calculated for pilot study and main study identification of the 46 research-determined 
contextual factors.  The results were reported in tables. 
Reliability testing.  Inter-rater reliability for the categorical variables of the 
presence or absence of the 46 literature-identified, GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC contextual 
factors was used to determine the consistency between the four raters (pilot study) and 
three raters (main study) by using overall percentage agreement and then by Fleiss’ kappa 
statistic to calculate agreement beyond chance expectation (Fleiss, 1971; Gwet, 2014; 
Kiliç, 2015; Landis & Koch, 1977; Scott, 1955; Sim & Wright, 2005; Singendonk et al., 
2016).  In order to determine if the magnitude of Fleiss’ kappa was influenced by 
prevalence of the presence for the 46 research-identified contextual factors in the sample 
of GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC accidents and bias for the degree the raters disagreed on 
the proportion of accidents where the contextual factors were present or absent, the 
PABAK was calculated (Byrt, Bishop, & Carlin, 1993; Sim & Wright, 2005).  
Qualitative data.  The Microsoft® AccessTM database collection form identified 
the 46 research-identified contextual factors for each GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC 
accident (Appendix B; Figure B1; Appendix C; Figure C1).  A drop down menu was 
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provided for each contextual factor including all possible choices for the raters to select.  
The last column in the Microsoft® AccessTM database collection form allowed the raters 
to provide their respective opinions of how contextual factors were manifested.     
Quantitative data.  Descriptive statistics were used to report pilot age, flight 
experience, weather, flight conditions, time of day, and certification level for the 
identified sample of NTSB AARs.  Point biserial and phi correlations were calculated 
using IBM® SPSS™ software to identify statistically significant relationships between 
the contextual factors and pilot age, flight experience, weather, flight conditions, time of 
day, and certification level (Field, 2009).  A Point-biserial correlation coefficient was 
used to examine the statistically significant relationships among the contextual factors, 
pilot age, and flight experience.  A phi correlation coefficient was used to examine the 
statistically significant relationships among the contextual factors, certification level, 
weather, flight conditions, and time of day.  A determination was made as to which of the 
contextual factors were associated with what effects for GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC 
decision-making error.  The multiple regression analyses using dummy variables 
determined which of the 46 research-identified contextual factors (independent variables) 
had any effect(s) on the crash distance from departure and crash distance to planned 






The research data source was taken from the January 1, 1991, to December 31, 
2014, population of completed NTSB United States AARs attributed to VFR-into-IMC 
pilot error where an investigator final probable cause ruling was established.  The number 
of qualifying reports meeting the GA Part 91 pilot entry into VFR-into-IMC criteria for 
the specified date range totaled 691.  A proportionate stratification was calculated from 
the 691 accident cases.  Systematic random sampling was used to select accidents directly 
from the sample frame.  As this number of qualifying reports was abundant, the number 
of NTSB AAR and probable cause reports was methodically narrowed down by selecting 
the 85 cases representative of all United States where the GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC 
accident type occurred.  The selection of this representative sample ensured the 
generalizability of the study results.  The percentage of accidents selected by NOAA 
defined climate region stratum and demographic information for the 85 selected cases are 
given in Appendices I and N, respectively. 
The qualitative and quantitative data from the pilot study (nine accident sample) 
were put into a table to analyze the results.  The table of pilot study qualitative and 
quantitative data from the four raters was used to generate a table of frequency and 
descriptive statistics.  Modifications were made to the main study (85 accident sample) 
Microsoft® Access™ database collection form from the results obtained from the pilot 
study data.  Qualitative and quantitative results obtained from the main study data 
generated by the three raters were used to create frequency and descriptive statistics 
tables for data analysis.  Pilot and main study statistics and reliability testing were 
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reviewed for agreement.  The pilot and main study qualitative and quantitative data were 
analyzed to identify the presence and frequencies of the research-identified contextual 
factors in Part 91, GA pilot VFR-into-IMC accidents in the reviewed NTSB AARs.  The 
relationships between the 46 research-identified contextual factors and age, flight 
experience, weather, flight conditions, time of day, and certification level as well as crash 
distance from departure and crash distance from planned destination were also explored.   
Pilot Study     
The percentage agreement, Fleiss’ kappa (κ), and PABAK calculations were used 
to determine rater agreement between the four raters in the pilot study beyond what was 
expected by chance.  This study used percentage agreement and Fleiss’ kappa to measure 
inter-rater consistency, as the consensus in the reviewed research literature was a 
recommendation to use a minimum of two measures due to the advantages and 
disadvantages of the available measures.  The percentage agreement is the simplest 
measure of inter-rater reliability but does not consider the agreement expected by chance 
alone and is strengthened by using measures indicating proportion of agreement beyond 
chance including Fleiss’ kappa for multiple raters rating nominal data.  Percentage 
agreement of 86% was manually calculated.  An overall Fleiss’ kappa (κ) for the pilot 
study was calculated using IBM® SPSS™ software and showed there was moderate 
agreement between the four raters, κ = 0.50 (95% CI, .46 to .54), p < .01 (Appendix D; 
Table D2).  The individual Fleiss’ kappa (κ) categories were also calculated using IBM® 
SPSS™ software (Appendix D; Table D3).  The PABAK was also manually calculated 
(PABAK = 0.42).  The calculated pilot study Fleiss’ kappa, κ = 0.50 was between 0.41 
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and 0.60 for moderate agreement on the generally accepted standards of agreement for 
kappa (κ) shown in Table 2 (Fleiss, 1971). 
The feedback from the raters gave the researcher insight into the reasons for the 
differences in identification of the presence of the contextual factors in the nine NTSB 
GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC accidents selected for the pilot study.  In some of the cases, 
there was minimal data provided in the NTSB AARs for the raters to make an informed 
decision as to the presence or absence of the 46 research-identified contextual factors.  It 
was noted by the raters a more in-depth analysis reported by the NTSB investigators in 
the AARs would have likely revealed more contextual factors.  The feedback from the 
raters obtained from the pilot study was used to modify the methodology including the 
main study Microsoft® Access™ database collection form.   
The following modifications were made based on the pilot study feedback: (a) 
include a general definition of contextual factors at the beginning of the main study 
instructions; (b) add pilot study sample size selection information and reference into the 
dissertation methodology section; (c) add an "Unknown" option in the main study; (d) 
change meters to feet for the Contextual Factor 25: ‘Height of crash site’ category; (e) 
include installed weather equipment verbiage for Contextual Factor 45: ‘Use of in-
cockpit weather information’ in the main study; (f) re-word last question to make it 
clearer the researcher is asking the raters to provide their opinions about how the 
identified contextual factors were manifested in each accident; (g) change times to 24-
hour, and ‘seal’ level should be corrected in drop downs for altitude/elevation; (h) amend 
the CF23 to include verbiage to “file IFR to the maximum extent possible”; (i) change the 
altitudes to include all possible values and put in numerical order; (j) add an option in the 
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drop down menu to include “not enough information provided to make a determination 
regarding contextual factor”; (k) include the hyperlink to skyvector.com (a publicly 
available website) for United States sectional charts so the raters can determine the 
accident site using the departure and destination points, as well as the latitude and 
longitude coordinates for the crash site location provided in the NTSB AARs in the main 
study instructions to raters document: https://skyvector.com/; (l) include only the final 
report for the main study to reduce the workload on the raters; (m) add an option in the 
drop down menu to include “Not Applicable, N.A.”.   
The reliability of the data collection form for the main study was tested in the 
pilot study and established a percentage agreement of 86% and statistically significant (p 
≤ .000) inter-rater reliability (k = 0.50; PABAK = 0.42) as shown in Appendix D (Table 
D2; Table D3).  As the pilot study Fleiss’ kappa (κ) was in the moderate agreement range 
between 0.41 and 0.60 on the Fleiss (1971) scale of agreement, modifications were made 
to the main study Microsoft® AccessTM database collection form based on the described 
rater feedback from the pilot study Microsoft® AccessTM database collection form 
(Appendix B; Figure B1; Appendix C; Figure C1).  This process validated the Microsoft 
AccessTM database collection form using the established guidance (Cohen, 1960; Fleiss, 
1971; Gwet, 2014).  The following results were from the data collected from the three 
raters for the main study. 
Descriptive Statistics 
The three raters determined the presence of specific contextual factors out of the 
46 research-identified factors in the main accident sample of 85 NTSB AARs from fatal 
GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC accidents (Appendix H; Table H1).  Rater’s identification of 
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the presence of the contextual factors in the 85 GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC cases used in 
the main study were assessed for specific factors, frequencies of occurrence, and 
manifestations.  Tables were developed to show the main study descriptive and frequency 
statistics (Table 3; Table 4; Table 5).  Tables were also developed to show the specific 
contextual factors and frequencies (Appendix H; Table H1).  The tables show the specific 
contextual factors and frequencies present in the 85 accidents used in the main study as 
identified by the three raters.  The manifestations were reported separately in the analysis. 
The relationships between the 46 research-identified contextual factors and age, flight 
experience, weather, flight conditions, time of day, and certification level were explored.   
The main study descriptive statistics were given in Table 3 and obtained from the 
SPSSTM analysis.  Accident pilot ages ranged from 17 to 82 (M = 52.20, SD = 13.35).  
The pilot flight experience (total flight hours) ranged from 35 to 15,000 hours (M = 
2,191.34, SD = 3,208.93).  Number of passengers on board ranged from 0 to 5 (M = 1.01, 
SD = 1.06).  Time of day when the accidents occurred ranged from 0100 to 2300 hours 




Accident Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation 
     
Pilot Age 17 82 52.20 13.35 
     
Pilot Flight Experience  35 15,000 2,191.34 3,208.93 
     
Passengers 0 5 1.01 1.06 
     
Time of Day (24 Hour) 1 23 14.05 6.17 
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Main study frequency statistics were provided in Table 4 and obtained from the 
SPSSTM analysis.  Highest to lowest frequencies were identified.  Flight conditions and 
inclement weather were identified with the highest frequencies of 97.6% occurrences in 
the main study.  Non-instrument rated pilots had the second highest frequency of 62.4% 
occurrence in the 85 accident sample.  Time of Day (Night) had the third highest 
frequency at 56.5% occurrence.  The Time of Day Light Condition (Day) had the fourth 
highest frequency at 43.6% occurrence.  Time of Day (Day) had the fifth highest 
frequency at 43.5% occurrence.  The Time of Day Light Condition (Night) had the sixth 
highest frequency at 39.9% occurrence.  Instrument-rated pilots had the seventh highest 
frequency at 37.6% occurrence.  Time of Day Light Condition (Dusk) had the eighth 
highest frequency at 7.1% occurrence.  Time of Day Light Condition (Dark) and (Dawn) 
had the nineth highest frequencies at 4.7% occurrence.  Flight Conditions (VMC) and 

























Accident Frequency Statistics 
 
Variable Percent 
     
Flight Conditions (IMC) 97.6    
     
Weather (Inclement) 97.6    
     
Non-Instrument Rated Pilot 62.4    
     
Time of Day (Night) 56.5    
     
Time of Day (Light Condition) - Day 43.6    
     
Time of Day (Day)  43.5    
     
Time of Day (Light Condition) - Night 39.9    
     
Instrument Rated Pilot 37.6    
     
Time of Day (Light Condition) - Dusk 7.1    
     
Time of Day (Light Condition) - Dark 4.7    
     
Time of Day (Light Condition) - Dawn 4.7    
     
Flight Conditions (VMC) 2.4    
     
Weather (Non-Inclement) 2.4    
     
 
Main study GA pilot crash distance descriptive statistics were provided in Table 5 and 
obtained from the SPSSTM analysis.  Crash distance from departure to the midpoint of the 
planned route as a percentage of planned course completion, 0% to 50%, identified from 
the provided latitude and longitude of the crash site in the NTSB AARs ranged from 0% 
to 49% (M = 7.51, SD = 14.47).  The crash distance from the midpoint to the planned 
destination of the planned route as a percentage of planned course completion, 51% to 
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100%, identified from the provided latitude and longitude of the crash site in the NTSB 





Crash Distance Descriptive Statistics (Main Study) 
 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation 
     
Crash Distance from 
Departure (0% to 
50%) 
0 49 7.51 14.47 
     
Crash Distance to 
Destination (51% to 
100%) 
51 99 82.53 15.46 




The percentage agreement, Fleiss’ kappa (κ), and PABAK calculations were used 
to determine rater agreement between the three raters in the main study beyond what was 
expected by chance.  The percentage agreement of 57% was manually calculated.  
Overall Fleiss’ kappa (κ) for the main study was calculated using IBM® SPSS™ software 
and showed there was fair agreement between raters, κ = 0.25 (95% CI, .24 to .25), p < 
.01 (Appendix D; Table D4).  The individual Fleiss’ kappa (κ) categories were calculated 
using IBM® SPSS™ software (Appendix D; Table D5).  The PABAK was also manually 
calculated (PABAK = 0.50).  The calculated main study overall Fleiss’ kappa, κ = 0.25, 
was between 0.21 and 0.40 for fair agreement on the generally accepted standards of 
agreement for kappa (κ) shown in Table 2 (Fleiss, 1971).  The fair agreement between the 
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three raters for the overall main study Fleiss’ kappa was a lower score on the scale of 
generally accepted standards of agreement.  The overall Fleiss’ kappa (κ) agreement was 
calculated for all ratings and six possible responses available for the 46 research-
identified contextual factor questions answered by each rater for the 85 accident sample 
dataset.  Although the overall Fleiss’ kappa (κ) score was in the fair range of agreement κ 
= 0.25, the individual Fleiss’ kappa (κ) score for the 1 response, indicating rater 
agreement for the presence of the contextual factor, was calculated to be κ = 0.51 and in 
the moderate range of agreement (Table 2).  The individual Fleiss’ kappa (κ) score for the 
0 response, indicating rater agreement for the absence of the contextual factor, was 
calculated to be κ = 0.38 and was on the high end of the fair range of agreement (Table 
2).  The overall Fleiss’ kappa (κ) score in the fair range of agreement κ = 0.25 was due to 
such reasons as inconsistency among the three raters in selecting the same response for 
the reason the contextual factor was not present, as there were several responses available 
to the raters for selection (i.e., Not Applicable, NA, Not enough information provided to 
identify the contextual factor, unknown, or providing no rating (blank) response).  The 
response of ‘Not enough information provided to identify the contextual factor’ was 
inconsistently but repeatedly used by the three raters as a reason for being unable to 
identify the presence of the contextual factors in the accident sample dataset (Appendix 
D; Table D5).  It is possible if the AARs and probable cause reports had contained more 
detailed information, a higher number of contextual factors could have been identified by 




The 46 research-identified contextual factors present in the main study sample of 
85 accidents, as identified by the three raters, was sorted to identify the specific 
contextual factors and associated frequencies, from the results obtained from SPSSTM 
(Appendix H; Table H1).  Three raters identified a total of 37 out of 46 research-
identified contextual factors in the 85 accident sample used in the main study.  The 
presence of the specific contextual factors identified by the raters is as follows: 
1. Passengers on board (CF29) - 53 out of 85 accidents 
2. Accident time of day (Day) (CF1) - 51 out of 85 accidents 
3. Crash distance from planned destination (CF15) - 46 out of 85 accidents 
4. Not filing a flight plan (CF21) - 42 out of 85 accidents 
5. Underestimating risk (CF43) - 42 out of 85 accidents 
6. IFR flight without clearance or ratings (CF26) - 41 out of 85 accidents 
7. Crash distance from departure (CF14) - 39 out of 85 accidents 
8. Situation assessment (CF39) - 35 out of 85 accidents 
9. Accident time of day (Night) (CF1) - 34 out of 85 accidents 
10. Crash distance from planned destination (CF15) - 29 out of 85 accidents 
11. Goal conflicts (CF24) - 27 out of 85 accidents 
12. Pilot briefer communication (CF33) - 25 out of 85 accidents 
13. Medical status policy violation (CF28) - 23 out of 85 accidents 
14. Receipt of weather briefing (CF36) - 22 out of 85 accidents 
15. Mountainous terrain (CF42) - 22 out of 85 accidents 
16. Adverse weather encountered late in the flight (CF3) - 22 out of 85 accidents 
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17. Plan continuation error (CF34) - 21 out of 85 accidents 
18. Adverse weather encountered early in the flight (CF2) - 20 out of 85 accidents 
19. Communication with air traffic control (CF12) - 18 out of 85 accidents 
20. Time/distance flown into IMC before the accident occurred - less than or 
equal to half the time and distance required to reach the destination before the 
accident occurred (CF6) - 17 out of 85 accidents 
21. Height of crash site (0 to 999 feet mean sea level) (CF25) - 16 out of 85 
accidents 
22. Currency policy violation (CF16) - 15 out of 85 accidents 
23. Decision to continue VFR-into-IMC to the planned destination (CF17) - 15 
out of 85 accidents 
24. Pilot briefer communication (not present) (CF33) - 14 out of 85 accidents 
25. Scud running (CF37) – 13 out of 85 accidents 
26. Filing a flight plan (CF21) - 12 out of 85 accidents 
27. Ratings policy violation (CF35) - 12 out of 85 accidents 
28. Self reported weather cues (CF38) - 12 out of 85 accidents 
29. Source of weather information (good source) (CF41) - 12 out of 85 accidents 
30. Adverse weather encountered early in the flight (CF2) - 11 out of 85 accidents 
31. Communication with air traffic control (CF12) – 11 out of 85 accidents 
32. Number of passengers on board (2) (CF29) – 9 out of 85 accidents 
33. Receipt of weather briefing (CF36) – 9 out of 85 accidents 
34. Medical status policy violation (CF28) – 7 out of 85 accidents 
35. Ratings policy violation (CF35) – 7 out of 85 accidents 
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36. Ambiguity (CF5) – 6 out of 85 accidents 
37. Time/distance flown into IMC before the accident occurred - greater than half 
the time and distance required to reach the destination before the accident 
occurred (CF6) – 6 out of 85 accidents 
38. Flight into known icing conditions (CF22) – 5 out of 85 accidents 
39. Decision to divert from VFR-into-IMC to an alternate destination (CF18) – 4 
out of 85 accidents 
40. Height of crash site 2,000 to 2,999 feet mean sea level (CF25) – 4 out of 85 
accidents 
41. Terrain (Hill) (CF42) – 4 out of 85 accidents 
42. Unrecoverable low altitude (CF44) – 4 out of 85 accidents 
43. Cruising altitude 0 to 999 feet mean sea level (CF4) – 3 out of 85 accidents 
44. Cruising altitude 10,000 to 10,999 mean sea level (CF25) – 3 out of 85 
accidents 
45. Height of crash site 3,000 to 3,999 mean sea level (CF25) – 3 out of 85 
accidents 
46. Height of crash site 4,000 to 4,999 feet mean sea level (CF25) – 3 out of 85 
accidents 
47. Height of crash site 5,000 to 5,999 feet mean sea level (CF25) – 3 out of 85 
accidents 
48. Height of crash site 6,000 to 6,999 feet mean sea level (CF25) – 3 out of 85 
accidents 
49. Passengers on board (3) (CF29) – 3 out of 85 accidents 
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50. Permission seeking behaviors (CF32) - 3 out of 85 accidents 
51. Social (CF40) - 3 out of 85 accidents 
52. Cruising altitude 13,000 to 13,999 feet mean sea level (CF4) – 2 out of 85 
accidents 
53. Cruising altitude 6,000 to 6,999 feet mean sea level (CF4) – 2 out of 85 
accidents 
54. Cruising altitude 7,000 to 7,999 feet mean sea level (CF4) – 2 out of 85 
accidents 
55. Height of crash site 1,000 to 1,999 feet mean sea level (CF25) – 2 out of 85 
accidents 
56. Height of crash site 8,000 to 8,999 feet mean sea level (CF25) – 2 out of 85 
accidents 
57. Passengers on board (5) (CF29) – 2 out of 85 accidents 
58. Organization (CF31) – 2 out of 85 accidents 
59. Terrain (Ocean) (CF42) – 2 out of 85 accidents 
60. Cruising altitude 11,000 to 11,999 feet mean sea level (CF4) – 1 out of 85 
accidents 
61. Cruising altitude 12,000 to 12,999 feet mean sea level (CF4) – 1 out of 85 
accidents 
62. Cruising altitude 14,000 to 14,999 feet mean sea level (CF4) – 1 out of 85 
accidents 




64. Cruising altitude 4,000 to 4,999 feet mean sea level (CF4) – 1 out of 85 
accidents 
65. Cruising altitude 5,000 to 5,999 feet mean sea level (CF4) – 1 out of 85 
accidents 
66. Cruising altitude 9,000 to 9,999 feet mean sea level (CF4) – 1 out of 85 
accidents 
67. Amount of time/distance the GA pilot flew into the IMC weather before 
diverting (CF7) – 1 out of 85 accidents 
68. Time/distance into IMC before diverting to an alternate - flight time and 
distance in IMC were less than or equal to half the time and distance to reach 
the destination before diverting (CF7) – 1 out of 85 accidents 
69. Circular decision making (CF10) – 1 out of 85 accidents 
70. Consequences not anticipated (CF13) – 1 out of 85 accidents 
71. Height of crash site 10,000 to 10,999 feet mean sea level (CF25) – 1 out of 85 
accidents 
72. Height of crash site 7,000 to 7,999 feet mean sea level (CF25) – 1 out of 85 
accidents 
73. Obtaining an online preflight weather briefing (CF30) – 1 out of 85 accidents 
74. Self reported weather cues (CF38) – 1 out of 85 accidents 
75. Terrain (Forest) (CF42) – 1 out of 85 accidents 
76. Unrecoverable low altitude (CF44) – 1 out of 85 accidents 
The three raters provided their respective opinions about how the 46 research-
identified contextual factors were manifested in the 85 accident sample.  Comments 
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provided by the raters for each accident were reviewed for their opinions on how the 46 
contextual factors were manifested.  Rater contextual factor manifestation results for the 
main study are as follows:  
Accident time of day (CF1).  Three raters identified the time of day when the 85 
accidents occurred.  There were a total of 70 accidents occurring during the day, and 15 
accidents took place at night.  The particular lighting conditions varied and included six 
accidents taking place at dusk, 37 during daylight conditions, 33 during night light 
conditions, five during dark light conditions, and four during dawn light conditions.  Two 
accidents occurred at 0000, one at 0100, two at 0400, five at 0500, three at 0600, four at 
0700, three at 0800, four at 0900, five at 1000, four at 1100, five at 1200, one at 1300, 
five at 1400, two at 1500, three at 1600, four at 1700, seven at 1800, ten at 1900, five at 
2000, four at 2100, three at 2200, and three at 2300.                                
Adverse weather encountered early in flight (CF2).  In a particular accident, 
the rater commented adverse weather existed, possibly the whole way.  In another 
accident, the pilot filed IFR, then near the destination cancelled IFR and flew VFR-into-
IMC back to the point of origin.  A rater commented for a particular accident adverse 
weather was encountered before and after the mid flight point since the pilot was IMC 
from the departure point to the crash site which was a distance almost as great as that of 
the destination.   
Adverse weather encountered late in flight (CF3).  A rater commented for a 
particular accident adverse weather existed, possibly the whole way.  In another accident 
the rater commented the pilot filed IFR, then near the destination, cancelled IFR and flew 
VFR into IMC back to point of origin.  A rater commented for a particular accident 
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adverse weather was encountered before and after the mid flight point since the pilot was 
IMC from the departure point to the crash site which was a distance almost as great as 
that of the destination. 
Altitude (CF4).  The cruising altitudes of the aircraft in the 85 accident sample 
included the following: (1) 0 - 999 feet mean sea level, (2) 1,300 - 1,399 feet mean sea 
level, (3) 5,000 - 5,999 feet mean sea level, (4) 6,000 - 6,999 feet mean sea level, (5) 
7,000 - 7,999 feet mean sea level, (6) 9,000 - 9,999 feet mean sea level, (7) 10,000 - 
10,999 feet mean sea level, (8) 11,000 - 11,999 feet mean sea level, (9) 12,000 - 12,999 
feet mean sea level, and (10) 13,000 - 13,999 feet mean sea level. 
Ambiguity (CF5).  A rater commented for a particular accident ambiguity 
deterioration was gradual since the open VFR channel, as perceived by the pilot, may 
have been misleading.  In a particular accident, the rater commented the radio call 
indicated cues were clear to the pilot.  A rater commented for one of the accidents a 
discussion of cloud cycle with another pilot was not considered relevant by the pilot.  A 
rater commented for one of the accidents cues were clear to the pilot as explained by the 
surviving rear seat passenger.  In another accident, the rater commented a pilot stated the 
pilot-in-command descended to maintain contact with the ground.  A rater commented 
for a particular accident ambiguity determination was based on the pilot reports to air 
traffic control.  In another accident, the rater commented the cues were clear to the pilot, 
as the pilot-in-command advised air traffic control prior to frequency change the field 
was not in sight and he may need to call them again.  A rater commented for one of the 
accidents the pilot could have seen cues and was trying to descend or did not see cues and 
thought he had enough holes to descend.   
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Amount time/distance GA pilot flew into IMC before accident occurred 
(CF6).  A rater commented the plane was not in IMC conditions a long time.  In another 
accident, the rater commented there was no way of knowing if the pilot was diverting to 
an alternate or just trying to get below clouds to continue the flight. 
Amount time/distance GA pilot flew into IMC before diverting (CF7).  A 
rater commented for a particular accident the plane was not in IMC conditions a long 
time.  Another rater commented there was no way of knowing if the pilot was diverting to 
an alternate or just trying to get below clouds to continue the flight. 
Attentional tunneling (CF8).  One rater commented attentional tunneling was 
unknown.  The rater made an additional comment a handheld global positioning system 
(GPS) was onboard but its use was unknown, and there was not enough information 
provided in the report.  In another accident, one of the raters commented there was a 
moving map onboard; however, there was no information provided in the report on how 
it was used.  One of the raters commented for a particular accident there was not enough 
information provided in the report, although the pilot had a handheld Garmin GPSMAP 
196 onboard.  Another rater commented for another accident a handheld GPS was found, 
but there was no way to know if the pilot became overly absorbed in its use. 
Ceiling and visibility determination (CF9).  A rater commented for a particular 
report the pilot overestimated the ceiling most likely due to rapid changes in ceiling and 
conditions of darkness.  Another rater commented for a particular accident the pilot radio 
call at 1931 for weather at Lafayette to transition perhaps caused an overestimation for 
the destination ceiling and visibility.  In another accident, the rater commented the pilot 
thought he could stay above and get below clouds.  A rater commented for another 
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accident the pilot overestimated ceiling; otherwise he would not have cruised at 7,500 
becoming stuck on top.  One rater commented for another accident the pilot may have 
flown VMC above a fog layer.  In another accident, the rater commented the pilot 
overestimated clouds.  One of the raters commented for a particular accident the pilot 
misinterpretation of ceiling and visibility led to getting caught above the clouds (ruling 
out intentional self-harm).  A rater commented for one of the accidents the pilot thought 
he could get on top of clouds. 
Circular decision-making (CF10).  A rater commented for a particular accident 
no circular decision making was apparent, since no changes were made (no divert 
decision).  In another accident, the rater commented circular decision making was 
apparent when the pilot changed the flight path to try and exit IMC.  In another accident, 
the rater commented, although better decisions could have been made, the pilot used new 
information from the controller to update his plan, based on the level of risk he was 
willing to accept. 
Cognitive anchoring (CF11).  A rater commented cognitive anchoring was 
present due to the VFR channel and may have been misleading.  In another accident, the 
rater commented there was not enough information to make a definite decision but since 
the weather was fine at the departure point, it is likely the pilot "anchored" this 
information and applied it to the destination.  A rater commented for a particular 
accident, even though the weather was not formally checked, the pilot was likely aware 
of clear sky conditions and was misled with a rapidly changing ceiling in darkness.  In 
another accident, a rater commented cognitive anchoring was attributable to the 1931 
radio call.  A rater commented for a particular accident since the earlier legs were trouble 
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free, even with new information, the pilot thought it would hold.  Another rater 
commented for one of the accidents cognitive anchoring was apparent since fog was 
moving into the area but had not yet arrived.  In another accident, the rater commented 
there was no cognitive anchoring because the pilot was trying to pull information out of 
the second briefer to update his information.  A rater commented for a particular accident 
cognitive anchoring was apparent as the pilot relied heavily on briefer information, 
suggesting VFR.  In another accident, the rater commented cognitive anchoring was 
apparent when the pilot likely used his earlier experience on the inbound flight as a 
picture of the weather on the return, not checking weather for the return flight.  A rater 
commented for another accident cognitive anchoring was apparent because the briefer 
said things would get better by 1000 and then he stated if the pilot waited until 1000 to 
depart then he could avoid the fog.  A rater commented for another accident cognitive 
anchoring was apparent after addressing the radio failure, the pilot did not change his 
plan.  In another accident the rater commented cognitive anchoring was apparent because 
the pilot left the departure point with marginal VFR.  In another accident, the rater 
commented cognitive anchoring was possible due to the pilot latching on to the 
destination Terminal Aerodrome Forecast (TAF) and not giving as much consideration to 
the Airmen’s Meteorological Information (AIRMET).  A rater commented for a 
particular accident cognitive anchoring was apparent as the pilot was probably 
comfortable with the normal VMC of the area and used it to proceed; however, it is 
unclear why he navigated to Gorman (GMN) Very High Frequency Omni-Directional 
Range (VOR) which is near high terrain.  In another accident, the rater commented 
cognitive anchoring was apparent due to predominantly VMC and the multiple crossings 
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through the pass several times that day.  A rater commented for another accident 
cognitive anchoring was apparent because the pilot, prior to the flight, indicated he would 
fly through the pass via route 95, and the plan was followed precisely until the crash.  
The rater made an additional comment the pilot likely had a belief this would avoid IMC.  
Another rater commented cognitive anchoring was apparent because the initial weather 
briefing, 11 hours prior, was acceptable for VFR flight.  The rater made an additional 
comment the pilot never received an updated briefing, and it is likely the pilot maintained 
VFR flight to the destination was possible.  A rater commented for a particular accident 
cognitive anchoring was apparent because the briefer and pilot concluded if he could get 
to the destination in about 45-50 minutes, the pilot could avoid the weather with the 
briefer, adding if he did need to get back to VFR he could head south.  In another 
accident, the rater commented cognitive anchoring was apparent by continuing the flight 
and descending rather than turning around and finding an alternate.  A rater commented 
for a particular accident cognitive anchoring was apparent as the pilot was told by another 
pilot at the destination he could see the stars and the runway lights.  The rater made an 
additional comment, it appeared this convinced the pilot to make the flight rather than 
cancel or wait.  In another accident, the rater commented the pilot imposed self-induced 
pressures to make flight.  A rater commented for a particular accident cognitive 
anchoring was apparent due to nice weather on departure.  In another accident, the rater 
commented cognitive anchoring was apparent as the weather at the departure point was 
acceptable; however, the pilot's wife called him to let him know she was encountering 
heavy fog, but he continued to the destination with no regard to the updated weather 
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information.  In another accident, the rater commented cognitive anchoring was apparent 
as the pilot must have been convinced the weather would improve at the destination. 
Communication with air traffic control (CF12).  A rater commented for a 
particular accident the pilot communicated with the automated flight service station 
(AFSS) but not air traffic control.  A rater commented for one of the accidents the pilot 
communicated with air traffic control before the accident but then lost communication, 
although some communication relay was conducted.  In another accident, the rater 
commented the pilot communicated with air traffic control, but the communication was 
very brief, and he did not respond to the assigned squawk and frequency change for 
transit through Memphis Class B airspace.  In another accident, the rater commented the 
pilot was not in communication with Air Traffic Control (ATC).  A rater commented for 
a particular accident the pilot was told services were terminated about nine minutes prior 
to the accident.  In another accident, the rater commented the pilot was in communication 
with ATC prior to the accident but made the frequency change off of air traffic control 
before the actual accident. 
Consequences not anticipated (CF13).  A rater made a comment for one of the 
accidents the pilot was under stress because the left fuel cap was left off.  In another 
accident, the rater commented the pilot was under stress and may or may not have 
considered IMC consequences.  A rater commented for one of the accidents the pilot was 
under stress due to previous cancellations.  A rater commented for one of the accidents 
the pilot was under stress due to a spinal condition and treatment.  In another accident, 
the rater commented the pilot was under stress due to medications.  A rater commented 
for another accident the underlying condition requiring the antihistamine likely stressed 
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the pilot.  In another accident, the rater commented the pilot was under stress due to the 
antihistamines in his system.  A rater commented in one of the accidents the pilot was 
under stress due to his business work schedule.  In another accident, the pilot was under 
stress due to a medical condition related to back pain.  In another accident, the rater 
commented the pilot was under stress as he had a passenger onboard, and the purpose of 
the flight was to make an appointment, specifically soaring instruction.  In another 
accident, the rater commented the pilot was under stress due to a medical condition.  A 
rater commented for one of the accidents the pilot was under stress due to the weather 
environment.  Another rater commented for a particular accident the pilot was under 
stress due to the long flight activity. 
Crash distance from departure (CF14).  The aircraft crash distances occurring 
between 0% and 50% of the planned route distance from the departure were calculated by 
the researcher based on the latitude and longitude coordinates provided by the NTSB 
investigators completing the AARs.  The crash distances from the departure location to 
the midpoint as a percentage of the planned route of flight course completion included the 
following: (1) 0% (12 accidents), (2) 1% (3 accidents), (3) 2% (2 accidents), (4) 3% (1 
accident), (5) 10% (2 accidents), (6) 11% (1 accident), (7) 13% (1 accident), (8) 18% (1 
accident), (9) 19% (1 accident), (10) 20% (1 accident), (11) 23% (1 accident), (12) 24% 
(1 accident), (13) 25% (1 accident), (14) 29% (1 accident), (15) 33% (1 accident), (16) 
35% (1 accident), (17) 41% (3 accidents), (18) 45% (1 accident), (19) 46% (1 accident), 
(20) 47% (1 accident), (21) 48% (1 accident), and (22) 49% (2 accidents). 
Crash distance from planned destination (CF15).  The aircraft crash distances 
occurring between 51% and 100% of the planned route distance from the planned 
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destination were calculated by the researcher based on the latitude and longitude 
coordinates provided by the NTSB investigators completing the AARs.  The crash 
distances from the midpoint to the planned destination as a percentage of the planned 
route of flight course completion included the following: (1) 51% (12 accidents), (2) 56% 
(1 accident), (3) 59% (1 accident), (4) 60% (1 accident), (5) 62% (1 accident), (6) 66% (1 
accident), (7) 69% (1 accident), (8) 70% (2 accidents), (9) 71% (1 accident), (10) 73% (1 
accident), (11) 74% (2 accidents), (12) 77% (3 accidents), (13) 84% (1 accident), (14) 
86% (1 accident), (15) 89% (1 accident), (16) 90% (1 accident), (17) 94% (1 accident), 
(18) 95% (1 accident), (19) 96% (1 accident), (20) 97% (1 accident), (21) 98% (1 
accident), and (22) 99% (9 accidents). 
Currency policy violation (CF16).  One of the raters commented the pilot's 
passenger carrying currency was exceeded.  In another accident, the rater commented 
there was not enough information on night landing currency with passengers to determine 
if CF16 was present.  A rater commented for a particular accident the pilot’s biennial 
flight review was expired.  In another accident, the rater commented currency was 
assumed ok for night landings with passenger by assuming the reported night hours in the 
last 90 days included the three night takeoffs and landings.  In another accident, the rater 
commented the currency policy was ok as 31 hours was obtained in the last 90 days and 
allowed for the three takeoffs and landings needed for passenger carry.  A rater 
commented for a particular accident the student pilot took a passenger on the flight and 
was prohibited.  One of the raters commented for a particular accident there was a 
currency policy violation because the last pilot logbook entry was greater than six months 
prior and would preclude 90 takeoffs and landings currency for passenger carrying.  One 
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of the raters commented for a particular accident the pilot was current due to pilot recent 
time, night passenger carrying currency was assumed, and the recent biennial flight 
review (BFR) was valid. 
Decision to continue VFR-into-IMC to the planned destination (CF17).  A 
rater commented for a particular accident the pilot overflew the destination field saying 
he saw lights, but the observation was not visual on the field.  In another accident, the 
rater commented the pilot decided to continue VFR-into-IMC to the planned destination 
possibly due to communication with the controller.  A rater made the comment for 
another accident the pilot decided to continue into IMC since the briefer said VFR was 
not recommended in the obscuration areas, but the pilot went anyway.  In another 
accident, the rater commented the pilot decided not to divert based on descent and course.   
Decision to divert from VFR-into-IMC to an alternate destination (CF18).  A 
rater made the comment for a particular accident the pilot did not continue VFR-into-
IMC because the report concluded the pilot turned to exit IMC.  In another accident, the 
rater commented the pilot did not continue to the planned destination but tried to return to 
the point of origin.  A rater made the comment for another accident, the pilot turned to 
the North and could have been disorientation or tried to divert to an alternate location.  In 
another accident, the rater commented the pilot may have decided to divert based on the 
pilot statement to his wife and may have attempted to divert to the point of origin.  In 
another accident, the rater commented the pilot decided to divert from IMC because the 
report concluded the pilot turned to exit IMC. 
Delay in obtaining the current weather conditions (CF19).  A rater made the 
comment for a particular accident, the pilot delayed obtaining the current weather 
119 
 
conditions.  In another accident, the rater commented the pilot did not get any weather 
information. 
Descent below weather minimums (CF20).   A rater commented for a particular 
accident, the pilot descended below weather minimums and encountered rising terrain.  In 
another accident, the rater commented the pilot descended below VFR weather 
minimums, and likely IFR weather minimums, in an attempt to land at the desired airport. 
Filing of a flight plan (CF21).  One of the raters made the comment for a 
particular accident, the pilot did not file a flight plan.  In another accident, the rater 
commented the flight plan was input via computer but did not go through due to 
incomplete information input by the pilot.  A rater made the comment for another 
accident, the pilot filed IFR, through a malformed request to air traffic control, but was 
not rated to do so.  In another accident, the rater commented the pilot filed a flight plan, 
although the NTSB investigator completing the report incorrectly and indicated no on the 
form.  In another accident, the rater commented it was possible an instrument rated pilot 
opted to not file IFR.  A rater commented for a particular accident, the pilot filed IFR, 
then near the destination, cancelled the IFR flight plan and flew VFR-into-IMC back to 
the point of origin.  In another accident, the rater commented the pilot received a weather 
briefing and filed via the Direct User Access Terminal Service (DUATS), but the report 
did not say that a briefing was obtained from DUATS.  In another accident, the rater 
commented, the pilot filing IFR was technically true, but practically, if the pilot was 
trying to avoid icing, filing IFR was not a practical option.  In another accident, the rater 
commented the IFR pilot in Class G airspace was not in violation of needing to file a 
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flight plan.  A rater commented for one of the accidents, the pilot should have filed IFR 
and flown IFR procedures. 
Flight into known icing conditions (CF22).  A rater made the comment for a 
particular accident, the pilot flew into forecast icing at night.  In another accident, the 
rater commented, the pilot flew into icing conditions, since IMC was above the freezing 
level.  Another rater commented in one of the accidents, the pilot flew into known icing 
based on the Meteorological Impact Statement (MIS). 
Flight plan policy violation (CF23).  A rater made the comment for one of the 
accidents, the pilot had a ratings policy violation, since he lied on his application.  In 
another accident, the rater commented the flight plan policy was a key factor.  Another 
rater commented on a particular accident, while the flight was conducted under Part 91 
flight rules, the flight was operated by a Part 135 operator and is unlike most of the other 
accidents conducted as personal flights. 
Goal conflicts (CF24).  One of the raters commented in a particular accident, the 
pilot took a risk, since the co-owner advised him not to make the flight.  In another 
accident, the rater commented it was not possible to determine if the pilot took a safety 
risk, as he thought he was getting good information.  A rater made the comment in one of 
the accidents there was a goal conflict related to a 0930 appointment. 
Height of crash site (CF25).  The height of the crash sites were reported as the 
following: (1) 0 - 999 feet mean sea level, (2) 1,000 - 1,999 feet mean sea level, (3) 2,000 
- 2,999 feet mean sea level, (4) 3,000 - 3,999 feet mean sea level, (5) 4,000 - 4,999 feet 
mean sea level, (6) 5,000 - 5,999 feet mean sea level, (7) 6,000 - 6,999 feet mean sea 
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level, (8) 7,000 - 7,999 feet mean sea level, (9) 8,000 - 8,999 feet mean sea level, and 
(10) 10,000 - 10,999 feet mean sea level.   
IFR flight without clearance or ratings (CF26).  A rater made the comment for 
a particular accident, the pilot conducted the flight without clearance because the NTSB 
stated Class E airspace was the location for the accident. 
Linear decision - making (CF27).  One of the raters made the comment for a 
particular accident, the pilot exhibited linear decision making, since even though the 
forecast was for IFR along route of flight, the pilot waited for IMC to occur. 
Medical status policy violation (CF28).  One of the raters made the comment for 
a particular accident, the pilot's medical policy violation was severe since he lied on his 
medical application.  In another accident, the rater commented the pilot was not in 
violation, but postmortem medical status was an interesting factor.  A rater made the 
comment for one of the accidents, the pilot exhibited several medical status policy 
violations, as numerous impairing drugs seemed central and/or indicative of the pilot’s 
hazardous attitude.  One of the raters commented for another accident, medical status 
policy violation was apparent due to the pilot’s use of antihistamine.  In another accident, 
the rater made the comment, the pilot exhibited a medical policy violation due to drugs 
with a sedating side effect in his system.  One of the raters made the comment for one of 
the accidents, the pilot exhibited a medical status violation due to an expired medical.  In 
another accident, one of the raters made the comment a medical status violation was 
apparent since the coroner obtained the pilot’s medical data and the NTSB investigator 
provided the information in the AAR. 
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Number of passengers on board (CF29).  A total of 32 out of the 85 accident 
sample occurred with no passengers on board the aircraft.  A total of 36 accidents had 
one passenger on the aircraft.  A total of 11 accidents had two passengers.  A total of 
three accidents had three passengers on board the aircraft.  A total of one accident had 
four passengers on board the aircraft.  A total of two accidents had five passengers on 
board the aircraft. 
Obtaining an on-line preflight weather briefing (CF30).  One of the raters 
made the comment for a particular accident, the pilot was unable to get an online 
preflight weather briefing, though he tried.  In another accident, the rater commented the 
pilot failed to get an online preflight weather briefing.  One of the raters made the 
comment for a particular accident, the pilot obtained an online preflight weather briefing. 
Organization (CF31).  A rater made the comment for one of the accidents, the 
pilot was concerned about leaving the aircraft at the hospital and may have been a 
concern related to aircraft exposure to a storm.  In another accident, the rater commented 
organizational conflict factored into an experienced pilot's decision to continue VFR-
into-IMC.  One of the raters made the comment for a particular accident, the 
organizational conflict affected the pilot's decision-making to conduct the flight. 
Permission-seeking behaviors (CF32).  One of the raters commented for a 
particular accident, the group flight contributed to permission seeking behavior.  In 
another accident, the rater commented the pilot's permission-seeking also seemed at play, 
with multiple calls to the Flight Service Station (FSS); although, FSS never gave 
"permission" and advised against the flight, as did another IFR-rated pilot.  In another 
accident, the rater commented the briefer aided the pilot's permission-seeking behavior. 
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Pilot-briefer communication (CF33).  A rater commented in one of the 
accidents, the pilot-briefer communication was a factor.  In another accident, the rater 
commented the co-owner advised the pilot about the weather.  A rater made the comment 
in one of the accidents, the pilot-briefer communication may have contributed to pilot 
weather misdiagnosis by the briefer saying no adverse weather.  In another accident, the 
rater commented the weather briefing for the accident segment was misleading and 
incomplete.  A rater made the comment in one of the accidents, despite the adverse 
weather briefing, the pilot decided to conduct the flight. 
Plan continuation error (PCE) (CF34).  One of the raters made the comment for 
a particular accident, PCE was a factor contributing to the accident due to business plans 
discussed in the report.  In another accident, the rater made the comment PCE behavior 
was assumed based on action and outcome.  One of the raters made the comment for a 
particular accident, PCE was a possible contextual factor as the pilot seemed to go with 
his plan and ignore fog assuming he could punch through.  In another accident, the rater 
commented PCE was likely, given the proximity to the airport.  A rater made the 
comment in a particular accident, PCE was apparent based on the descent and flight 
course and affected the pilot's decision making.  In another accident, the rater made the 
comment, the pilot exhibited poor decision-making skills combined with PCE to attempt 
the flight.  One of the raters made the comment in a particular accident, PCE was likely 
because the pilot proceeded even with an airborne briefing in addition to a briefing during 
preflight.  In another accident, the rater made the comment this was a preflight decision-
making accident, not only for IMC but for thunderstorms.  One of the raters made the 
comment in a particular accident, despite the weather briefing, the pilot conducted the 
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flight anyway.  In another accident, one of the raters made the comment PCE was a factor 
by the pilot continuing the flight and descending rather than turning around and finding 
an alternate.  One of the raters made the comment for a particular accident, PCE led the 
pilot to underestimate the risk of conducting the flight.  In another accident, the rater 
commented the pilot imposed self-induced pressures to complete the flight contributing 
to PCE. 
Ratings policy violation (CF35).  One of the raters made the comment the pilot 
filed IFR, through a malformed request to air traffic control, but was not rated to do so 
and was a key factor.  In another accident, the rater made the comment a non-instrument 
rated pilot flying into IMC is a rating violation.  One of the raters made the comment in a 
particular accident, the pilot was in violation of the ratings policy, as the pilot-in-
command was a student pilot, because he was carrying passengers with no endorsement.  
In another accident, the rater commented there was a ratings policy violation since the 
pilot lied on his medical application.  In another accident, the rater commented there was 
no instrument recency met.  One of the raters commented for a particular accident, there 
was inadequate instructor supervision, as the instructor was obliged to provide better 
supervision to student pilot.  In another accident, the rater commented the ratings policy 
violation was the primary contextual factor related to a student pilot with a passenger on 
a twice a week greater than 25 nm flight at night.  One of the raters made the comment 
for a particular accident, many IMC flights were logged by the pilot without the proper 




Receipt of weather briefing (CF36).  One of the raters made the comment for a 
particular accident, the pilot did not receive a weather briefing.  In another accident, the 
rater commented, given the resources at the field, the pilot likely obtained a weather 
briefing using electronic means at the Fixed Base Operator (FBO).  One of the raters 
commented for a particular accident, the pilot did not receive a full weather briefing.  In 
another accident, the rater commented the pilot received a weather briefing, but the 
weather briefing was incomplete and was not factored into the risk estimation.  A rater 
made the comment in one of the accidents, the pilot did not receive a preflight weather 
briefing.  In another accident, the rated commented the weather briefing for the accident 
segment was misleading and incomplete.  One of the raters made the comment in a 
particular accident, the pilot received a weather briefing, presumably by DUATS.  The 
rater made an additional comment the pilot filed via DUATS, but the report did not say a 
weather briefing was obtained from DUATS.  In another accident, the rater commented 
despite the adverse weather briefing, the pilot decided to conduct the flight anyway.  One 
of the raters commented in a particular accident, the pilot did receive a weather briefing, 
but it was not timely.  In another accident, the rater commented the pilot did not get a 
weather brief from an FAA-approved source.  The rater made an additional comment it is 
unknown if the pilot got a brief from another source.   
Scud running (CF37).  A rater made the comment in one of the accidents, it is 
assumed the pilot was scud running due to the 700 foot above ground level (AGL) cruise 
altitude.  In another accident, the rater commented it is assumed the pilot was scud 
running due to the altitude prior to the accident.  In another accident, the rater commented 
scud running was likely due to a transition, at some point, from 7,500 feet cruise altitude 
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to 1,300 feet.  One of the raters made the comment in a particular accident, the pilot was 
not scud running, as a witness said he was flying above the base of the clouds and was 
intentional IMC.  In another accident, the rater commented scud running was assumed 
based on the aircraft altitude.  One of the raters commented in a particular accident, the 
pilot was scud running based on a witness account.  In another accident, the rater 
commented, the pilot was scud running based on weather and transit through controlled 
airspace.  One of the raters commented in a particular accident, scud running was the 
primary cause of the accident. 
Self-reported weather cues (CF38).  One of the rater’s commented in a 
particular accident, the squawked 7700 transponder code suggested the pilot recognized 
the deteriorating weather conditions but did not know how or what action to take to exit 
such conditions.  In another accident, the rater commented the pilot recognized the self-
reported weather cues, as the flight path near the crash site indicated he recognized the 
visibility.  One of the raters commented in a particular accident, the pilot's inability to 
recognize self-reported weather cues led to getting caught above the clouds, ruling out 
intentional self-harm.  In another accident, the rater commented the pilot was not able to 
recognize weather cues. 
Situation assessment (CF39).  One of the raters commented in a particular 
accident, the situation was underestimated by the pilot leading to inadvertent IMC.  In 
another accident, the rater commented the pilot did assess the situation and return.  One 
of the raters commented in a particular accident, the pilot misdiagnosed the situation 
using bad weather information.  In another accident, the rater commented the pilot 
misdiagnosed the weather situation of fog forming, and night conditions contributed to 
127 
 
the misdiagnosis.  One of the raters made the comment in a particular accident, the pilot's 
poor decision-making let to poor situation assessment.  In another accident, the pilot 
exhibited poor decision-making skills to attempt the flight.  One of the raters commented 
in a particular accident, the accident was a preflight decision-making accident, not only 
for IMC but for thunderstorms.  In another accident, the rater commented the pilot 
conducted a poor situation assessment, ruling out intentional self-harm.  One of the raters 
made the comment in a particular accident, the pilot’s poor situation assessment led to 
getting caught above the clouds, ruling out intentional self-harm.  In another accident, the 
rater commented the pilot misdiagnosed weather cues, and night was a factor including 
possible fatigue resulting from five flights, nine to ten hours of duty time, lack of risk 
assessment for positioning the flight, and lack of night vision goggles.  One of the raters 
made the comment in a particular accident, the pilot imposed self-induced pressures to 
make the flight leading to poor situation assessment. 
Social (CF40).  One of the raters commented on a particular flight, the group 
flight contributed to permission seeking behavior.  In another accident, social pressures 
were at play with business plans discussed in the report.  One of the raters made the 
comment in a particular accident, social pressures factored into the experienced pilot's 
decision to continue VFR-into-IMC.  In another accident, social pressure was apparent 
and based on the pressure to attend a meeting in Aspen.  One of the raters made the 
comment in a particular accident, social pressures adversely affected the pilot's decision 
making.  In another accident, the rater commented social pressure was apparent due to 
expectations at work, arriving by conducting a flight to different work locations.  One of 
128 
 
the raters made the comment in a particular accident, social pressures led to the pilot 
underestimating risk to conduct the flight. 
Source of weather information (CF41).  One of the raters commented for a 
particular flight, there was no record of a weather briefing.  In another accident, the pilot 
selected a good source of weather information, but the weather information was not 
complete.  One of the raters made the comment in a particular accident, the source of 
weather information provided to the pilot by the briefer was bad.  In another accident, the 
rater commented the pilot should not have completed the long flight with only an outlook 
briefing, resulting in VFR-into-IMC and icing.  One of the raters commented in a 
particular accident, the pilot did not update the weather information soon enough, 
resulting in his weather information being poor and leading to underestimating the risk in 
conducting the flight. 
Terrain (CF42).  The raters identified the physical characteristics of the land 
where the accidents occurred included the following: (1) marsh based on the chart; (2) 
mountains; (3) hills; (4) forest; and (5) swamp.   
Underestimating risk (CF43).  One of the raters commented, after the adverse 
weather briefing, the pilot filed VFR, indicating an underestimation of risk in conducting 
the flight.  In another accident, the rater commented the pilot underestimated the risk in 
conducting the flight, given the time of day, night conditions, and mountainous terrain.  
One of the raters made the comment in a particular accident, the pilot exhibited poor 
decision-making in underestimating the risk in conducting the flight.  In another accident, 
the rater commented the instructor-rated passenger presence and bad decision-making 
factors contributed to the pilot underestimating the risk in conducting the flight.  One of 
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the raters commented in a particular accident, the accident was a preflight decision-
making accident, not only for IMC but for thunderstorms.  In another accident, the rater 
commented the lighting conditions contributed to the accident.  One of the raters 
commented in a particular accident, the pilot received a weather briefing, but it was 
incomplete and not factored into the risk estimation of flying in mountainous terrain.  In 
another accident, the rater commented the weather briefing for the accident segment was 
misleading and incomplete, combined with an incomplete pilot risk assessment.  One of 
the raters commented in a particular accident, the pilot was flying in night conditions.  In 
another accident, the rater commented the NTSB report emphasized the pilot had next 
day work-related obligations.  The rater made an additional comment stating these factors 
contributed to the pilot's bad decision-making, contributing to underestimating the risk in 
conducting the flight.  The rater made another comment stating it is also possible an 
intentional self-harm act on the part of the pilot may have been a factor contributing to 
the accident.  In another accident, the rater commented the pilot's underestimation of risk 
led to getting caught above the clouds.  The rater made an additional comment stating it 
is also possible intentional self-harm may have also been a factor in the accident.  In 
another accident, the rater commented the pilot underestimated the risk of clouds and 
thunderstorms.  One of the raters made the comment in a particular accident, the pilot 
underestimated the risk of flying low to avoid IMC.  In another accident, the rater 
commented social pressures led the pilot to underestimate risk in conducting the flight.  
One of the raters commented in a particular accident, the pilot imposed self-induced 
pressures on himself to make the flight, leading to an underestimation of risk resulting in 
the accident.  In another accident, the rater commented an underestimation of risk by the 
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pilot was a key factor resulting in the accident.  One of the raters made the comment in a 
particular accident, it is possible the pilot did not recognize there was fog.  In another 
accident, the rater commented the equipment failure, many unknowns, and probable 
cause faulting air traffic control could have contributed to the pilot's underestimation of 
risk in completing the flight.  A rater made the comment in a particular accident, the pilot 
underestimated the risk in conducting the flight at night, considering the pilot’s lack of 
experience flying at night. 
Unrecoverable low altitude (CF44).  One rater made the comment in a particular 
accident, the pilot was flying VFR at low altitude.  In another accident, the rater 
commented the rear seat passenger survived and provided an account of the accident.  
One of the raters commented in a particular accident, a pilot stated the accident pilot 
descended to maintain contact with the ground.  The rater made an additional comment 
stating this also applies to scud running and unrecoverable low altitude.  In another 
accident, the rater commented the pilot was scud running and at an unrecoverable low 
altitude, based on the pilot's transmission to air traffic control indicating he was trapped 
beneath the layer. 
Use of in-cockpit weather information (CF45).  No use of in-cockpit weather 
information contextual factor manifestations were reported by the raters. 
Use of portable weather applications (CF46).  One of the raters commented in a 
particular accident, a handheld GPS was onboard, but its use was unknown.  In another 
accident, the rater commented the pilot had a handheld Garmin GPSMAP 196 onboard, 
but its use was unknown.  One of the raters commented in a particular accident, a 
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handheld GPS was found, but there was no way to know if the pilot became overly 
absorbed in its use. 
Quantitative Data 
A point-biserial correlation coefficient was used to examine the statistically 
significant relationships among the contextual factors, pilot age, and flight experience in 
the 85 accident main study sample of NTSB AARs.  Results identified several 
statistically significant relationships among specific contextual factors, pilot age, and 
flight experience.  Point-biserial results between the 46 contextual factors and pilot age 









Accident time of day (Day) 
(CF1) r = -.377, p = .000 
Accident time of day (Night) 
(CF1) r = -.277, p = .000 
Adverse weather encountered 
before mid flight point 
reached (CF2)  
r = -.140, p = .025 
Adverse weather not 
encountered after mid flight 
point was reached (CF3) 
 r = -.148, p = .018 
Less than or equal to half the 
time and distance required to 
reach the destination before 
the accident occurred (CF6) 
r = -.139, p = .026 
The pilot did not exhibit 
circular decision-making 
(CF10) 
r = -.140, p = .026 
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Table 6 continued 
 





The pilot exhibited cognitive 
anchoring (CF11) r = -.133, p = .034 
The aircraft crash site was 
closer to the departure 
location than the planned 
destination (CF14) 
r = -.158, p = .012 
The aircraft crash site was not 
closer to the departure 
location than the planned 
destination (CF14) 
r = .123, p = .050 
The aircraft crash site was 
closer to the planned 
destination than the departure 
location (CF15) 
r = .139, p = .026 
The pilot flew into known 
icing conditions (CF22) r = .164, p = .009 
The pilot did not experience 
an organizational conflict 
between productivity and 
safety (CF31) 
r = -.141, p = .025 
The pilot was in violation of 
FAA ratings policy (CF35) r = -.141, p = .024 
The pilot was not in violation 
of FAA ratings policy (CF35) r = .164, p = .009 
The pilot was able to 
recognize self-reported 
weather cues (CF38) 
r = .191, p = .002 
The pilot was not able to 
recognize self-reported 
weather cues (CF38) 
r = -.191, p = .002 
The pilot did not decide to 
obtain and use weather 
information through use of in-
cockpit installed weather 
equipment information 
(CF45) 






A point-biserial correlation coefficient was also used to examine the statistically 
significant relationships between the contextual factors and flight experience in the 85 
accident main study sample of NTSB AARs.  Results identified several statistically 
significant relationships between specific contextual factors and flight experience.  Point-











The pilot did not 
communicate with air 
traffic control at the time 
of the VFR-into-IMC 
accident (CF12) 




Table 6 continued 
 





The pilot did not decide to 
use weather information 
obtained through portable 
weather smart phone 
applications (CF46) 
r = -.174, p = .005 
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Table 7 continued 
 






The pilot was 
communicating with air 
traffic control at the time 
of the VFR-into-IMC 
accident (CF12) 
r = -.156, p = .012 
The pilot was not under 
stress and did anticipate 
the consequences of 
flying in IMC (CF13) 
r = .153, p = .015 
The pilot did not descend 
below weather minimums 
(CF20) 
r = -.149, p = .018 
The pilot flew into known 
icing conditions (CF22) r = .148, p = .018 
The pilot was not in 
violation of organizational 
flight plan policy - filing 
IFR when required 
(CF23) 
r = .209, p = .001 
The pilot did not exhibit 
linear decision-making 
(CF27) 
r = .200, p = .001 
The pilot did not exhibit 
permission-seeking 
behaviors (CF32) 
r = -.239, p = .000 
The pilot was in 
communication with a 
briefer (CF33) 
r = -.178, p = .004 
The pilot was in violation 
of FAA ratings policy 
(CF35) 
r = -.231, p = .000 
The pilot was not in 
violation of FAA ratings 
policy (CF35) 
r = -.231, p = .000 
 
A phi correlation coefficient was used to examine the statistically significant 
relationships among the contextual factors, certification level (instrument/non-
instrument), weather (inclement/non-inclement), flight conditions (VMC/IMC) and time 
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of day (day/night) in the 85 accident main study sample of NTSB AARs.  Results 
identified statistically significant relationships between the contextual factors, and these 
identified other factors.  Phi correlation results between the 46 contextual factors and the 













encountered before mid 
flight point reached (CF2) 
r = -.165, p = .007 
Adverse weather not 
encountered before mid 
flight point reached (CF2) 
r = -.126, p = .040 
Adverse weather 
encountered after mid 
flight point was reached 
(CF3) 
r = -.161, p = .009 
Cues signaling problem 
clear to pilot  (CF5) r = -.126, p = .040 
Less than or equal to half 
the time and distance 
required to reach the 
destination before the 
accident occurred (CF6) 
r = -.163, p = .008 
The pilot overestimated 
ceiling and/or visibility 
weather conditions (CF9) 
r = -.122, p = .048 
The pilot did not 
communicate with air 
traffic control at the time 
of the VFR-into-IMC 
accident (CF12) 





Table 8 continued 
 








The pilot was 
communicating with air 
traffic control at the time 
of the VFR-into-IMC 
accident (CF12) 
r = -.124, p = .044 
The aircraft crash site was 
closer to the departure 
location than the planned 
destination (CF14) 
r = -.160, p = .009 
The aircraft crash site was 
not closer to the departure 
location than the planned 
destination (CF14) 
r = -.164, p = .008 
The aircraft crash site was 
closer to the planned 
destination than the 
departure location (CF15) 
r = -.186, p = .002 
The aircraft crash site was 
not closer to the planned 
destination than the 
departure location (CF15) 
r = -.139, p = .024 
The pilot was not in 
violation of the FAA 
flight time currency 
policy (CF16) 
r = -.153, p = .013 
The pilot decided to 
continue VFR-into-IMC 
to the planned destination 
(CF17) 
r = -.156, p = .011 
The pilot did not submit a 
flight plan to flight 
service (CF21) 
r = .377, p = .000 
The pilot took a safety 
risk to fly in IMC 
conditions to planned 
destination (CF24) 














Inclement Weather  
 
Adverse weather 
encountered before mid 
flight point reached (CF2) 
r = -.165, p = .007 
Adverse weather not 
encountered before mid 
flight point reached (CF2) 
r = -.126, p = .040 
Adverse weather 
encountered after mid 
flight point was reached 
(CF3) 
r = -.161, p = .009 
The pilot was in violation 
of conducting an IFR 
flight without proper 
clearance or ratings 
(CF26) 
r = .230, p = .000 
The pilot was not in 
violation of FAA medical 
status policy (CF28) 
r = -.293, p = .000 
The pilot was in 
communication with a 
briefer (CF33) 
r = -.143, p = .020 
The pilot was not in 
communication with a 
briefer (CF33) 
r = -.132, p = .032 
The pilot exhibited Plan 
Continuation Error 
behavior (CF34) 
r = -.306, p = .000 
The pilot was in violation 
of FAA ratings policy 
(CF35) 
r = -.150, p = .015 
The pilot was not in 
violation of FAA ratings 
policy (CF35) 
r = -.154, p = .012 
The pilot did not receive a 







Table 9 continued 
 





Inclement Weather  
 
 
The pilot received a 
weather briefing (CF36) r = -.147, p = .017 
The pilot was able to 
recognize self-reported 
weather cues (CF38) 
r = -.136, p = .027 
The pilot misdiagnosed 
the changes in or severity 
of the weather (CF39) 
r = -.322, p = .000 
The pilot underestimated 
the level of risk associated 
with cues that should have 
signaled a change in 
course of action (CF43) 












Flight Conditions  
 
Adverse weather 
encountered before mid 
flight point reached (CF2) 
r = -.165, p = .007 
Adverse weather not 
encountered before mid 
flight point reached (CF2) 
r = -.126, p = .040 
Adverse weather 
encountered after mid 
flight point was reached 
(CF3) 




Table 10 continued 
 





Flight Conditions  
 
 
Cues signaling problem 
clear to pilot (CF5) r = -.126, p = .040 
Less than or equal to half 
the time and distance 
required to reach the 
destination before the 
accident occurred (CF6) 
r = -.163, p = .008 
The pilot overestimated 
ceiling and/or visibility 
weather conditions (CF9) 
r = -.122, p = .048 
The pilot did not 
communicate with air 
traffic control at the time 
of the VFR-into-IMC 
accident (CF12) 
r = -.159, p = .010 
The pilot was 
communicating with air 
traffic control at the time 
of the VFR-into-IMC 
accident (CF12) 
r = -.124, p = .044 
The aircraft crash site was 
closer to the departure 
location than the planned 
destination (CF14) 
r = -.160, p = .009 
The aircraft crash site was 
not closer to the departure 
location than the planned 
destination (CF14) 
r = -.164, p = .008 
The aircraft crash site was 
closer to the planned 
destination than the 
departure location (CF15) 
r = -.186, p = .002 
The aircraft crash site was 
not closer to the planned 
destination than the 
departure location (CF15) 




Table 10 continued 
 





Flight Conditions  
 
 
The pilot was not in 
violation of the FAA 
flight time currency 
policy (CF16) 
r = -.153, p = .013 
The pilot decided to 
continue VFR-into-IMC 
to the planned destination 
(CF17) 
r = -.156, p = .011 
The pilot did not submit a 
flight plan to flight 
service (CF21) 
r = -.322, p = .000 
The pilot took a safety 
risk to fly in IMC 
conditions to planned 
destination (CF24) 











Time of Day  
 
Adverse weather 
encountered before mid 
flight point reached (CF2) 
r = .177, p = .004 
Adverse weather not 
encountered before mid 
flight point reached (CF2) 
r = -.146, p = .018 
Adverse weather 
encountered after mid 
flight point was reached 
(CF3) 




Table 11 continued 
 





Time of Day  
 
 
Less than or equal to half 
the time and distance 
required to reach the 
destination before the 
accident occurred (CF6) 
r = .133, p = .030 
The aircraft crash site was 
closer to the departure 
location than the planned 
destination (CF14) 
r = .168, p = .006 
The aircraft crash site was 
closer to the planned 
destination than the 
departure location (CF15) 
r = -.130, p = .034 
The aircraft crash site was 
not closer to the planned 
destination than the 
departure location (CF15) 




A multiple regression analysis was completed on the 85 NTSB GA Part 91, VFR-
into-IMC accident sample to determine if any of the 46 contextual factors 
(independent/predictor variables) had any effects on the crash distance from the departure 
point to the midpoint of the planned route of flight (dependent/outcome variable).  The 46 
research-identified contextual factors were entered into the independent/predictor 
variable field and the crash distances from departure to the midpoint of the planned route 
of flight were entered into the dependent/outcome variable field of SPSSTM as a 
percentage from 0% to 50% of planned route completion, as determined by the provided 
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latitude and longitude of the departure point to the crash site in the NTSB AARs (Table 
12).   
The six multiple regression assumptions were checked for each of the analyses 
completed by the researcher to ensure the correct data was reported.  The relationship 
between the independent/predictor variables and dependent/outcome variable was 
assessed for linearity through review of scatterplots (Assumption 1).  No multicollinearity 
in the data was determined by all variance inflation factor (VIF) scores below 10 and all 
tolerance scores above 0.2 (Assumption 2).  Independent values of the residuals were 
determined through review of the Durbin-Watson statistic to ensure the number was close 
to the value of 2 (Assumption 3).  Constant variance of the residuals was determined 
through a review of standardized residuals versus standardized predicted values showing 
no indication of funneling, suggesting the assumption of homoscedasticity had been 
accomplished (Assumption 4).  Values of the residuals were determined to be normally 
distributed through review of the P-P plot for the model (Assumption 5).  A check was 
made to ensure no influential cases were biasing the model as determined through review 
of Cook’s Distance values being under 1, suggesting the individual cases were not unduly 
influencing the model (Assumption 6).   
The multiple regression results were reviewed.  A value of .609 for the multiple 
correlation coefficient, R, was observed and indicated a relatively strong level of 
prediction.  The R Square coefficient of determination value is the proportion of variance 
in the dependent/outcome variable explained by the independent/predictor variables.  The 
value of .371 indicated the independent/predictor variables explained 37.1% of the 





Crash Distance from Departure Model Summary 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model  R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 




1 .609a .371 .123 13.57626 1.013 
a. Predictors: CF1, CF2, CF3, CF5, CF6, CF7, CF8, CF9, CF10, CF11, CF12, 
CF13, CF16, CF17, CF18, CF19, CF20, CF21, CF22, CF23, CF24, CF26, CF27, 
CF28, CF29, CF30, CF31, CF32, CF34, CF35, CF37, CF38, CF39, CF40, CF41, 
CF43, CF44, CF45 
b. Dependent Variable: Crash Distance from Departure to Midpoint of Planned 
Route of Flight (0% to 50% of Planned Route Completion) 
 
 
The F-ratio in the analysis of variance (ANOVA) table tests whether the overall 
regression model is a good fit for the data (Table 13).  The table shows the 
independent/predictor variables statistically significantly predict the dependent/outcome 
variable, F (72, 182) = 1.494, p < .017.  Therefore, the regression model is a good fit for 
the data.  Statistical significance for each of the contextual factors (independent/predictor 
variables) was tested for whether the unstandardized or standardized coefficients were 
equal to zero in the population.  It was determined the flight time and distance in IMC 
were less than or equal to half the time and distance required to reach the destination, p = 
.033 (CF7), the pilot submitted a flight plan to flight service, p = .040 (CF21), the pilot 
did not fly into known icing conditions, p = .027 (CF22), and the pilot was conducting 
scud running flight operations at the time of the accident, p = .054 (CF37) added 
statistically significantly to the prediction of the crash distance from departure to the 
midpoint of the planned route of flight (0 to 50 Percent), F(72, 182) = 1.494, p < .017, R2 





Crash Distance from Departure ANOVA 
 
ANOVAa 







1 Regression 19822.441 72 275.312 1.494 .017b 
 Residual 33545.300 182 184.315   
 Total 53367.741 254    
a. Dependent Variable: Crash Distance from Departure to Midpoint of Planned Route of 
Flight (0% to 50% of Planned Route Completion) 
b. Predictors: CF1, CF2, CF3, CF5, CF6, CF7, CF8, CF9, CF10, CF11, CF12, CF13, 
CF16, CF17, CF18, CF19, CF20, CF21, CF22, CF23, CF24, CF26, CF27, CF28, CF29, 
CF30, CF31, CF32, CF34, CF35, CF37, CF38, CF39, CF40, CF41, CF43, CF44, CF45 
          
 
A multiple regression analysis was also completed on the 85 NTSB GA Part 91, 
VFR-into-IMC accident sample to determine if any of the 46 contextual factors 
(independent/predictor variables) had any effects on the crash distance from the midpoint 
to the destination of the planned route of flight (dependent/outcome variable).  The 46 
research-identified contextual factors were entered into the independent/predictor 
variable field, and the crash distances from midpoint to destination of the planned route 
of flight were entered into the dependent/outcome variable field of SPSSTM as a 
percentage from 51% to 100% of planned route completion as determined by the 








Crash Distance from Midpoint Model Summary 
 
Model Summaryb 








1 .746a .557 .382 32.73822 1.327 
a. Predictors: CF1, CF2, CF3, CF5, CF6, CF7, CF8, CF9, CF10, CF11, CF12, CF13, 
CF16, CF17, CF18, CF19, CF20, CF21, CF22, CF23, CF24, CF26, CF27, CF28, 
CF29, CF30, CF31, CF32, CF34, CF35, CF37, CF38, CF39, CF40, CF41, CF43, 
CF44, CF45  
b. Dependent Variable: Crash Distance from Midpoint to Destination of Planned Route 
of Flight (51% to 100% of the Planned Route Completion) 
 
 
The multiple regression results were reviewed.  A value of .746 for the multiple 
correlation coefficient, R, was observed and indicated a strong level of prediction.  The R 
square coefficient of determination value is the proportion of variance in the 
dependent/outcome variable that can be explained by the independent/predictor variables.  
A value of .557 indicated the independent/predictor variables explained 55.7% of the 
variability of the dependent/outcome variable (Table 14).  The F-ratio in the ANOVA 
table tests whether the overall regression model is a good fit for the data (Table 15).  The 
table shows the independent/predictor variables statistically significantly predict the 
dependent variable, F (72, 182) = 3.178, p < .01.  Therefore, the regression model is a 
good fit for the data.  Statistical significance for each of the contextual factors 
(independent/predictor variables) was tested for whether the unstandardized or 
standardized coefficients were equal to zero in the population.  It was determined the 
adverse weather encountered before mid flight point reached, p = .009 (CF2), adverse 
weather encountered after mid flight point was reached, p = .000 (CF3), the flight time 
and distance in IMC were greater than half the time and distance required to reach the 
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destination before diverting, p = .003 (CF7), the pilot was not fixated on visually 
compelling head down displays, p = .021 (CF8), the pilot was under stress and did not 
anticipate the consequences of flying in IMC, p = .017 (CF13), the pilot decided not to 
continue VFR-into-IMC to the planned destination, p = .018 (CF17), the pilot decided to 
continue VFR-into-IMC to the planned destination, p = .032 (CF17), the pilot submitted a 
flight plan to flight service, p = .002 (CF21), the pilot flew into known icing conditions, p 
= .027 (CF22), the pilot exhibited linear decision-making, p = .004 (CF27), and the pilot 
did not exhibit permission-seeking behaviors, p = .011 (CF32), added statistically 
significantly to the prediction of the crash distance from the midpoint to the destination of 





Crash Distance from Midpoint ANOVA 
 
ANOVAa 







1 Regression 245217.019 72 3405.792 3.178 .000b 
 Residual 195065.946 182 1071.791   
 Total 440282.965 254    
a. Dependent Variable: Crash Distance from Midpoint to Destination of Planned Route 
of Flight (51% to 100% of the Planned Route Completion) 
b. Predictors: CF1, CF2, CF3, CF5, CF6, CF7, CF8, CF9, CF10, CF11, CF12, CF13, 
CF16, CF17, CF18, CF19, CF20, CF21, CF22, CF23, CF24, CF26, CF27, CF28, 







DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Discussion 
The fair agreement inter-rater reliability Fleiss’ kappa value of κ = 0.25 was 
determined for the main study rater agreement on the presence of the 46 research-
identified contextual factors in the GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC sample of 85 NTSB 
AARs.  This fair agreement value was determined to be between 0.21 and 0.40 on the 
generally accepted standards of agreement (Fleiss, 1971).  A percentage agreement of 
57% percent was calculated between the three raters for the main study presence of the 
contextual factors.  The Fleiss’ kappa statistic was adjusted for prevalence and calculated 
to be a PABAK value of 0.50.  Although the overall Fleiss’ kappa (κ) score was in the 
fair range of agreement κ = 0.25, the individual Fleiss’ kappa (κ) score for the 1 response, 
indicating rater agreement for the presence of the contextual factor, was calculated to be 
κ = 0.51 and in the moderate range of agreement (Table 2).  The individual Fleiss’ kappa 
(κ) score for the 0 response, indicating rater agreement for the absence of the contextual 
factor, was calculated to be κ = 0.38 and was on the high end of the fair range of 
agreement (Table 2).  The overall Fleiss’ kappa (κ) score in the fair range of agreement κ 
= 0.25 was due to such reasons as inconsistency in the raters selecting the same response 
for the reason the contextual factor was not present, as there were several responses 
available to the rater for selection (i.e., Not Applicable, N.A., Not enough information 
provided to identify the contextual factor, unknown, or providing no (blank) rating).  The 
response of ‘Not enough information provided to identify the contextual factor’ was 
inconsistently but repeatedly used by the three raters as a reason for being unable to 
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identify the presence of the contextual factors in the accident sample dataset (Appendix 
D; Table D5).  It is possible if the AARs and probable cause reports had contained more 
detailed information, a higher number of contextual factors could have been identified by 
the raters resulting in a higher overall Fleiss’ kappa (κ) score. 
The study utilized expert raters to identify the presence and frequency of 46 
research-identified contextual factors and manifestations from the pilot perspective in 85 
GA VFR-into-IMC NTSB accident AARs.  Rater-identified contextual factors were 
assessed with multiple regression analysis using dummy variables to determine any 
statistically significant effects from the 46 contextual factors on crash distance from 
departure to midpoint of the planned route (0% to 50% of planned course completion) 
and crash distance from midpoint to planned destination (51% to 100% of planned course 
completion).  Relationships between the 46 contextual factors and pilot age and total 
flight experience were assessed for any statistically significant interactions using a point 
biserial correlation.  The relationships between the 46 contextual factors and pilot 
certification level (instrument/non-instrument rated), weather (inclement/non-inclement), 
flight conditions (VMC/IMC), and time of day were assessed for any statistically 
significant interactions using a phi correlation.   
Three raters identified the presence for 37 out of 46 (80%) of the research-
identified contextual factors in the 85 accident sample used in the main study.  The 
presence of the contextual factors was identified by the raters in the majority of the 85 
GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC NTSB accident sample.  Identified contextual factors were 
assessed by comparing study findings with the research literature in reviewing the 
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presence, frequency, and manifestation results from the raters, as well as findings from 
the correlation and multiple regression analyses.     
The highest presence and frequencies of the top five rater-identified contextual 
factors in the sample of 85 GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC NTSB AARs included the 
following: (1) number of passengers on board (CF29-62%), (2) accident time of day 
(Day) (CF1-60%), (3) crash distance from planned destination (CF15-54%), (4) not filing 
a flight plan (CF21-49%), and (5) underestimating risk (CF43-49%).  Number of 
passengers on board the aircraft has been investigated by Barron (2011) in how pressure 
from passengers might have contributed to pilots’ decisions to continue into adverse 
weather conditions by using passenger social pressure in flight.  The study used 
passenger social pressure in flight to convince pilots to continue or divert from hazardous 
weather.  It was found the pilot participants tended to concede to the pressure of the 
passenger, whether they were positively or negatively motivated to continue into poor 
weather conditions.  At the conclusion of the study, pilot participants were informed of 
the results.  The participating pilots stated they were unaware of passenger influence on 
their decision-making.  Study results found private pilots who were instrument rated were 
more likely to continue farther into IMC than their low time VFR or high time 
commercial and/or ATP counterparts, a finding pertaining primarily to the pilot’s ratings.  
In the current study, as the contextual factor number of passengers on board (CF29) was 
identified by the raters as the highest frequency factor present in the sample of 85 
accidents, it could be the case the passengers were influencing the decision-making of the 
GA pilot to fly farther into IMC than he would if there were no passengers on board the 
aircraft, confirming the Barron (2011) findings.   
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The accident time of day has been investigated by Ison (2014a) and Ison (2014b).  
These studies used logistic regression to investigate potential pilot-related, and situational 
factors including accident time of day, terrain, receipt of weather briefing, 
communication with air traffic control, filing of a flight plan, pilot certification, pilot 
experience, and pilot age.  No significant findings were identified pertaining to accident 
time of day.  The results of these studies showed more research is needed to understand 
the context of pilot actions resulting in VFR-into-IMC accidents, as there are gaps in 
understanding among context, training, and on the factors related to the length of time a 
pilot would fly into degraded weather conditions including accident time of day.  In the 
current study, the raters identified accident time of day (Day) as the second highest 
frequency (60%) contextual factor and accident time of day (Night) as the ninth highest 
frequency (40%) contextual factor.  A total of 7.1% of the 85 accidents occurred during 
dusk light conditions, 4.7% occurred during dark light conditions, and 4.7% occurred 
during dawn light conditions.  There was a spike in accidents occurring during the 1800- 
and 1900-time frame, accounting for the greater number of accidents taking place at 
night.  Although the Ison (2014a) and Ison (2014b) studies did not provide any specific 
research findings on accident time of day (Day/Night), it could be the case the time of 
day (Day) when the accidents are occurring take place with the added lighting condition 
difficulties associated with dawn and dusk.  It could also be the case the time of day 
(Night) when the accidents are occurring take place with the added lighting condition 
difficulties associated with darkness.    
The crash distance from planned destination has been investigated by O’Hare and 
Owen (2002).  Researchers have clarified, pilot contribution to cross-country VFR 
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crashes cannot be explained by flight-time alone.  There are other factors at play, 
ultimately comprising pilot circumstances, including but not limited to over-confidence, 
faulty risk-perception, lack of awareness, flight circumstances leading to risky decisions, 
decision-making, risk assessment, situational awareness, proximity of the goal/planned 
destination, and time already invested in the flight/sunk cost.  A related research study 
has been conducted by Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare (2002) by assessing when adverse 
weather is encountered during the flight.  It was discovered when adverse weather was 
encountered later in the flight, pilots were more likely to continue as they might be more 
optimistic about the possibility of positive outcomes than they were when they encounter 
poor weather early in a flight.  The results were consistent with more optimism during 
poor weather encounters occurring later into flights, and less optimism when hazardous 
weather was present earlier in flights.  A primary comparison found several contextual 
factors contributing to the accidents including a marginally significant difference (F [1, 
28] = 8.3, p = 0.07) in the estimated visibility at the time of the crash.  The visibility was 
reported as 20 km for all the AOG crashes and 5 to 20 km for IFV crashes (seven IFV 
crashes occurred below 5 km visibility).  There was a statistically significant difference in 
the height above sea level of the crash site for IFV crashes at a mean 2,970 feet AMSL 
and 150 feet AMSL for the AOG crashes (F [1,20] = 6.3, p = .02).  Pilot mean age in IFV 
crashes was 37.8 years.  The AOG pilots were 47 years of age.  It was determined the 
difference of 9.2 years between the groups was statistically significant (F [1, 43] = 3.9, p 
= .05).  Mean hours flown in the IFV group during the previous 90 days was determined 
to be 59.8 hours.  It was also determined the AOG group flew a total of 31.9 hours.  No 
statistically significant relationship was found for the flight hours of the two groups (F [1, 
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54] = 3.7, p = .06).  Additionally, no statistically significant differences were found for 
any of the other pilot characteristics assessed in the study.  A second Wiegmann, Goh, 
and O’Hare (2002) comparison of weather-related and non-weather-related crashes 
revealed weather-related crashes took place later into cross-country flights and closer to 
planned destinations than other types of GA accidents.  Additionally, the second 
comparison found age and flight to be contextual, contributing factors to weather-related 
GA accidents.  The GA pilots who were involved in weather-related accidents tended to 
be younger and possessed more recent flight time than other pilots.  Saxton (2008) found 
sunk cost to be a valid concept, as the participants of the study who were financially 
motivated did, in fact, continue longer into poor weather conditions than the participants 
who were not financially motivated and came upon hazardous weather earlier in the 
flight.  The Ball (2008) research investigated why pilots fly too closely to hazardous 
weather.  Researchers explained it might not be, necessarily, an ability to maintain safe 
distances, but rather, a conscious choice influenced by level of experience and quality of 
training.  Ahlstrom, Ohneiser, and Caddigan (2016) found the use of a weather device did 
improve situational awareness, weather related decision-making in diverting or 
continuing to the planned destination, and distances in route deviation from the hazardous 
weather.  In the current study, the findings of the Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare (2002) 
study are supported for time and distance the pilot flew into adverse weather.  As the 
raters identified the contextual factor crash distance from the planned destination (CF15) 
with the third highest frequency (54%), crash distance from the departure (CF14) with the 
eighth highest frequency (46%), adverse weather encountered early in the flight (CF2) 
with the sixteenth highest frequency (24%), and adverse weather encountered late in the 
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flight (CF3) also with the sixteenth highest frequency (24%), it could be the case the 
adverse weather encountered late in the flight could be influencing the GA pilot’s 
decision to continue to the planned destination instead of diverting to an alternate 
location.  However, since both CF2 and CF3 each have 20 accidents (24% of 85 
accidents) identified by the raters with the respective contextual factors present for 
adverse weather encountered early and late in the flight, it cannot be stated for certain this 
is the case.  In either case, the findings of the Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare (2002) 
research are confirmed for time and distances flown into adverse weather.  It is possible 
any of the O’Hare and Owen (2002) identified pilot factors could be affecting pilot 
circumstances and be contributory factors resulting in the fatal accidents assessed in the 
current study.  The Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare (2002) findings for visibility could not 
be assessed, as the current study did not study specific visibilities in the reviewed 
accidents.  Identification of the heights of the crash sites by the raters varied, and not all 
crash site heights could be determined from the NTSB AARs.  Heights of the crash sites 
identified by the raters included the following: (1) 0 - 999 feet mean sea level (16 out of 
85 accidents), (2) 1,000 - 1,999 feet mean sea level (4 out of 85 accidents), (3) 2,000 - 
2,999 feet mean sea level (3 out of 85 accidents), (4) 3,000 - 3,999 feet mean sea level (3 
out of 85 accidents), (5) 4,000 - 4,999 feet mean sea level (3 out of 85 accidents), (6) 
5,000 - 5,999 feet mean sea level (3 out of 85 accidents), (7) 6,000 - 6,999 feet mean sea 
level (2 out of 85 accidents), (8) 7,000 - 7,999 feet mean sea level (2 out of 85 accidents), 
(9) 8,000 - 8,999 feet mean sea level (1 out of 85 accidents), and (10) 10,000 - 10,999 
feet mean sea level (1 out of 85 accidents).  The current study findings for height of crash 
site differed from the Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare (2002) height above sea level of the 
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crash site for IFV crashes at a mean 2,970 feet mean sea level and 150 feet mean sea 
level for the AOG crashes.  As the current study determined the height of accident crash 
site in ranges based on drop down menu options selected by the raters, an exact 
comparison with the findings of Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare (2002) cannot be made.  
However, the most frequently identified height of crash site determined by the raters in 
the current study was 0 to 999 feet mean sea level (16 out of 85 accidents (19%) of 
accidents) in the range of 150 feet average mean sea level identified in the Wiegmann, 
Goh, and O’Hare (2002) study for the AOG crashes.  There were only 3 out of 85 (4%) 
accidents in the range of 2,970 feet average mean sea level identified in the Wiegmann, 
Goh, and O’Hare (2002) study for IFV crashes.  Current study findings for the mean age 
of pilots involved in the 85 accident sample was 52 years of age.  The current study 
findings for mean pilot age were higher than the Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare (2002) 
study findings of pilot mean age in IFV crashes of 37.8 years and AOG pilots was 47 
years of age.  These current study findings disagree with the Wiegmann, Goh, and 
O’Hare (2002) research findings of GA pilots who were involved in weather-related 
accidents tended to be younger.  A comparison with the Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare 
(2002) findings for pilot recent flight time could not be completed as the NTSB AARs 
did not identify the recency of reported pilot total flight hours.  It could be the case the 
pilots in the current study were financially motivated to complete the flight and continued 
farther into IMC toward the destination than pilots who were not financially motivated 
diverting to an alternate location or attempting to return to the departure point confirming 
the Saxton (2008) study findings on sunk cost.  It is also possible the pilots in the current 
study flew too closely to hazardous weather as a conscious choice influenced by level of 
155 
 
experience and quality of training, supporting the Ball (2008) research.  The findings of 
the Ahlstrom, Ohneiser, and Caddigan (2016) research could not be addressed from 
findings in the current study.  Although the raters identified specific accidents where a 
weather device was discovered in the wreckage, the use of the device by the pilot during 
the flight could not be determined.    
The pilot’s failure to file a flight plan has been investigated by Jackman’s (2014) 
study investigating pilot policy violations to assess fatal VFR-into-IMC accidents in an 
ex post facto, quantitative analysis.  Violations including filing a flight plan were 
reviewed.  A need for training, regulatory modifications, or enforcements was explored.  
Information between the years of 1998 and 2013 for NTSB GA VFR-into-IMC accident 
data was analyzed using binary logistic regression.  Study findings revealed flight plan 
violations were not statistically significant predictors of fatality.  Ison (2014a) used 
logistic regression to investigate potential pilot-related and situational factors including 
filing of a flight plan.  Two significant relationships were found related to flight plans 
including accident type and flight plans and terrain and flight plan.  The Ison (2014b) 
study found similar and additional information to the Ison (2014a) study.  Results of 
these studies showed more research is needed to understand the context of pilot actions 
resulting in VFR-into-IMC accidents, as there are gaps in understanding among context, 
training, and on the additional factors related to the length of time a pilot would fly into 
degraded weather conditions including filing of a flight plan.  In the current study, 
although the raters identified the contextual factor failure to file a flight plan (CF21) in 
49% (fourth highest rater identified factor in the study) of the accidents in the 85 NTSB 
sample, it was not a significant contextual factor identified in the multiple regression 
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analyses.  The pilot’s filing of a flight plan was identified as a statistically significant 
factor in both regression analyses for crash distance from the departure to the midpoint of 
the planned route of the flight (0% to 50% of the planned route completion), p = .04, and 
crash distance from the midpoint to the destination of the planned route of the flight (51% 
to 100% of the planned route completion), p = .002.  Results of the current study did not 
refute or confirm the findings of the Jackman (2014) research discovery of flight plan 
violations were not statistically significant predictors of fatality only the filing of a flight 
plan was determined to be significant.  A weak negative relationship was discovered in 
the current study as the pilot certification increased from the non-instrument to the 
instrument rating, the chance of the pilot not submitting a flight plan to flight service 
decreased (CF21) and was significant at the p < .01 level, r = -.277, p = .000.  A weak 
negative relationship was also discovered in the current study as the flight conditions 
increased from VMC to IMC, the chance of the pilot not submitting a flight plan 
decreased (CF21) and was also significant at the p < .01 level, r = -.277, p = .000.   
The underestimating of risk (CF43) has been assessed by Martin, Davison, and 
Orasanu (1998) in a study investigating errors in aviation decision-making.  It was 
hypothesized by the researcher, errors are facilitated by underestimation of risk and 
failure to analyze the potential consequences of continuing with the initial plan as well as 
stressors may further contribute to these effects.  In the current study, as the raters 
identified the contextual factor underestimation of risk (CF43) as the fifth highest (49%) 
in the study, it could be the case the GA pilots in the accidents could have failed to 
correctly estimate the level of risk and potential consequences of continuing the flight 
from VFR-into-IMC to the planned destination resulting in the fatal accidents.  The 
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related contextual factor, consequences not anticipated (CF13), defined as the pilot being 
under stress and not anticipating the consequences of flying in IMC, was identified as a 
significant contextual factor in the multiple regression analysis for crash distance from 
the midpoint to the destination of the planned route of the flight (51% to 100% of the 
planned route completion), p = .017, adding evidence to pilots failing to correctly 
estimate the level of risk and potential consequences of continuing the flight into IMC, 
confirming the findings of the Martin, Davison, and Orasanu (1998) research.  A weak 
positive relationship was identified in the current study as the number of total flight hours 
increased, the chance of the pilot not being under stress and anticipating the 
consequences of flying in IMC increased (CF13) and was significant at the p < .05 level, 
r = .153, p = .015.  A moderate negative relationship was identified in the current study as 
the weather increased from non-inclement to inclement weather, the chance of the pilot 
underestimating the level of risk associated with cues that should have signaled a chance 
in course of action decreased (CF43) and was significant at the p < .01 level, r = -.322, p 
= .000. 
The raters provided their personal opinions on how the contextual factors were 
manifested in the sample of NTSB accident AARs.  Manifestations provided by the raters 
for the top five contextual factors of (1) number of passengers on board (CF29-62%), (2) 
accident time of day (Day) (CF1-60%), (3) crash distance from planned destination 
(CF15-54%), (4) not filing a flight plan (CF21-49%), and (5) underestimating risk (CF43-
49%) were assessed by the researcher.  Raters identified the number of passengers on 
board the aircraft in the 85 NTSB accident sample.  A total of 53 out of 85 aircraft, or 
62% of the accident sample, had passengers on board the aircraft.  The break down 
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according to category of passenger number on board the aircraft and the associated 
percentages were identified as follows: 32 aircraft (0 passengers - 38%), 36 aircraft (1 
passenger – 42%), 11 accidents (2 passengers – 13%), 3 accidents (3 passengers – 4%), 1 
accident (4 passengers – 1%), and 2 accidents (5 passengers – 2%).  As the majority of 
accidents had passengers on board the aircraft, it could be the case the pilots may have 
been influenced by the passengers in deciding to continue into IMC to the planned 
destination instead of diverting to an alternate location, supporting the Barron (2011) 
research.  
Raters also provided their opinions on the manifestation of the contextual factor 
accident time of day (CF1-60%).  There was a total of 34 accidents occurring during the 
day and 51 accidents took place at night.  The particular lighting conditions varied and 
included six accidents taking place at dusk, 37 during daylight conditions, 33 during 
night light conditions, five during dark light conditions, and four during dawn light 
conditions.  Two accidents occurred at 0000, one at 0100, two at 0400, five at 0500, three 
at 0600, four at 0700, three at 0800, four at 0900, five at 1000, four at 1100, five at 1200, 
one at 1300, five at 1400, two at 1500, three at 1600, four at 1700, seven at 1800, ten at 
1900, five at 2000, four at 2100, three at 2200, and three at 2300.  As previously 
described, there was a spike in accidents occurring during the 1800- and 1900-hour 
timeframe, increasing the number of accidents occurring at night over day accidents.  The 
Ison (2014) and Ison (2014b) research indicated additional research is needed to improve 
understanding of how time of day affects the decision of pilots to fly in IMC.  As the 
identified Ison (2014) and Ison (2014b) research could not be assessed for findings 
related to time of day and IMC flight, it could be the case the time of day (Day) when the 
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accidents are occurring take place with the added lighting condition difficulties 
associated with dawn and dusk.  It could also be the case, the time of day (Night) when 
the accidents are occurring take place with the added lighting condition difficulties 
associated with darkness.  These lighting conditions could be contributing to the pilot’s 
inability to see the ground resulting in an accident.  
The raters also provided their opinions on the manifestation of the contextual 
factor crash distance from the planned destination (CF15-54%).  The aircraft crash 
distances occurring between 51% and 100% of the planned route distance from the 
midpoint to the planned destination were also calculated by the researcher based on the 
latitude and longitude coordinates provided by the NTSB investigators completing the 
AARs.  The crash distances from the midpoint to the planned destination as a percentage 
of the planned route of flight course completion included the following: (1) 51% (12 
accidents), (2) 56% (1 accident), (3) 59% (1 accident), (4) 60% (1 accident), (5) 62% (1 
accident), (6) 66% (1 accident), (7) 69% (1 accident), (8) 70% (2 accidents), (9) 71% (1 
accident), (10) 73% (1 accident), (11) 74% (2 accidents), (12) 77% (3 accidents), (13) 
84% (1 accident), (14) 86% (1 accident), (15) 89% (1 accident), (16) 90% (1 accident), 
(17) 94% (1 accident), (18) 95% (1 accident), (19) 96% (1 accident), (20) 97% (1 
accident), (21) 98% (1 accident), and (22) 99% (9 accidents).  The majority of accidents 
occurred between the midpoint to the planned destination and totaled 46 versus 39 
occurring from the departure to the midpoint of the planned route of flight.  As explained 
previously, as the raters identified the contextual factor crash distance from the planned 
destination (CF15) with the third highest frequency (54%), crash distance from the 
departure (CF14) with the eighth highest frequency (46%), adverse weather encountered 
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early in the flight (CF2) with the sixteenth highest frequency (24%), and adverse weather 
encountered late in the flight (CF3) also with the sixteenth highest frequency (24%), it 
could be the case, supporting the Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare (2002) and Barron’s 
(2011) research findings, the adverse weather encountered late in the flight and/or 
passenger pressure could be influencing the GA pilot’s decision to continue to the 
planned destination instead of diverting to an alternate location.  As the same percentage 
of accidents encountered adverse weather early and late in the flight (24%), a definite 
determination cannot be made.       
The raters also provided their opinions on the manifestation of the contextual 
factor filing of a flight plan (CF21-49%).  Manifestations included descriptions of GA 
pilots either filing or not filing a flight plan for various reasons.  Reasons given by the 
raters for the GA pilots in the accident sample filing a flight plan included (1) the flight 
plan was input via computer but did not go through due to incomplete information input 
by the pilot, (2) the pilot filed a flight plan although the NTSB investigator completing 
the report incorrectly indicated no on the form, (3) the pilot filed IFR, then near the 
destination, cancelled the IFR flight plan and flew VFR-into-IMC back to point of origin, 
(4) the pilot filed IFR, through a malformed request to air traffic control, but was not 
rated to do so, (5) the pilot filed IFR was technically true, but, practically, if the pilot was 
trying to avoid icing filing IFR was not a practical option.  The reasons given by the 
raters for the GA pilots not filing a flight plan included (1) it is possible an instrument 
rated pilot opted to not file IFR, an IFR pilot in Class G airspace was not in violation of 
needing to file a flight plan, and (2) the pilot should have filed IFR and flown IFR 
procedures.  Reasons reported by the raters for the pilots filing and not filing a flight plan 
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were reviewed by the researcher.  The reasons reported by the raters for pilots filing a 
flight plan included (1) the pilot experienced errors in attempting to enter the flight plan, 
(2) NTSB investigators making mistakes in reporting pilots not filing flight plans when 
the pilots did file flight plans, (3) the pilots filing flight plans and then cancelling the 
flight plans for various reason, and (4) the pilots filing IFR flight plans when not 
qualified to file IFR flight plans.  Reasons reported by the raters for pilots not filing flight 
plans included (1) the pilots felt filing flight plans was not necessary, and (2) the pilots 
did not file flight plans when they should have filed flight plans.  These rater-identified 
manifestations for filing a flight plan could address the areas of future research needed as 
identified in the Ison (2014a) and Ison (2014b) studies. 
The raters also provided their opinions on the manifestation of the contextual 
factor underestimating risk (CF43-49%).  In the rater’s opinions, the reasons the GA 
pilots underestimated the risk in conducting the flight included (1) after the adverse 
weather briefing, the pilot filed VFR indicating an underestimation of risk in conducting 
the flight, (2) the pilot underestimated the risk in conducting the flight given the time of 
day, night conditions, and mountainous terrain, (3) the pilot exhibited poor decision-
making in underestimating the risk in conducting the flight, (4) the instructor-rated 
passenger presence and bad decision-making factors played into the pilot underestimating 
the risk in conducting the flight, (5) the accident was a preflight decision-making 
accident, not only for IMC but for thunderstorms, (6) the lighting conditions contributed 
to the accident, (7) the pilot received a weather briefing, but it was incomplete and not 
factored into the risk estimation of flying in mountainous terrain, (8) the weather brief for 
the accident segment was misleading and incomplete, combined with an incomplete pilot 
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risk assessment, (9) the pilot was flying in night conditions, (10) the NTSB report 
emphasized the pilot had next day work-related obligations, (11) the pilot's bad decision-
making, (12) a possible intentional self-harm act on the part of the pilot may have been a 
factor contributing to the accident, (13) the pilot's underestimation of risk led to getting 
caught above the clouds, (14) the pilot underestimated the risk of clouds and 
thunderstorms, (15) the pilot underestimated the risk of flying low to avoid IMC, (16) 
social pressures led the pilot to underestimate risk in conducting the flight, (17) the pilot 
imposed self-induced pressures on himself to make the flight leading to an 
underestimation of risk resulting in the accident, (18) it is possible the pilot did not 
recognize there was fog, (19) the equipment failure, many unknowns, and probable cause 
faulting air traffic control could have contributed to the pilot's underestimation of risk in 
completing the flight, (20) the pilot underestimated the risk in conducting the flight at 
night, considering the pilot’s lack of night flying experience.  Reasons reported by the 
raters for the pilots underestimating the risks in conducting the flights were reviewed by 
the researcher.  These reasons included (1) poor decision-making, (2) time of day, (3) 
lighting conditions, (4) terrain, (5) social pressure, (6) incomplete weather briefing, (7) 
incomplete pilot risk assessment, (8) pilot intentional self-harm, (9) underestimation of 
risk for flight direction/location decision, (10) underestimation of risk for flying near 
adverse weather decision, (11) pilot self-imposed pressures, (12) equipment failure, (13) 
ATC failure, and (14) underestimation of night flying risk.  Rater identified 
manifestations for the contextual factor underestimating risk (CF43) were found to be 
consistent with the Martin, Davison, and Orasanu (1998) study findings related to human 
error and judgement contributing to accidents.  The researchers explained the problem 
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centers on the pilot falling into the decision error type known as PCE to decide to 
continue with the original plan despite cues suggesting a change in course of action is 
required.  Contextual factors contributing to PCE include organizational and socially 
induced conflicts and ambiguous dynamic conditions.  Decision errors are facilitated by 
the pilot’s underestimation of risk, failure to analyze the consequences of continuing with 
the initial plan, and stress.  Pilots were using linear versus circular decision making under 
extremely stressful situations, supporting the Balog (2013) and Balog (2016) study 
findings where pilots commit to one decision without reevaluation after actions have been 
implemented.  These findings are consistent with all 14 manifestation areas identified 
where pilots in the accident sample exhibited an underestimation of risk contributing to 
the fatal accidents.  Current study findings also confirm the Keller (2015) research where 
VFR pilots who flew into IMC did so because they misperceived the severity of the 
weather and the associated risks versus pilots who turned, or diverted, did so because 
they became aware of the danger and sought to return to safety.  It is possible the pilots in 
the current study misperceived the severity of the risk in attempting to continue the flight 
into IMC to the planned destination.  The study also supports the O’Hare and Smitheram 
(1995) study finding pilots who viewed risk from a gain standpoint were less likely to 
continue into IMC, and those who considered risk from a loss viewpoint were more likely 
to continue.  It is possible the pilots in the current study who chose to continue into IMC 
to the planned destination viewed risk from a loss perspective. 
The GA pilot age and the 46 research-identified contextual factors were reviewed 
for significant relationships using the point biserial correlation.  The analysis identified 
several statistically significant relationships between pilot age and the contextual factors.  
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A relationship between pilot age and the pilot flying into known icing conditions was 
significant at the p < .05 level, r = .164, p = .009 (CF22).  As the age of the pilot 
increased, the chance of the pilot flying into known icing conditions would also increase.  
It was also found as the age of the pilot increased, the chance of being involved in more 
accidents during the day than at night decreased, p < .01, r = -.377, p = .000 (CF1).  
Statistically significant relationships between pilot age and the other contextual factors 
are as follows, as the age of the pilot increased (Table 16): 
• the chance of being able to recognize self-reported weather cues increased, 
p < .05, r = .191, p = .002 (CF38) 
• the chance of not being in violation of FAA ratings policy increased, p < 
.05, r = .164, p = .009 (CF35) 
• the chance of being involved in fatal GA VFR-into-IMC accidents where 
the aircraft crash site was closer to the planned destination than the 
departure location increased, p < .05, r = .139, p = .026 (CF15) 
• the chance of being involved in more accidents at night decreased,  
p < .01, r = -.277, p = .000 (CF1) 
• the chance of not deciding to obtain and use weather information through 
use of in-cockpit installed weather equipment information decreased, p < 
.01, r = -.277, p = .000 (CF45) 
• the chance of not being able to recognize self-reported weather cues 
decreased, p < .05, r = -.191, p = .002 (CF38) 
• the chance of not deciding to use weather information obtained through 
portable weather smart phone applications decreased, p < .05, r = -.174,  
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p = .005 (CF46) 
• the chance of being involved in fatal VFR-into-IMC accidents where the 
aircraft crash site was closer to the departure location than the planned 
destination decreased, p < .05, r = -.158, p = .012 (CF14) 
• the chance of being involved in flight situations where adverse weather 
was not encountered after mid flight point was reached decreased, p < .05, 
r = -.148, p = .018 (CF3) 
• the chance of being in violation of FAA ratings policy decreased, p < .05, 
r = -.141, p = .024 (CF35) 
• the chance of being involved in flight situations where adverse weather 
was encountered before mid flight point reached decreased, p < .05,  
r = -.14, p = .025 (CF2) 
• the chance of not experiencing an organizational conflict between 
productivity and safety decreased, p < .05, r = -.141, p = .025 (CF31) 
• the chance of being involved in flight situations where less than or equal 
to half the time and distance was required to reach the destination before 
the accident occurred decreased, p < .05, r = -.139, p = .026 (CF6) 
• the chance of not exhibiting circular decision-making decreased, p < .05, r 
= -.14, p = .026 (CF10) 
• the chance of exhibiting cognitive anchoring decreased, p < .05, r = -.133, 
p = .034 (CF11) 
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• the chance of the aircraft crash site not being closer to the departure 












Accident time of day 
(Day) (CF1) r = -.377, p = .000 
Accident time of day 
(Night) (CF1) r = -.277, p = .000 
The pilot did not decide to 
obtain and use weather 
information through use 
of in-cockpit installed 
weather equipment 
information (CF45) 
r = -.277, p = .000 
The pilot was able to 
recognize self-reported 
weather cues (CF38) 
r = .191, p = .002 
The pilot was not able to 
recognize self-reported 
weather cues (CF38) 
r = -.191, p = .002 
The pilot did not decide to 
use weather information 
obtained through portable 
weather smart phone 
applications (CF46) 
r = -.174, p = .005 
The pilot flew into known 
icing conditions (CF22) r = .164, p = .009 
The pilot was not in 
violation of FAA ratings 
policy (CF35) 





Table 16 continued 
 








The aircraft crash site was 
closer to the departure 
location than the planned 
destination (CF14) 
r = -.158, p = .012 
Adverse weather not 
encountered after mid 
flight point was reached 
(CF3) 
r = -.148, p = .018 
The pilot was in violation 
of FAA ratings policy 
(CF35) 
r = -.141, p = .024 
Adverse weather 
encountered before mid 
flight point reached (CF2) 
r = -.14, p = .025 
The pilot did not 
experience an 
organizational conflict 
between productivity and 
safety (CF31) 
r = -.141, p = .025 
Less than or equal to half 
the time and distance 
required to reach the 
destination before the 
accident occurred (CF6) 
r = -.139, p = .026 
The pilot did not exhibit 
circular decision-making 
(CF10) 
r = -.14, p = .026 
The aircraft crash site was 
closer to the planned 
destination than the 
departure location (CF15) 
r = .139, p = .026 
The pilot exhibited 
cognitive anchoring 
(CF11) 
r = -.133 p = .034 
The aircraft crash site was 
not closer to the departure 
location than the planned 
destination (CF14) 




Point biserial correlation results between GA pilot age and the contextual factors 
show 18 significant correlations between age and the contextual factors.  There were a 
total of five positive and 13 negative correlations identified between age and the 
contextual factors.  The five significant positive correlations included the following: 
• The chance of the pilot to recognize self-reported weather cues increased.   
• The chance of the pilot flying into known icing conditions increased. 
• The chance of the pilots not being in violation of the FAA ratings policy 
increased.   
• The chance of the aircraft crash site being closer to the planned destination 
than the departure location increased.   
• The chance of the aircraft crash site not being closer to the planned 
destination than the departure location increased. 
There was a negative correlation between age and 13 of the contextual factors.  
As the age of the GA pilot increased, the chance of the accident occurring during the day 
decreased.  Additionally, as the age of the GA pilot increased, the chance of the accident 
occurring at night decreased.  The other significant negative correlations included the 
following: 
• The chance of the pilot not deciding to obtain and use weather information 
through use of in-cockpit installed weather equipment information 
decreased. 
• The chance of the pilot not using weather information obtained through 
portable weather smart phone applications decreased.   
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• The chance of the aircraft crash site being closer to the departure location 
than the planned destination decreased.   
• The chance of weather not being encountered after mid flight point was 
reached decreased.   
• The chance of the pilot being in violation of FAA ratings policy 
decreased.   
• The chance of the weather being encountered before the mid flight point 
was reached decreased.   
• The chance of the pilot not experiencing an organizational conflict 
between productivity and safety decreased.   
• The chance of less than or equal to half the time and distance required to 
reach the destination before the accident occurred decreased.   
• The chance of the pilot not exhibiting circular decision-making decreased.   
• The chance of the pilot exhibiting cognitive anchoring decreased. 
• The chance of the pilot not being able to recognize self-reported weather 
cues decreased. 
These correlations relate to the identified research literature.  The current research 
correlation findings between pilot age and the applicable contextual factors support the 
Saxton (2008) study findings on sunk cost.  It is possible the pilots who flew longer 
distances and crashed closer to the destination were financially motivated.  Correlation 
findings of the current study also confirm the study results of the Wiegmann, Goh, and 
O’Hare (2002) research.  It could be the case when adverse weather was encountered 
later in the flight, the pilots were more likely to continue due to increased optimism about 
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the possibility of a successful landing at the destination (positive outcome) than the pilots 
would have been had they encountered bad weather early in a flight.  Johnson and 
Wiegmann (2015) and Ahlstrom, Ohneiser, and Caddigan (2016) study results cannot be 
addressed with the current study findings as it is unknown how the pilots used the in-
cockpit installed weather equipment information or weather information obtained through 
portable weather smart phone applications or other devices.  Walmsley and Gilbey (2016) 
study findings are also supported by the current results, as it is possible the pilots flew 
longer in IMC toward the destination because they interpreted the decisions of pilots who 
flew into deteriorating weather conditions toward the same destination more favorably as 
they landed at the same destination airport and perhaps heard their radio transmissions 
over the common traffic advisory frequency communicating a successful landing had 
been accomplished (positive outcome) as opposed to not being able to make the 
destination airport (negative outcome).  In the research completed by Bazargan and 
Guzhva (2011) on the impact of gender, age, and experience of pilots on general aviation 
accidents, it was found older pilots have a higher probability of being involved in both 
fatal and non-fatal accidents.  The statistically significant positive correlation findings 
between the identified contextual factors and older pilots support the Bazargan and 
Guzhva (2011) research for factors contributing to the higher probability of older pilots 
being involved in both fatal and non-fatal accidents. 
Statistically significant relationships between GA pilot flight experience (total 
flight hours) and the specific research identified contextual factors were also determined 
using the point biserial correlation.  A total of five positive and six negative significant 
correlations were identified.  The relationship between total flight hours and the pilot not 
171 
 
exhibiting permission-seeking behaviors was significant at the p < .01 level, r = -.239, p = 
.000 (CF32).  As the number of total flight hours increased, the chance of the pilot not 
exhibiting permission-seeking behaviors decreased.  It was also found as the pilot’s total 
flight hours increased, the chance of not being in violation of organizational flight plan 
policy, filing IFR when required increased, p < .05, r = .209, p = .001 (C23).  The other 
statistically significant relationships between GA pilot flight experience (total flight 
hours) and the specific research identified contextual factors are as follows, as the flight 
experience (total flight hours) increased (Table 17): 
• the chance of not exhibiting linear decision-making increased, p < .05,  
r = .200, p = .001 (CF27) 
• the chance of not being under stress and anticipating the consequences of 
flying in IMC increased, p < .05, r = .153, p = .015 (CF13) 
• the chance of flying into known icing conditions increased, p < .05,  
r = .148, p = .018 (CF22) 
• the chance of not communicating with air traffic control at the time of the 
VFR-into-IMC accident increased, p < .05, r = .131, p = .037 (CF12) 
• the chance of the pilot being in violation of FAA ratings policy decreased, 
p < .01 level, r = -.231, p = .000 (CF35) 
• the chance of the pilot not being in violation of FAA ratings policy 
decreased, p < .01, r = -.231, p = .000 (CF35) 
• the chance of communication with a briefer decreased, p < .01, r = -.178, p 
= .004 (CF33) 
172 
 
• the chance of being in communication with air traffic control at the time of 
the VFR-into-IMC accident decreased, p < .05, r = -.156, p = .012 (CF12) 
• the chance of descending below weather minimums decreased, p < .05,  











The pilot did not exhibit 
permission-seeking 
behaviors (CF32) 
r = -.239, p = .000 
The pilot was in violation 
of FAA ratings policy 
(CF35) 
r = -.231, p = .000 
The pilot was not in 
violation of FAA ratings 
policy (CF35) 
r = -.231, p = .000 
The pilot was not in 
violation of organizational 
flight plan policy - filing 
IFR when required 
(CF23) 
r = .209, p = .001 
The pilot did not exhibit 
linear decision-making 
(CF27) 
r = .200, p = .001 
The pilot was in 
communication with a 
briefer (CF33) 
r = -.178, p = .004 
The pilot was 
communicating with air 
traffic control at the time 
of the VFR-into-IMC 
accident (CF12) 





Table 17 continued 
 








The pilot was not under 
stress and did anticipate 
the consequences of 
flying in IMC (CF13) 
r = .153, p = .015 
The pilot did not descend 
below weather minimums 
(CF20) 
r = -.149, p = .018 
The pilot flew into known 
icing conditions (CF22) r = .148, p = .018 
The pilot did not 
communicate with air 
traffic control at the time 
of the VFR-into-IMC 
accident (CF12) 
r = .131, p = .037 
 
 
There were a total of five statistically significant positive correlations between 
experience (total flight hours) and the identified contextual factors.  As the total flight 
hours increased, the chance of the pilot not being in violation of organizational flight plan 
policy, filing IFR when required increased.  The other significant positive correlations 
included the following: 
• The chance of the pilot not exhibiting linear decision-making increased.   
• The chance of the pilot not being under stress and anticipating the 
consequences of flying in IMC increased.   
• The chance of the pilot flying into known icing conditions increased.   
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• The chance of the pilot not communicating with air traffic control at the 
time of the VFR-into-IMC accident increased.   
There were a total of six statistically significant negative correlations between experience 
(total flight hours) and the identified contextual factors.  As the total flight hours 
increased, the chance of the pilot not exhibiting permission-seeking behaviors decreased.  
As the total flight hours increased, the chance of the pilot being in violation of FAA 
ratings policy decreased, the chance of the pilot not being in violation of FAA ratings 
policy decreased, the chance of the pilot being in communication with a briefer 
decreased, the chance of the pilot communicating with air traffic control at the time of the 
VFR-into-IMC accident decreased, and the chance of the pilot not descending below 
weather minimums decreased.   
These positive and negative correlations relate to the identified research literature.  
Wiegmann, Goh, and O'Hare (2002) discovered the time and distance GA pilots flew into 
the weather before deciding to divert were negatively correlated with previous flight 
experience.  Findings of the study suggested VFR flight into IMC may be caused, in part, 
by poor situation assessment and experience rather than motivational judgment, 
encouraging risk-taking behavior as the GA pilot invests more time in the flight.  More 
research is needed to improve understanding of pilot behavior and VFR-into-IMC 
accidents.  Current study findings support the Bazargan and Guzhva (2011) research 
exploring whether pilot age and experience were factors in VFR-into-IMC occurrences.  
Results indicated male pilots over 60 years of age with more experience were more likely 
than other pilots to be involved in a fatal accident.  As the mean age of the pilots in the 
study were 57 years of age, including pilots as old as 82 years of age, it is possible the 
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age of pilots over 60 with high flight hours and associated experience (total flight hours) 
was a factor contributing to the fatal accidents.   
Statistically significant relationships between GA pilot certification 
(Instrument/Non-Instrument) and the specific research-identified contextual factors were 
determined using the phi correlation.  A total of one significant positive and 15 
significant negative correlations were identified.  The relationship between certification 
(Instrument/Non-Instrument) and the pilot not submitting a flight plan to flight service 
(CF21) was significant at the p < .01 level, r = .377, p = .000.  As the pilot certification 
from non-instrument to instrument-rating increased, the chance of the pilot not submitting 
a flight plan to flight service increased.  It was also found as the pilot’s certification from 
non-instrument to instrument-rating increased, the chance of the pilot taking a safety risk 
to fly in IMC conditions to the planned destination decreased, p < .01 level, r = -.222, p = 
.000 (CF24).  The other statistically significant relationships between GA pilot 
certification (Instrument/Non-Instrument) and the specific research identified contextual 
factors are as follows, as the pilot certification increased from the non-instrument to the 
instrument rating (Table 18): 
• the chance of the aircraft crash site being closer to the planned destination 
than the departure location decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.186, p = .002 
(CF15) 
• the chance of adverse weather being encountered before the mid flight 
point was reached decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.165, p = .007 (CF2) 
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• the chance of less than or equal to half the time and distance required to 
reach the destination before the accident occurred decreased, p < .05 level, 
r = -.163, p = .008 (CF6) 
• the chance of the aircraft crash site not being closer to the departure 
location than the planned destination decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.164, p 
= .008 (CF14) 
• the chance of adverse weather encountered after the mid flight point was 
reached decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.161, p = .009 (CF3) 
• the chance of the aircraft crash site being closer to the departure location 
than the planned destination decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.16, p = .009 
(CF14) 
• the chance of the pilot not communicating with air traffic control at the 
time of the VFR-into-IMC accident decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.159, p = 
.01 (CF12) 
• the chance of pilot deciding to continue VFR-into-IMC to the planned 
destination decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.156, p = .011 (CF17) 
• the chance of the pilot not being in violation of the FAA flight time 
currency policy decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.153, p = .013 (CF16) 
• the chance of the aircraft crash site not being closer to the planned 
destination than the departure location decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.139, 
p = .024 (CF15) 
• the chance of the adverse weather not encountered before the mid flight 
point was reached decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.126, p = .04 (CF2) 
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• the chance of the cues signaling a problem being clear to pilot decreased, p 
< .05 level, r = -.126, p = .04 (CF5) 
• the chance of the pilot communicating with air traffic control at the time 
of the VFR-into-IMC accident decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.124, p = .044 
(CF12) 
• the chance of the pilot overestimating the ceiling and/or visibility weather 









Pilot Certification  
 
The pilot did not submit a 
flight plan to flight 
service (CF21) 
r = .377, p = .000 
The pilot took a safety 
risk to fly in IMC 
conditions to planned 
destination (CF24) 
r = -.222, p = .000 
The aircraft crash site was 
closer to the planned 
destination than the 
departure location (CF15) 
r = -.186, p = .002 
Adverse weather 
encountered before mid 
flight point reached (CF2) 
r = -.165, p = .007 
Less than or equal to half 
the time and distance 
required to reach the 
destination before the 
accident occurred (CF6) 





Table 18 continued 
 





Pilot Certification  
 
 
The aircraft crash site was 
not closer to the departure 
location than the planned 
destination (CF14) 
r = -.164, p = .008 
Adverse weather 
encountered after mid 
flight point was reached 
(CF3) 
r = -.161, p = .009 
The aircraft crash site was 
closer to the departure 
location than the planned 
destination (CF14) 
r = -.16, p = .009 
The pilot did not 
communicate with air 
traffic control at the time 
of the VFR-into-IMC 
accident (CF12) 
r = -.159, p = .01 
The pilot decided to 
continue VFR-into-IMC 
to the planned destination 
(CF17) 
r = -.156, p = .011 
The pilot was not in 
violation of the FAA 
flight time currency 
policy (CF16) 
r = -.153, p = .013 
The aircraft crash site was 
not closer to the planned 
destination than the 
departure location (CF15) 
r = -.139, p = .024 
Adverse weather not 
encountered before mid 
flight point reached (CF2) 
r = -.126, p = .04 
Cues signaling problem 





Table 18 continued 
 





Pilot Certification  
 
 
The pilot was 
communicating with air 
traffic control at the time 
of the VFR-into-IMC 
accident (CF12) 
r = -.124, p = .044 
The pilot overestimated 
ceiling and/or visibility 
weather conditions (CF9) 
r = -.122, p = .048 
 
 
There was a total of one significant positive and 15 significant negative 
correlations between certification (non-instrument verses instrument rating) and the 
identified contextual factors.  As the pilot certification from non-instrument to 
instrument-rating increased, the chance of the pilot not submitting a flight plan to flight 
service increased.  The other significant negative correlations included the following: 
• The chance of the pilot taking a safety risk to fly in IMC conditions to the 
planned destination decreased.   
• The chance of the aircraft crash site being closer to the planned destination 
than the departure location decreased.   
• The chance of adverse weather being encountered before the mid flight 
point was reached decreased.   
• The chance of less than or equal to half the time and distance required to 
reach the destination before the accident occurred decreased.   
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• The chance of the aircraft crash site not being closer to the departure 
location than the planned destination decreased.   
• The chance of adverse weather being encountered after the mid flight 
point was reached decreased.   
• The chance of the aircraft crash site being closer to the departure location 
than the planned destination decreased.   
• The chance of the pilot not communicating with air traffic control at the 
time of the VFR-into-IMC accident decreased.   
• The chance of the pilot deciding to continue VFR-into-IMC to the planned 
destination decreased.   
• The chance of the pilot not being in violation of the FAA flight time 
currency policy decreased.   
• The chance of the aircraft crash site not being closer to the planned 
destination than the departure location decreased.   
• The chance of adverse weather not being encountered before the mid 
flight point was reached decreased.   
• The chance of cues signaling a problem were clear to pilot decreased.   
• The chance of the pilot not communicating with air traffic control at the 
time of the VFR-into-IMC accident decreased.   
• The chance of the pilot overestimating the ceiling and/or visibility weather 
conditions decreased.   
These positive and negative correlations relate to the identified research literature.  
Barron (2011) study results found private pilots who were instrument rated were more 
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likely to continue farther into IMC than their low time VFR or high time commercial, 
and/or ATP counterparts, a finding pertaining primarily to the pilot’s ratings.  The current 
study findings confirmed the Baron (2011) research results, as it was discovered as the 
GA pilot certification increased from the non-instrument to the instrument rating, the 
chance of the aircraft crash site not being closer to the planned destination than the 
departure location decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.139, p = .024 (CF15).  There were more 
instrument rated pilots identified in the current study crashing closer to the destination 
than the departure.  Current study findings also support the Jackman’s (2014) research 
pertaining to the discovery through the results of a binary logistic regression analysis 
pilot ratings violations and pilot currency violations were statistically significant 
predictors of fatality.  The current study discovered as the certification of the GA pilot 
increased from the non-instrument to the instrument rating, the chance of the pilot not 
being in violation of the FAA flight time currency policy decreased, p < .05 level, r = -
.153, p = .013 (CF16).  Current study findings support the Coyne, Baldwin, and 
Latrorella (2008) results.  While instrument rated pilots are more likely to continue into 
adverse weather, they are, according to Coyne, Baldwin, and Latrorella (2008), less 
proficient in accurately determining true visibility.  Coyne, Baldwin, and Latrorella 
(2005) also explained, on average, pilots overestimated visibility when ceilings were 
higher, and overestimated ceilings when visibility was better.  It was suggested by the 
researchers the interaction of ceiling and visibility shows pilots may be inappropriately 
assessing weather conditions.  Findings of the current study disagree with the Baldwin 
and Latrorella (2005) study conclusions.  A weak negative relationship was identified in 
the current study.  It was determined as the GA pilot certification increased from the non-
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instrument to instrument rating, the chances of the pilot overestimating the ceiling and/or 
visibility weather conditions decreased (CF9) and was significant at the p < .05 level, r = 
-0.122, p = 0.048. 
Statistically significant relationships between Weather (Inclement/Non-
Inclement) and the specific research identified contextual factors were determined using 
the phi correlation.  A total of one significant positive and 14 significant negative 
correlations were identified.  The relationship between Weather (Inclement/Non-
Inclement) and the pilot being in violation of conducting an IFR flight without proper 
clearance or ratings was significant at the p < .01 level, r = .230, p = .000 (CF26).  As the 
weather increased from non-inclement to inclement, the chance of the pilot being in 
violation of conducting an IFR flight without proper clearance or ratings increased.  It 
was also found as the weather increased from non-inclement to inclement, the chance of 
the pilot not being in violation of FAA medical status policy decreased, p < .01 level, r = 
-.293, p = .000 (CF28).  The other statistically significant relationships between Weather 
(Inclement/Non-Inclement) and the specific research-identified contextual factors are as 
follows: 
As the weather increased from non-inclement to inclement (Table 19): 
• the chance of the pilot exhibiting PCE behavior decreased, p < .01 level, r 
= -.306, p = .000 (CF34) 
• the chance of the pilot misdiagnosing the changes in or severity of the 
weather decreased, p < .01 level, r = -.322, p = .000 (CF39) 
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• the chance of the pilot underestimating the level of risk associated with 
cues that should have signaled a change in course of action decreased, p < 
.01 level, r = -.322, p = .000 (CF43) 
• the chance of adverse weather encountered before the mid flight point was 
reached decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.165, p = .007 (CF2) 
• the chance of adverse weather encountered after the mid flight point was 
reached decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.161, p = .009 (CF3) 
• the chance of the pilot not being in violation of FAA ratings policy 
decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.154, p = .012 (CF35) 
• the chance of the pilot being in violation of FAA ratings policy decreased, 
p < .05 level, r = -.150, p = .015 (CF35) 
• the chance of the pilot receiving a weather briefing decreased, p < .05 
level, r = -.147, p = .017 (CF36) 
• the chance of the pilot being in communication with a briefer decreased, p 
< .05 level, r = -.143, p = .02 (CF33) 
• the chance of the pilot being able to recognize self-reported weather cues 
decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.136, p = .027 (CF38) 
• the chance of the pilot not being in communication with a briefer 
decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.132, p = .032 (CF33) 
• the chance of adverse weather not encountered before the mid flight point 
was reached decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.126, p = .04 (CF2) 
• the chance of the pilot not receiving a weather briefing decreased, p < .05 












The pilot was in violation 
of conducting an IFR 
flight without proper 
clearance or ratings 
(CF26) 
r = .230, p = .000 
The pilot was not in 
violation of FAA medical 
status policy (CF28) 
r = -.293, p = .000 
The pilot exhibited Plan 
Continuation Error (PCE) 
behavior (CF34) 
r = -.306, p = .000 
The pilot misdiagnosed 
the changes in or severity 
of the weather (CF39) 
r = -.322, p = .000 
The pilot underestimated 
the level of risk associated 
with cues that should have 
signaled a change in 
course of action (CF43) 
r = -.322, p = .000 
Adverse weather 
encountered before mid 
flight point reached (CF2) 
r = -.165, p = .007 
Adverse weather 
encountered after mid 
flight point was reached 
(CF3) 
r = -.161, p = .009 
The pilot was not in 
violation of FAA ratings 
policy (CF35) 
r = -.154, p = .012 
The pilot was in violation 
of FAA ratings policy 
(CF35) 
r = -.150, p = .015 
The pilot received a 





Table 19 continued 
 








The pilot was in 
communication with a 
briefer (CF33) 
r = -.143, p = .02 
The pilot was able to 
recognize self-reported 
weather cues (CF38) 
r = -.136, p = .027 
The pilot was not in 
communication with a 
briefer (CF33) 
r = -.132, p = .032 
Adverse weather not 
encountered before mid 
flight point reached (CF2) 
r = -.126, p = .04 
The pilot did not receive a 
weather briefing (CF36) r = -.122, p = .048 
 
 
There was a total of one positive significant and 14 negative significant 
correlations between weather (inclement/non-inclement) and the identified contextual 
factors.  As the weather increased from non-inclement to inclement conditions, the 
chance of the pilot being in violation of conducting an IFR flight without proper 
clearance or ratings increased.  The other significant negative correlations included the 
following: 
• The chance of the pilot not being in violation of FAA medical status 
policy decreased.   
• The chance of the pilot exhibiting PCE behavior decreased.   
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• The chance of the pilot misdiagnosing the changes in or severity of the 
weather decreased.   
• The chance of the pilot underestimating the level of risk associated with 
cues that should have signaled a change in course of action decreased.   
• The chance of adverse weather being encountered before the mid flight 
point was reached decreased.   
• The chance of adverse weather being encountered after the mid flight 
point was reached decreased.   
• The chance of the pilot not being in violation of FAA ratings policy 
decreased.   
• The chance of the pilot being in violation of FAA ratings policy 
decreased.   
• The chance of the pilot receiving a weather briefing decreased.   
• The chance of the pilot being in communication with a briefer decreased.   
• The chance of the pilot being able to recognize self-reported weather cues 
decreased.   
• The chance of the pilot being in communication with a briefer decreased.   
• The chance of adverse weather not being encountered before the mid 
flight point was reached decreased.   
• The chance of the pilot not receiving a weather briefing decreased.  
These positive and negative correlations relate to the identified research literature.  
Current research findings confirm the Jackman (2014) study results on FAA ratings and 
medical status violations.  The findings revealed flight plan violations and pilot medical 
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status violations were not statistically significant predictors of fatality.  It was discovered 
through the results of the binary logistic regression analysis, pilot ratings violations were 
statistically significant predictors of fatality.  It could be the case the pilots in the study 
flying while violating FAA ratings policy contributed to the fatal accidents.  The current 
research findings also support the Saxton (2008) study conclusions on sunk cost.  It is 
possible the pilots in the study took greater risks by continuing further into adverse 
weather when IMC was encountered later into a flight.  It could also be the case as the 
pilots were not in communication with a briefer and did not receive a weather briefing 
these contextual factors contributed to the fatal accidents as well.   
Statistically significant relationships between Flight Conditions (VMC/IMC) and 
the specific research identified contextual factors were determined using the phi 
correlation.  A total of 16 significant negative correlations were identified.  The 
relationship between Flight Conditions (VMC/IMC) and the pilot not submitting a flight 
plan to flight service was significant at the p < .01 level, r = -.322, p = .000 (CF21).  As 
the flight conditions increased from VMC to IMC, the chance of the pilot not submitting 
a flight plan to flight service decreased.  It was also found as the flight conditions 
increased from VMC to IMC, the chance of the pilot taking a safety risk to fly in IMC 
conditions to the planned destination decreased, p < .01 level, r = -.332, p = .000 (CF24).  
Other statistically significant relationships between Flight Conditions (VMC/IMC) and 
the specific research identified contextual factors are as follows, as the flight conditions 
increased from VMC to IMC (Table 20): 
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• the chance of the aircraft crash site being closer to the planned destination 
than the departure location decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.186, p = .002 
(CF15) 
• the chance of adverse weather encountered before the mid flight point was 
reached decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.165, p = .007 (CF2) 
• the chance of less than or equal to half the time and distance required to 
reach the destination before the accident occurred decreased, p < .05 level, 
r = -.163, p = .008 (CF6) 
• the chance of the aircraft crash site not being closer to the departure 
location than the planned destination decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.164, p 
= .008 (CF14) 
• the chance of adverse weather encountered after the mid flight point was 
reached decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.161, p = .009 (CF3) 
• the chance of the aircraft crash site being closer to the departure location 
than the planned destination decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.16, p = .009 
(CF14) 
• the chance of the pilot not communicating with air traffic control at the 
time of the VFR-into-IMC accident decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.159 p = 
.01 (CF12) 
• the chance of the pilot deciding to continue VFR-into-IMC to the planned 
destination decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.156 p = .011 (CF17) 
• the chance of the pilot not being in violation of the FAA flight time 
currency policy decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.153 p = .013 (CF16) 
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• the chance of the aircraft crash site not being closer to the planned 
destination than the departure location decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.139 p 
= .024 (CF15) 
• the chance of adverse weather not encountered before mid flight point 
reached decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.126 p = .04 (CF2) 
• the chance of cues signaling a problem were clear to the pilot decreased, p 
< .05 level, r = -.126 p = .04 (CF5) 
• the chance of the pilot communicating with air traffic control at the time 
of the VFR-into-IMC accident decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.124 p = .044 
(CF12) 
• the chance of the pilot overestimating the ceiling and/or visibility weather 









Flight Conditions  
 
The pilot did not submit a 
flight plan to flight 
service (CF21) 
r = -.322, p = .000 
The pilot took a safety 
risk to fly in IMC 
conditions to planned 
destination (CF24) 





Table 20 continued 
 





Flight Conditions  
 
 
The aircraft crash site was 
closer to the planned 
destination than the 
departure location (CF15) 
r = -.186, p = .002 
Adverse weather 
encountered before mid 
flight point reached (CF2) 
r = -.165, p = .007 
Less than or equal to half 
the time and distance 
required to reach the 
destination before the 
accident occurred (CF6) 
r = -.163, p = .008 
The aircraft crash site was 
not closer to the departure 
location than the planned 
destination (CF14) 
r = -.164, p = .008 
Adverse weather 
encountered after mid 
flight point was reached 
(CF3) 
r = -.161, p = .009 
The aircraft crash site was 
closer to the departure 
location than the planned 
destination (CF14) 
r = -.16, p = .009 
The pilot did not 
communicate with air 
traffic control at the time 
of the VFR-into-IMC 
accident (CF12) 
r = -.159, p = .01 
The pilot decided to 
continue VFR-into-IMC 
to the planned destination 
(CF17) 
r = -.156, p = .011 
The pilot was not in 
violation of the FAA 
flight time currency 
policy (CF16) 




Table 20 continued 
 





Flight Conditions  
 
 
The aircraft crash site was 
not closer to the planned 
destination than the 
departure location (CF15) 
r = -.139, p = .024 
Adverse weather not 
encountered before mid 
flight point reached (CF2) 
r = -.126, p = .004 
Cues signaling problem 
clear to pilot (CF5) r = -.126, p = .04 
The pilot was 
communicating with air 
traffic control at the time 
of the VFR-into-IMC 
accident (CF12) 
r = -.124, p = .044 
The pilot overestimated 
ceiling and/or visibility 
weather conditions (CF9) 
r = -.122, p = .048 
 
 
There were 16 statistically significant negative correlations between flight 
conditions (VMC/IMC) and the identified contextual factors.  As the flight conditions 
increased from VMC to IMC, the chance of the pilot not submitting a flight plan to flight 
service decreased.  These negative correlations also included the following: 
• The chance of the pilot taking a safety risk to fly in IMC conditions to the 
planned destination decreased.   
• The chance of the aircraft crash site being closer to the planned destination 
than the departure location decreased.   
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• The chance of adverse weather being encountered before the mid flight 
point was reached decreased.   
• The chance of less than or equal to half the time and distance required to 
reach the destination before the accident occurred decreased.   
• The chance of the aircraft crash site not being closer to the departure 
location than the planned destination decreased.   
• The chance of adverse weather being encountered after the mid flight 
point was reached decreased.   
• The chance of the aircraft crash site being closer to the departure location 
than the planned destination decreased.   
• The chance of the pilot not communicating with air traffic control at the 
time of the VFR-into-IMC accident decreased.   
• The chance of the pilot deciding to continue VFR-into-IMC to the planned 
destination decreased.   
• The chance of the pilot not being in violation of the FAA flight time 
currency policy decreased.   
• The chance of the aircraft crash site not being closer to the planned 
destination than the departure location decreased.   
• The chance of adverse weather not being encountered before the mid 
flight point was reached decreased.   
• The chance of the cues signaling a problem were clear to pilot decreased.   
• The chance of the pilot communicating with air traffic control at the time 
of the VFR-into-IMC accident decreased.   
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• The chance of the pilot overestimating the ceiling and/or visibility weather 
conditions decreased.  
These negative correlations relate to the identified research literature.  The current study 
findings support the Wiegmann, Goh, and O'Hare (2002) conclusions on the amount of 
time and distance GA pilots flew into the IMC weather before deciding to divert.  Study 
findings identified pilots who encountered the deteriorating weather earlier in the flight 
flew longer into IMC before diverting and were more optimistic about the weather 
conditions.  The GA pilots who encountered the IMC weather later in the flight flew 
shorter distances into IMC before diverting and were not optimistic about the weather 
conditions.  In the current study it was discovered as the weather increased from VMC to 
IMC, the crash sites and adverse weather occurred closer to the departure location 
slightly more often than the crash sites identified closer to the planned destination.  It 
could be the case these pilots flew longer into IMC before attempting to divert to an 
alternate location and were more optimistic about the weather conditions.  It is also 
possible as these pilots did not submit flight plans, were not in communication with air 
traffic control at the time of the accident, and violated FAA flight time currency policy, 
these contextual factors contributed to the fatal accidents as well.   
Significant relationships between Accident Time of Day (Day/Night) and the 
specific research-identified contextual factors were determined using the phi correlation.  
A total of four significant positive and three significant negative correlations were 
identified.  The relationship between Accident Time of Day (Day/Night) and the aircraft 
crash site not being closer to the planned destination than the departure location was 
significant at the p < .05 level, r = .189, p = .002 (CF15).  As the time of day increased 
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from Day to Night, the chance of the aircraft crash site not being closer to the planned 
destination than the departure location increased.  It was also found as the time of day 
increased from Day to Night, the chance of adverse weather encountered before the mid 
flight point was reached increased, p < .05 level, r = .177, p = .004 (CF2).  Other 
statistically significant relationships between Accident Time of Day (Day/Night) and the 
specific research-identified contextual factors are as follows, as the time of day increased 
from day to night (Table 21): 
• the chance of the aircraft crash being closer to the departure location than 
the planned destination increased, p < .05 level, r = .168, p = .006 (CF14) 
• the chance of adverse weather encountered after the mid flight point was 
reached decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.155, p = .012 (CF3) 
• the chance of adverse weather not encountered before the mid flight point 
was reached decreased, p < .05 level, r = -.146, p = .018 (CF2) 
• the chance of less than or equal to half the time and distance required to 
reach the destination before the accident occurred increased, p < .05 level, 
r = .133, p = .03 (CF6) 
• the chance of the aircraft crash site being closer to the planned destination 


















Time of Day  
 
The aircraft crash site was 
not closer to the planned 
destination than the 
departure location (CF15) 
r = .189, p = .002 
Adverse weather 
encountered before mid 
flight point reached (CF2) 
r = .177, p = .004 
The aircraft crash site was 
closer to the departure 
location than the planned 
destination (CF14) 
r = .168, p = .006 
Adverse weather 
encountered after mid 
flight point was reached 
(CF3) 
r = -.155, p = .012 
Adverse weather not 
encountered before mid 
flight point reached (CF2) 
r = -.146, p = .018 
Less than or equal to half 
the time and distance 
required to reach the 
destination before the 
accident occurred (CF6) 
r = .133, p = .03 
The aircraft crash site was 
closer to the planned 
destination than the 
departure location (CF15) 
r = -.13, p = .034 
 
 
There were four statistically significant positive correlations between the 
Accident Time of Day (Day/Night) and the identified contextual factors.  As the time of 
day increased from day to night, the chance of the aircraft crash site not being closer to 
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the planned destination than the departure location increased.  Other significant positive 
correlations included the following: 
• The chance of weather being encountered before the mid flight point was 
reached increased.   
• The chance of the aircraft crash site being closer to the departure location 
than the planned destination increased.   
• The chance of less than or equal to half the time and distance required to 
reach the destination before the accident occurred increased.   
There were three statistically significant negative correlations between the Accident Time 
of Day (Day/Night) and the identified contextual factors.  As the accident time of day 
increased from day to night, the chance of adverse weather being encountered after the 
mid flight point was reached decreased.  The other statistically significant negative 
correlations included the following: 
• The chance of adverse weather not encountered before the mid flight 
point was reached decreased.   
• The chance of the aircraft crash site being closer to the planned 
destination than the departure location decreased.   
These significant positive and negative correlations relate to the identified research 
literature.  The current study findings support the Wiegmann, Goh, and O'Hare (2002) 
conclusions on the amount of time and distance GA pilots flew into the IMC weather 
before deciding to divert.  Study findings identified pilots who encountered the 
deteriorating weather earlier in the flight flew longer into IMC before diverting and were 
more optimistic about the weather conditions.  The GA pilots who encountered the IMC 
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weather later in the flight flew shorter distances into IMC before diverting and were not 
optimistic about the weather conditions.  In the current study, it was discovered as the 
Time of Day increased from Day to Night, the crash sites and adverse weather occurred 
closer to the departure locations than the planned destinations.  It could be the case these 
pilots flew longer into IMC before attempting to divert to an alternate location and were 
more optimistic about the weather conditions. 
Significant contextual factors identified included those factors revealed from the 
multiple regression analyses with the crash distance from departure to the midpoint of the 
planned route (0% to 50% of planned route completion).  The results of the multiple 
regression analyses with the crash distance from departure to the midpoint of the planned 
route (0% to 50% of planned route completion) are the following: 
• The flight time and distance in IMC were less than or equal to half the 
time and distance required to reach the destination, p = .033 (CF7).  
• The pilot submitted a flight plan to flight service, p = .040 (CF21). 
• The pilot did not fly into known icing conditions, p = .027 (CF22). 
• The pilot was conducting scud running flight operations at the time of the 
accident, p = .054 (CF37). 
The results added statistically significantly to the prediction of the crash distance 
from departure to the midpoint of the planned route of flight (0% to 50%), F (72, 182) = 
1.494, p < .017, R2 = .371.  Current study results support the Saxton (2008) study 
findings on sunk cost to be a valid concept, as the participants of the study who were 
financially motivated did, in fact, continue longer into poor weather conditions than the 
participants who were not financially motivated and came upon hazardous weather earlier 
198 
 
in the flight.  It could be the case the pilots in the current study, having encountered IMC 
early in the flight, continued farther into IMC because they were financially motivated.  
The current study findings also support the Wiegmann, Goh, and O'Hare (2002) results 
identifying pilots who encountered the deteriorating weather earlier in the flight flew 
longer into IMC before diverting and were more optimistic about the weather conditions.  
It is possible the pilots in the current study, having encountered IMC early in the flight, 
flew greater distances into IMC and were optimistic about the weather conditions.  
Current study findings also support the Walmsley and Gilbey (2016) results of pilots 
interpreting the decisions of pilots who flew into deteriorating weather conditions more 
favorably when the outcome was positive than when the outcome was negative.  It could 
be the case the pilots in the current study may have flown farther than they would have 
into IMC knowing other pilots had arrived successfully at the planned destination perhaps 
through hearing the radio transmissions of the pilots landing at the same destination.  The 
findings of the current study are also consistent with the Ball (2008) results finding 
training improved pilots’ ability to maintain safe distances from poor weather conditions.  
It is possible the pilots in the current study made a conscious choice to fly into IMC 
influenced by level of experience and quality of training.  
The significant contextual factors identified from the multiple regression analyses 
also included those factors revealed with the crash distance from the midpoint of the 
planned route (51% to 100% of planned route completion) and include the following: 




• The adverse weather was encountered after the mid flight point was reached, p 
= .000 (CF3). 
• The flight time and distance in IMC were greater than half the time and 
distance required to reach the destination before diverting, p = .003 (CF7). 
• The pilot was not fixated on visually compelling head down displays, p = .021 
(CF8). 
• The pilot was under stress and did not anticipate the consequences of flying in 
IMC, p = .017 (CF13). 
• The pilot decided not to continue VFR-into-IMC to the planned destination, p 
= .018 (CF17). 
• The pilot decided to continue VFR-into-IMC to the planned destination, p = 
.032 (CF17). 
• The pilot submitted a flight plan to flight service, p = .002 (CF21). 
• The pilot flew into known icing conditions, p = .027 (CF22). 
• The pilot exhibited linear decision-making, p = .004 (CF27). 
• The pilot did not exhibit permission-seeking behaviors, p = .011 (CF32). 
The findings added statistically significantly to the prediction of the crash distance from 
the midpoint to the destination of the planned route of flight (51% to 100%), F (72, 182) 
= 3.178, p < .01, R2 = .557.  Current study results support the Keller (2015) findings of 
VFR pilots who flew into IMC did so because they misperceived the severity of the 
weather and the associated risks and pilots who turned, or diverted, did so because they 
became aware of the danger and sought to return to safety.  It could be the case in the 
current study the pilots who attempted to land at the destination in IMC and crashed may 
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have misperceived the severity and risks of flying in adverse weather and those pilots 
diverting to an alternate did so because they became aware of the risks of flying in IMC 
and attempted to divert to an alternate or the departure point.  The current study also 
supports the O’Hare and Smitheram (1995) research finding pilots who viewed risk from 
a gain standpoint were less likely to continue into IMC, and those who considered risk 
from a loss viewpoint were more likely to continue.  It is possible the pilots in the current 
study who attempted to land at the destination viewed risk from a loss perspective and 
continued in IMC to the planned arrival point.  It could also be the case the pilots in the 
current study who viewed risk from a gain perspective diverted to an alternate location or 
the departure point.  The current study also agrees with the Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare 
(2002) research results; when adverse weather is encountered later in flight, pilots are 
more likely to continue as they might be more optimistic about the possibility of positive 
outcomes than they are when they encounter poor weather early in a flight.  Results were 
consistent with more optimism during poor weather encounters occurring later into 
flights and less optimism when hazardous weather was present earlier in flights.  It could 
be the case the pilots in the current study encountering IMC later in the flight were more 
likely to continue to the planned destination being more optimistic of the positive 
outcome of a successful landing at the arrival point.  It is also possible the pilots in the 
current study encountering IMC earlier in the flight were more likely to divert to an 
alternate or attempt to return to the departure point being less optimistic with bad weather 
encountered early in the flight.  The current study results also agree with the Ahlstrom, 
Ohneiser, and Caddigan (2016) findings documenting the tendency of the novice pilot to 
utilize linear decision-making and the expert pilot utilization of circular decision-making.  
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Researchers explained when the pilot chooses to continue into questionable weather 
conditions, circumstances including invested time, money and energy, passenger 
pressure; and get-there-itis may influence a pilot to continue, rather than divert.  It is 
possible the pilots in the current study making the decision to continue in IMC to the 
planned destination used linear decision making rather than circular decision making and 
could have been influenced by any of the identified factors contributing to the fatal 
accidents.  The current study also supports the Goh and Wiegmann (2001) results 
identifying pilots who overestimated personal abilities and inaccurately diagnosed 
visibility were more likely to continue into adverse weather.  It could be the case the 
pilots in the current study making the decision to continue into IMC to the planned 
destination were overconfident in their personal abilities and misjudged the decreasing 
visibility, thinking the visibility was higher when in fact it was lower, and continued into 
IMC to the destination, factors possibly contributing to the accident.  Current study 
findings also support the Walmsley and Gilbey (2016) results of pilots interpreting the 
decisions of pilots who flew into deteriorating weather conditions more favorably when 
the outcome was positive than when the outcome was negative.  It could be the case the 
pilots in the current study heard pilots on the radio arriving at the destination airport and 
making a successful landing (positive outcome) and decided to continue to the same 
destination airport in IMC to attempt a landing with deteriorating weather conditions 
based on the successful landing of other pilots in better weather conditions.  The current 
study also supports the Coyne, Baldwin, and Latrorella (2005) findings on linear 
decision-making, where pilots commit to one decision without reevaluation after actions 
have been implemented.   It is possible the pilots in the current study used linear rather 
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than circular decision making and did not check decisions once they were made to see if 
another decision should be made based on updated information, contributing to the fatal 
accident.  The current study also supports the Ball (2008) research findings for the reason 
pilots fly too closely to adverse weather being a conscious choice influenced by level of 
experience and quality of training.  It could be the case the pilots in the current study 
made the conscious choice to fly too closely to adverse weather based on level of flight 
experience and quality of the training received.  The current study also supports the 
Martin, Davison, and Orasanu (1998) research findings investigating errors in aviation 
decision-making.  It was hypothesized by the researchers errors are facilitated by 
underestimation of risk and failure to analyze the potential consequences of continuing 
with the initial plan as well as stressors may further contribute to these effects.  It could 
be the case the pilots in the current study were involved in the fatal aircraft crashes 
resulting partially from contributory factors related to bad decision-making, 
underestimation of risk, and stress.    
Conclusions 
The main study was able to answer the three research questions for the 46 
research-identified contextual factors related to Part 91, GA pilot intentions and behavior 
resulting in VFR-into-IMC accidents.  The first and second research questions were as 
follows: 
1. What contextual factors contribute to Part 91, GA pilot VFR-into-IMC 
accidents in the reviewed NTSB AARs? 
2. What is the frequency of occurrence for the contextual factors in Part 91, GA 
pilot VFR into-IMC accidents in the reviewed NTSB AARs? 
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The study’s research questions one and two were able to be answered by the 
researcher.  The 46 research-identified contextual factors present in the main study 
sample of 85 accidents, as identified by the three raters, were sorted to identify the 
specific contextual factors and associated frequencies from the results obtained from 
SPSSTM (Appendix H; Table H1).  Three raters identified a total of 37 out of 46 research-
identified contextual factors in the 85 accident sample used in the main study.  Highest 
presence and frequencies of the top five rater identified contextual factors in the sample 
of 85 GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC NTSB AARs included the following: (1) number of 
passengers on board (CF29-62%), (2) accident time of day (Day) (CF1-60%), (3) crash 
distance from planned destination (CF15-54%), (4) not filing a flight plan (CF21-49%), 
and (5) underestimating risk (CF43-49%).   
The third research question was as follows: 
3. How are the contextual factors manifested in Part 91, GA pilot VFR-into-IMC 
accidents in the sample of reviewed NTSB AARs? 
The researcher was able to answer the third research question.  Three raters 
provided their respective opinions about how the 46 research-identified contextual factors 
were manifested in the 85 accident sample.  Highest frequency rater-identified contextual 
factor manifestations including the following:   
The number of passengers on board the aircraft was identified by the raters in the 
85 NTSB accident sample.  A total of 53 out of 85 aircraft, or 62% of the accident 
sample, had passengers on board the aircraft.  A break down according to category of 
passenger number on board the aircraft and the associated percentages were identified as 
follows: 32 aircraft (0 passengers - 38%), 36 aircraft (1 passenger – 42%), 11 accidents (2 
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passengers – 13%), 3 accidents (3 passengers – 4%), 1 accident (4 passengers – 1%), and 
2 accidents (5 passengers – 2%).   
Accident time of day was identified by the raters in the 85 NTSB accident sample.  
There was a total of 34 accidents occurring during the day and 51 accidents took place at 
night.  Particular lighting conditions varied and included six accidents taking place at 
dusk, 37 during daylight conditions, 33 during night light conditions, five during dark 
light conditions, and four during dawn light conditions.  Two accidents occurred at 0000, 
one at 0100, two at 0400, five at 0500, three at 0600, four at 0700, three at 0800, four at 
0900, five at 1000, four at 1100, five at 1200, one at 1300, five at 1400, two at 1500, 
three at 1600, four at 1700, seven at 1800, ten at 1900, five at 2000, four at 2100, three at 
2200, and three at 2300.   
Crash distances from the midpoint to the planned destination were identified by 
the raters for the 85 NTSB accident sample.  The crash distances from the midpoint to the 
planned destination as a percentage of the planned route of flight course completion 
included the following: (1) 51% (12 accidents), (2) 56% (1 accident), (3) 59% (1 
accident), (4) 60% (1 accident), (5) 62% (1 accident), (6) 66% (1 accident), (7) 69% (1 
accident), (8) 70% (2 accidents), (9) 71% (1 accident), (10) 73% (1 accident), (11) 74% 
(2 accidents), (12) 77% (3 accidents), (13) 84% (1 accident), (14) 86% (1 accident), (15) 
89% (1 accident), (16) 90% (1 accident), (17) 94% (1 accident), (18) 95% (1 accident), 
(19) 96% (1 accident), (20) 97% (1 accident), (21) 98% (1 accident), and (22) 99% (9 
accidents).  A majority of accidents occurred between the midpoint to the planned 
destination and totaled 46 versus 39 occurring from the departure to the midpoint of the 
planned route of flight.   
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Reasons the pilots filed and did not file flight plans were identified by the raters in 
the 85 NTSB accident sample.  The reasons reported by the raters for pilots filing a flight 
plan included the following: (1) the pilot experienced errors in attempting to enter the 
flight plan, (2) NTSB investigators making mistakes in reporting pilots not filing flight 
plans when the pilots did file flight plans, (3) the pilots filing flight plans and then 
cancelling the flight plans for various reasons, and (4) the pilots filing IFR flight plans 
when not qualified to file IFR flight plans.  Reasons reported by the raters for pilots not 
filing flight plans included (1) the pilots felt filing flight plans was not necessary, and (2) 
the pilots did not file flight plans when they should have filed flight plans.   
Reasons the pilots underestimated the risks in conducting the flights were 
identified by the raters in the 85 NTSB accident sample.  The reasons reported by the 
raters for the pilots underestimating the risks in conducting the flights included the 
following: (1) poor decision-making, (2) time of day, (3) lighting conditions, (4) terrain, 
(5) social pressure, (6) incomplete weather briefing, (7) incomplete pilot risk assessment, 
(8) pilot intentional self-harm, (9) underestimation of risk for flight direction/location 
decision, (10) underestimation of risk for flying near adverse weather decision, (11) pilot 
self-imposed pressures, (12) equipment failure, (13) ATC failure, and (14) 
underestimation of night flying risk.   
The main study identified and demonstrated a method of utilizing expert raters 
and historical archival fatal accident data and statistical analyses to identify significant 
contextual factors to mitigate incidents and accidents.  Significance between the majority 
of contextual factors and pilot age, flight experience (total flight hours), pilot certification 
level (instrument/non-instrument), weather (inclement/non-inclement), flight conditions 
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(VMC/IMC), time of day (day/night), crash distance from departure, and crash distance 
from planned destination studied at the p < .01 and p < .05 levels were identified.  A 
rater-identified possible NTSB archival database taxonomy suggestion of pilot intentional 
self-harm was also identified.  Findings of the current study provided support/refuted the 
key discoveries of the Ahlstrom, Ohneiser, and Caddigan (2016), Baldwin and Latrorella 
(2005), Ball (2008), Balog (2013), Balog (2016), Barron (2011), Bazargan and Guzhva 
(2011), Coyne, Baldwin, and Latrorella (2008), Goh and Wiegmann (2001), Ison 
(2014a), Ison (2014b), Jackman (2014), Johnson and Wiegmann (2015), Keller (2015), 
Martin, Davison, and Orasanu (1998), O’Hare and Owen (2002), O’Hare and Smitheram 
(1995), Saxton (2008), Walmsley and Gilbey (2016), and Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare 
(2002) research.  The application of the demonstrated methodology is generalizable to 
any other field and mode of transportation.     
Recommendations 
It is recommended archival studies be conducted for all flight domains using the 
identified methodology, including additional GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC accident 
research.  The studies should incorporate secondary data from the NTSB and other GA 
pilot historical databases.  Populations and samples should be taken from a variety of 
geographical areas to support/refute the present study contextual factor and manifestation 
findings.  These recommendations could increase the possibility of identifying other 
contextual factors and manifestations not revealed in the current study.  Different groups 
of raters should be recruited to provide subject matter expertise for VFR-into-IMC 
accidents, such as professional flight instructors.  Additional research should be 
conducted on the GA Part 91, VFR-into-IMC contextual factors and manifestations 
207 
 
identified in the current study to increase knowledge and understanding of the reasons 
these factors and manifestations exist.  Additional research should also be completed to 
improve understanding of the relationships among the contextual factors, manifestations, 
pilot age, flight experience (total flight hours), pilot certification level (instrument/non-
instrument), weather (inclement/non-inclement), flight conditions (VMC/IMC) and time 
of day (day/night) identified in this study.  The GA pilot community should be educated 
and trained on the relationships among the contextual factors, pilot age, flight experience, 
pilot certification level, weather, flight conditions, time of day, crash distance from 
departure, and crash distance from the planned destination as well as the manifestations 
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Table D1   
Forty-six Contextual Factor Sources    
Contextual Factor Name  Description Source 
1. Accident time of day The time of day 
when the accident 
occurred 
Ison, 2014a; Ison, 
2014b 
2. Adverse weather 
encountered early in 
flight 
The VFR-into-
IMC weather was 
encountered by the 
pilot early in the 
flight path headed 
toward the planned 
destination 
Wiegmann, & Goh, 
2000; Wiegmann, Goh, 
and O’Hare, 2002 
3. Adverse weather 
encountered late in flight 
The VFR-into-
IMC weather was 
encountered by the 
pilot late in the 
flight path headed 
toward the planned 
destination 
Wiegmann, & Goh, 
2000; Wiegmann, Goh, 
and O’Hare, 2002 
4. Altitude The cruising 
altitude of the 
aircraft above sea 
level 
O'Hare & Owen, 2002 
5. Ambiguity “Cues that signal a 




gradually, and the 
decision maker's 
situation 
Martin, Davison, & 




not keep pace” 
6. Amount of 
time/distance GA pilot 
flew into IMC weather 
before the accident 
occurred 
The flight time and 






7. Amount of 
time/distance the GA 
pilot flew into the IMC 
weather before diverting 
The flight time and 




decision to divert 
to an alternate 
landing location 
Wiegmann, Goh, & 
O'Hare, 2002 
8. Attentional tunneling “A concern with 
synthetic vision 
displays is the 3D 
immersed 
perspective of such 
displays can cause 
pilots to look 
extensively at the 
display at the 
expense of time 
spent sampling the 
outside world …. 
This attentional 
tunneling can have 
significant 
detrimental effects 
on pilots’ situation 
awareness, 
possibly causing 
them to miss vital 
weather cues only 
visible in the 
outside world” 
Johnson, Wiegmann, & 




9. Ceiling and visibility 
determination 
“…. pilots allowed 




other. That is, 
pilots tended to 
judge a ceiling to 
be higher than it 
actually was when 
it was paired with 
a high visibility. 
This interaction 
may play a 
significant role in 
pilots’ decisions to 
continue into IMC 




Coyne, Baldwin, & 
Latrorella, 2005, p. 153; 
Coyne, Baldwin & 
Latrorella, 2008, p. 1; 















using controls, and 
monitoring results.  
If changes are 
needed, hazards 
are repeatedly 
assessed as needed 
in a circular 
decision-making 
process 
Bell & Mauro, 2000; 
FAA, 2018c, p. 2-4 
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11. Cognitive Anchoring “…. how pilots 




making a decision 
can influence their 
decisions …. Any 
information the 
pilot gains prior to 
making a decision 
may bias his or her 
decision in favor 
of that 
information…. 
which has an effect 
on a person's 




Wiegmann, 2005, pp. 
44-45; Saxton, 2008, p. 
iii 
12.Communication with 
air traffic control 
“Pilots who were 
communicating 
with ATC at the 
time of the crash 
were less likely to 
be involved in a 
VFR-into-IMC 
accident …. seems 
to make sense as 
ATC could 
potentially assist 
the pilot get to 





accidents are more 
likely to be in 
communication 
with ATC” 
Ison, 2014a, p. 20 
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13. Consequences not 
anticipated 
“If pilots are under 
stress, they may 
not do the required 
evaluations. Stress 
limits the decision 
maker's ability to 
project the 




of a course of 
action” 
Martin, Davison, & 
Orasanu, 1998, p. 8; 
Orasanu, & Martin, 
1998; Orasanu, Martin, 
& Davison, 1998; 
Orasanu, Martin, & 
Davison, 2001 
14. Crash distance from 
departure 
The aircraft crash 
site distance from 
the departure 
location 
O’Hare & Owen, 2002 
15. Crash distance from 
planned destination 
The aircraft crash 
site distance from 
the destination 
location 
O’Hare & Owen, 2002 
16. Currency policy 
violation 
“…. without flight 
time currency 
policy violations 
for flights from 
VFR to IMC. 
There were two 
categorical areas 
where violations 
manifested in this 
area. Both 
requirements are 
located in FAR 
61.57 and 
pertained to the 
90-day window for 
recent flight 
currency and IFR 
flight currency 
requirement to act 






17. Decision to continue 
VFR-into-IMC to the 
planned destination 
The selection of 
the planned 
destination 
location by the 
pilot based on the 
pilot’s perception 
of the location and 
severity of IMC 
weather along the 
flight path. The 
pilot in-flight 
decision to 
continue into IMC 
to the planned 
destination 
Beringer & Ball, 2004; 
Wiegmann, Goh, & 
O'Hare, 2002 
18. Decision to divert 
from VFR-into-IMC to 
an alternate destination 
The selection of an 
alternate location 
by the pilot based 
on the pilot’s 
perception of the 
location and 
severity of IMC 
weather along the 
flight path 
Wiegmann, Goh, & 
O'Hare, 2002 
19. Delay in obtaining 




data received in 
the cockpit are 
always time-
delayed from the 
actual observation 
at least 6 to 7 
minutes following 
the actual radar 
scan. This means 
that an image on a 
cockpit display 
may be as old as 




12 to 14 minutes 
before it is 
updated. This fact 
gives rise to the 
legitimate concern 
that pilots might be 
trying to make 
tactical decisions 
based upon “old” 
data. There is also 
the question of 
how much 
degradation is 
acceptable in the 
resolution of the 
data before pilots 






they may be able 
to view directly 
through the 
windscreen 












McCoy & Mickunas, 
2000, pp. 1-26 
21. Filing of a flight plan The pilot 
submission of a 
hardcopy or online 
FAA, 2018d; Ison, 
2014a; Ison, 2014b 
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flight plan form to 
flight service 
22. Flight into known 
icing conditions 
The pilot either 
intentional or 
unintentional flight 
into known icing 
conditions 
McCoy & Mickunas, 
2000 




from visual flight 
rules to instrument 
meteorological 
conditions for pilot 
flight plan policy 
violations” 
Jackman, 2014, p. 63 
24. Goal conflicts “Pilots may be 
willing to take a 
risk with safety (a 
possible loss) to 
arrive on time (a 
sure benefit)” 
Martin, Davison, & 
Orasanu, 1998; 
Orasanu, & Martin, 
1998, p. 103; Orasanu, 
Martin, & Davison, 
1998; Orasanu, Martin, 
& Davison, 2001 
25. Height of crash site Height above 
mean sea level of 
the crash site 
O’Hare & Owen, 2002 
26. IFR flight without 
clearance or ratings 
The pilot decision 







Jackman, 2014, pp. 14, 
42, 131; McCoy & 
Mickunas, 2000 
27. Linear decision- 
making 
A thought process 
using a sequence 
of steps where a 
response to a step 
must be produced 
Bell & Mauro, 2000 
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before another step 
is taken 





policy by acting as 
PIC of a flight 
without the FAA 
required medical 
certificate (first 
class, second class, 
third class, student, 
sport pilot, 
expired, revoked, 
or no medical)” 
Jackman, 2014, p. 123 
29. Number of 
passengers on board 
The number of 
passengers 
onboard the GA 
PIC flight 
Martin, Davison, & 
Orasanu, 1998; 
Orasanu, & Martin, 
1998; Orasanu, Martin, 
& Davison, 1998; 
Orasanu, Martin, & 
Davison, 2001 






briefing] to find 
desired kinds of 
information” 
Knecht, Ball, & Lenz, 
2010, p. 9 
31. Organization “An organization's 
emphasis on 
productivity may 
unwittingly set up 
goal conflicts with 
safety” 
Martin, Davison, & 
Orasanu, 1998, p. 7; 
Orasanu, & Martin, 
1998; Orasanu, Martin, 
& Davison, 1998; 




The pilot seeking 
approval for a 








“Pilots call flight 
service briefers …. 
these exchanges 
can also be viewed 
as a series of 
commitments 
building on one 
another in a form 
of plan 
continuation that 
occurs on the 
ground before a 
flight ever 
launches.  Actions 
and words build on 
one another and 
make it 
increasingly 
difficult to change 
the path, to seek 
the open fields of 
alternative futures. 
The plan becomes 
more public while 
others assist in 
defining the 
acceptable 
outcomes. A flight 
service briefer can 
even become 
complicit in 
helping a pilot 
achieve a stated 
outcome and 
solidify a plan that 
needs to change. 
Rather than adapt 
to an alternative, 
together the pilot 
and briefer try to 
McCoy & Mickunas, 
2000, p. 29 
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force the original 
plan to work with 
a context no longer 
the same” 
34. Plan Continuation 
Error 
“…. Pressing on 
with the original 
plan in the face of 
cues that suggest a 
change would be 
warranted” 
Characteristics of 
PCE include pilot 
fixation on 




weather along the 
flight path. 
Martin, Davison, & 
Orasanu, 1998, p. 9; 
McCoy & Mickunas, 
2000 
35. Ratings policy 
violation 
“…. ratings, and 
hence experience 
has an impact on 
the predictability 
of Fatality Status, 
accidents from 
VFR to IMC. A 
pilot with a higher 
rating, specifically 
an instrument 
rating at a 
minimum, is 1.2 
times less likely to 
have a fatal 
accident from VFR 
to IMC than a pilot 
that does not have 
an instrument 
rating” 
Jackman, 2014, p. 142 
36. Receipt of weather 
briefing 
“… whether the 
pilot received a 
Ison, 2014a, p. 11 
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weather briefing or 
not” 
37. Scud running A GA practice by 
VFR pilots 
lowering the flight 
altitude to evade 
clouds or IMC 
staying clear of 
weather to 




Martin, Davison, & 
Orasanu, 1998; 
Orasanu, & Martin, 
1998; Orasanu, Martin, 
& Davison, 1998; 




The ability of the 
pilot to recognize 









“…. pilots risk 
pressing on into 
deteriorating 
weather because 
they do not fully 
realize they are 
doing so.  In other 
words, pilots 
continue VFR 
flight into IMC 
when they 
misdiagnose the 
changes in or 
severity of the 
weather” 
Goh & Wiegmann, 
2001; Orasanu, & 
Martin, 1998; Orasanu, 
Martin, & Davison, 
2001; Saxton, 2008; 
Wiegmann, Goh, & 
O'Hare, 2002, p. 191 
40. Social “Implied 
expectations 
among pilots may 
encourage risky 
Barron, 2011; Martin, 
Davison, & Orasanu, 
1998, p. 7; Orasanu, & 
Martin, 1998; Orasanu, 
253 
 
behavior or may 
induce one to 
behave as if one is 
an expert, even in 
the face of 
ignorance. This 
may result in 
unwillingness to 
admit that one 
does not know 
something, is 
unfamiliar, is 
uncertain, is lost.” 
Martin, & Davison, 
2001 
41. Source of weather 
information 
The source of 
weather 
information chosen 
by the pilot for a 
particular flight 
Balog, 2013; Balog 
2016 
42. Terrain The physical 
characteristics of 





O'Hare & Owen, 2002 
43. Underestimating risk “In several 
accidents, the crew 
clearly was aware 
of cues that should 
have signaled a 
change in course 
of action, but 
appeared to 
underestimate the 
level of risk 
associated with 
them” 
Martin, Davison, & 
Orasanu, 1998, p. 7 
44. Unrecoverable low 
altitude 
The decision made 
by the pilot to fly 
Wilson & Sloan, 2003 
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VFR at low 
altitudes below the 
clouds where a 
recovery is not 
possible resulting 
in a collision with 
the terrain 
45. Use of in-cockpit 
weather information 
The pilot decision 






Johnson, Wiegmann, & 
Wickens, 2006 
46. Use of portable 
weather applications 
The pilot decision 
























































        0 .866 .496 .021 23.633 .000 .455 .537 
        1 .630 .496 .021 23.633 .000 .455 .537 
0 = Rater identified the contextual factor as not present 












































        0 .485 .376 .009 39.954 .000 .358 .395 
        1 .659 .509 .009 54.075 .000 .491 .527 
        2 .199 .011 .009 1.148 .251 -.008 .029 
        3 .187 .142 .009 15.113 .000 .124 .161 
        4 .303 .096 .009 10.203 .000 .078 .114 
        5 .125 .080 .009 8.499 .000 .062 .098 
0 = Rater identified the contextual factor as not present 
1 = Rater identified the contextual factor as present 
2 = Rater provided no rating (blank) 
3 = Rater selected the ‘not applicable, N.A.’ response 
4 = Rater selected the ‘not enough information’ response 





















NTSB aviation accident database & synopses 
 
Figure E2. NTSB Aviation Accident Database & Synopses website. Adapted from the 





















Instructions to Raters 
 
INSTRUCTIONS TO RATERS: PILOT STUDY 
  
The pilot study is provided in the attached Microsoft® AccessTM database under the 
‘Main’ table.  Once you are in the program, click on the ‘Main’ table from the list of 
tables located on the left of the screen.  The ‘Main’ table has a total of nine General 
Aviation (GA) visual flight rules (VFR)-into-instrument meteorological condition (IMC) 
fatal accidents selected for testing in the pilot study and will not be used in the 
main study.  The respective National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Aviation 
Accident Report (AAR) numbers are given as well as hyperlinks to the NTSB Aviation 
Accident Data Summary and Aviation Accident Final Reports that can be clicked when 
the pointing hand icon appears while hovering over the respective links.  Once clicked, 
the respective NTSB data summary and final reports will open at this point for your 
review.   
 
After reviewing the data summaries, final reports, and definition sheet for the 46 research 
literature-identified contextual factors, please identify the applicable contextual factors 
indicative of the pilots’ actions for each of the nine GA VFR-into-IMC accidents in 
the pilot study.  This action can be accomplished by clicking the down arrow on the right 
side of each cell for each of the 46 contextual factors in moving from left to the right in 
the ‘Main’ table.  Also, provide any comments in the rater comments cell related to how 
the contextual factors were manifest considering the pilot actions indicative of the 
identified contextual factor(s) in the last cell of the Microsoft® AccessTM ‘Main’ table. 
 
These instructions should be completed for each of the nine accidents one at a 
time.  The pilot study Microsoft® AccessTM database ‘Main’ data collection table and 
Microsoft® WordTM contextual factor definitions document are provided as attachments 
to this email.  Please take as much time as you need to complete the pilot study and return 
to my email when finished to hartmaj7@my.erau.edu. 
  
The following files are included as attachments to this email for completion of 





*Note – If you are having difficulty downloading the attached files, you can also access 
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INSTRUCTIONS TO RATERS: MAIN STUDY 
  
Contextual factors have been generally defined as the degrees of challenge, uncertainty, 
predictability of outcome, time pressure, threat, emotionality, and situational 
understanding in classifying decisions (Boyes, & Potter, 2015).  In the aviation domain, 
contextual factors are a multifaceted arrangement of pertinent events or occurrences 
contributing to pilot accidents in weather-related decision-making error.  Specifically, the 
context term has been explained as “… contributing to General Aviation [GA] pilot 
errors in weather-related decision making … considered as a complex configuration of 
relevant events or phenomenon that may be considered the domain within which the pilot 
makes the weather-related decision” (McCoy & Mickunas, 2000, p. 1).  As a subject 
matter expert (SME) rater, you will be identifying the applicable contextual factors 
indicative of the pilots’ actions for each of 85 GA Visual Flight Rules (VFR)-into-
Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) selected accidents from the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Aviation Accident Database in this main study. 
 
The Main Study is provided in the attached Microsoft® AccessTM database under the 
‘Main’ table.  Once you are in the program, click on the ‘Main’ table from the list of 
tables located on the left of the screen.  The ‘Main’ table has 85 GA VFR-into-IMC fatal 
accidents selected from the NTSB Aviation Accident Database.  The respective NTSB 
Aviation Accident Report (AAR) numbers are given as well as hyperlinks to the NTSB 
Aviation AARs that can be clicked when the pointing hand icon appears while hovering 
over the respective links.  Once clicked, the respective NTSB final reports will open at 
this point for your review.  After reviewing the final reports and definition sheet for the 
46 research literature-identified contextual factors, please identify the applicable 
contextual factors indicative of the pilots’ actions for each of the 85 GA VFR-into-IMC 
accidents.  This action can be accomplished by clicking the down arrow on the right side 
of each cell for each of the 46 contextual factors in moving from left to the right in the 
‘Main’ table.   
 
If none of the drop-down list of options applies to the particular contextual factor, then 
select the NA (Not Applicable) option.  If, in your opinion, there is not enough 
information provided in the NTSB factual report to identify a specific contextual factor, 
select the ‘Not enough information provided to identify the contextual factor’ in the drop-
down options (select this option if there is a narrative to review and after reviewing, you 
feel there is not enough information to select a specific contextual factor).  The NTSB 
report may lack a narrative to decide.  If this is the case, select the ‘Unknown’ option in 
the drop down list (select this option if there is no narrative to review).  
 
The hyperlink is provided for skyvector.com (https://skyvector.com/).  This publicly 
available website includes sectional charts for the United States for rater determination of 
the accident site from the departure and destination points for DDLCF14 and 
DDLCF15.  Also, provide any comments in the rater comments cell related to how, in 
your opinion, the contextual factors were manifest considering the pilot actions indicative 





These instructions should be completed for each of the 85 accidents one at a time.  The 
main study Microsoft® AccessTM database ‘Main’ data collection table and Microsoft® 
Word™ contextual factor definitions document are provided as attachments to this 
email.  Please take as much time as you need to complete the main study and return to my 
email when finished at hartmaj7@my.erau.edu. 
  






Please let me know if you have any questions.  Thank you for your participation! 
 
*Note – If you are having difficulty downloading the attached files, you can also access 
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Rater-identified Contextual Factors and Frequencies (Pilot Study) 
 
Contextual Factor – Pilot Study Total 
CF1_Accident_time_of_day_Day 5 




















































































Rater-identified Contextual Factors and Frequencies (Main Study) 
 











































CF25_Height_of_crash_site_2,000 - 2,999 feet mean sea level 4 
CF42_Terrain_Type_Hill 4 
CF44_Unrecoverable_low_altitude_Yes 4 
CF4_Altitude_Cruising_0 - 999 feet mean sea level 3 
CF4_Altitude_Cruising_10,000 - 10,999 feet mean sea level 3 
CF17_Decision_Continue_VFR_IMC_Planned_Destination_No 3 
CF25_Height_of_crash_site_3,000 - 3,999 feet mean sea level 3 
CF25_Height_of_crash_site_4,000 - 4,999 feet mean sea level 3 
CF25_Height_of_crash_site_5,000 - 5,999 feet mean sea level 3 





CF4_Altitude_Cruising_13,000 - 13,999 feet mean sea level 2 
CF4_Altitude_Cruising_6,000 - 6,999 feet mean sea level 2 
CF4_Altitude_Cruising_7,000 - 7,999 feet mean sea level 2 
CF25_Height_of_crash_site_1,000 - 1,999 feet mean sea level 2 




CF4_Altitude_Cruising_11,000 - 11,999 feet mean sea level 1 
CF4_Altitude_Cruising_12,000 - 12,999 feet mean sea level 1 
CF4_Altitude_Cruising_14,000 - 14,999 feet mean sea level 1 
CF4_Altitude_Cruising_2,000 - 2,999 feet mean sea level 1 
CF4_Altitude_Cruising_4,000 - 4,999 feet mean sea level 1 
CF4_Altitude_Cruising_5,000 - 5,999 feet mean sea level 1 






CF25_Height_of_crash_site_10,000 - 10,999 feet mean sea level 1 












































Sample Size Selection 
Table I1 
































Sample Selection by   
NOAA Defined Region 
% Split 
Alaska AK 34    
Total   34 4.9% 2.0 
Central IL 7    
Central IN 3    
Central KY 9    
Central MO 7    
Central OH 9    
Central TN 26    
Central WV 7    


















WI 13    
Total   38 5.5% 2.00 
Islands GM 1    
Islands HI 6    
Islands PR 3    
Islands VI 1    
Total   11 1.6% 1.00 
Northeast CT 5    
Northeast MA 5    
Northeast MD 9    
Northeast ME 2    
Northeast NH 3    
Northeast NJ 6    
Northeast NY 9    
Northeast PA 16    
Northeast RI 1    
Northeast VT 2    
Total   58 8.4% 5.00 
Northwest ID 10    
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Northwest OR 16    
Northwest WA 20    
Total   46 6.7% 3.00 
South KS 10    
South LA 9    
South MS 6    
South OK 7    
South  AR 12    
South  TX 22    
Total   66 9.6% 6.00 
Southeast AL 17    
Southeast FL 30    
Southeast GA 18    
Southeast NC 20    
Southeast SC 7    
Southeast VA 20    
Total   112 16.2% 18.00 
Southwest AZ 16    
Southwest CO 31    
Southwest NM 12    
Southwest UT 16    
Total   75 10.9% 8.00 
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West CA 134    
West NV 11    




















WY 12    
Total   38 5.5% 2.00 
Grand 
Total 









Rater Lesson on Contextual Factors  
Objective(s): The objective of this lesson will be to familiarize the rater with the 
contextual factors identified in the peer-reviewed research.  The lesson 
will develop the rater’s skill in recognizing the presence of these 
contextual factors and manifestations in the sample of NTSB AARs.   
Methods:  Lecture, audio/visuals, and demonstration 
Materials:  Three NTSB GA VFR-into-IMC accident case studies 
References: Instructions to raters, complete list of peer-reviewed research-identified 
contextual factors, data collection form 
Presentation:  
Topics: 
1. Contextual Factors (Definitions and Descriptions) (Table 1) 
2. Data collection form (See Appendix B and Appendix C) 
3. Qualitative Approach for Analysis: using the data collection form 
a. Coding the presence of the contextual factors within the NTSB AARs will be 
completed by the raters such that the contextual factors will be used as a priori 
codes. The raters will use selective coding in that they will code 
systematically with respect to the contextual factors. 
b. The rater will record contextual factor manifestation thoughts and ideas as he 
reads the NTSB GA Part 91 VFR-into-IMC AARs using the data collection 
form comment cell. 
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c. The contextual factor presence coding and manifestation note taking 
completed by each rater will be cross-compared with the other raters.   
4. A demonstration exercise example using the data collection form will be given by the 
researcher (Case Study 1) 
a. The contextual factors will be identified using the NTSB GA AAR using the 
Probable Cause Section. 
b. Any other contextual factors will also be identified using the full information 
in the NTSB GA AAR. 
Practice: NTSB GA VFR-into-IMC Accident Case Study 2 (Accident to be 
determined) 
Assessment:   
1. A written assessment will be given covering the contextual factor concepts 
pertinent to the Part 91 GA flight environment. 
2. Practical Test: Case Study 3 (Accident to be determined). 
a. coding (individually) 
b. note taking (individually) 
c. integrative sessions (collectively) 
Completion Standards:  
1. The raters demonstrate understanding of the peer-reviewed research-defined 
contextual factors by passing the written exam with an 80% minimum score.  The 




2. The raters demonstrate competence identifying the presence of the contextual 
factors and manifestations using NTSB GA VFR-into-IMC AARs.  




NTSB GA VFR-into-IMC Accidents Sample (Pilot Study) 
Table K1 
NTSB GA VFR-into-IMC Accidents Sample (Pilot Study) 


































































































NTSB GA VFR-into-IMC Accidents Sample (Main Study) 
Table L1 
NTSB GA VFR-into-IMC Accidents Sample (Main Study) 














































































































































































































































































































































































Short Biographies of Raters  
1. Robert “Buck” Joslin joined the FAA in 2005.  Prior to being selected in 2010 as the 
CSTA-Flight Deck Technology Integration, he served as an FAA Flight Test pilot with 
the Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office and the Fort Worth Special Certification Office, 
involved in the certification of some of the latest flight deck systems.  Robert Joslin has 
served on various national/international committees involved in developing regulations 
and certification standards for new technology with international experience living and 
working in aviation and aviation flight test centers worldwide, to include 3 years in 
Japan, and has over 60 published manuscripts in various aviation periodicals.  He is an 
active FAA Flight Test Pilot and has over 9000 accident free flight hours in over 100 
aircraft type and is qualified in AMEL, ASEL, AMES, ASES, Powered-Lift, Rotorcraft-
Helicopter, Glider, and Remote Pilot with type ratings in the A-320, B-737, B-787, BE-
200, BV-107, DA-2Easy, EMB-500, G-V, N-265, S-70, SA-227, and SK-61 as well CFI, 
CFII for Airplane and Rotorcraft, and is a qualified sUAS operator for the RQ-12A 
WASP and RQ-20A Puma, and has completed a MQ-1B Predator familiarization course.  
Prior to joining the FAA in 2005, Dr. Joslin completed 30 years of military 
aviation service where he was a Colonel in the United States Marine Corps and a military 
experimental test pilot in jet, propeller, helicopter, and tilt-rotor aircraft at the Naval Air 
Test Centers in Patuxent River and China Lake, where he was involved in the early 
research and development of new flight deck technologies, many of which were 
subsequently adopted for civil use.  He was the Commander of Defense Contract 
Management Agency-Bell Helicopter responsible for the initial production, acceptance, 
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and delivery of the V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft.  He also was a "Marine One" pilot for the 
President of the United States under the Bush Sr. administration, a 1994 NASA Astronaut 
Candidate finalist, an Assistant Professor of Aerodynamics and Aviation Safety at the 
Naval Postgraduate School, an Adjunct Assistant Professor with Embry-Riddle 
Aeronautical University, and is completely bilingual English-Spanish having been raised 
in Latin America. 
Member, professional organizations, and societies:  
•Associate Fellow - Society of Experimental Test Pilots (SETP) 
•Full Member - International Society of Air Safety Investigators (ISASI) 
•Member - Human Factors and Ergonomics Society (HFES) 
•Fellow - Royal Aeronautical Society (FRAeS) 
Industry and government awards:  
•Contributor of the Year, Approach magazine 
•Scribe of the Year, Rotor Review magazine 
•Grampaw Pettibone award, National Naval Aviation Museum 
•White House Aircraft Commander - Presidential Pilot 
Academic achievement:  
•Ph.D. in Aviation, Embry Riddle Aeronautical University 
•Assistant Professor-College of Aviation, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
•Assistant Professor of Aerodynamics and Aviation Safety, Naval Postgraduate 
School 
•Engineering Test Pilot, U.S. Naval Test Pilot School 
•M.S. in Aeronautical Engineering, Naval Postgraduate School 
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•B.S. in Mechanical Engineering, University of Florida 
 
2. William (“Bill”) Tuccio was a regional airline pilot and has diverse experience in 
engineering, aviation, flight instruction, software engineering, accident investigation, and 
conversation analysis (CA).  In 2010 he joined the first cohort of Embry-Riddle’s PhD in 
Aviation program, earning his doctorate with a dissertation studying linguistics applied to 
pilot training.  He currently is a part-time flight instructor and an investigator for the 
National Transportation Safety Board, working with recovery of electronics, including 
aviation cockpit voice recorders, and audio and video from aviation and rail.  He has 
published numerous technical reports in support of accident investigations.  His PhD in 
Aviation dissertation explored interventionist conversation analysis for pilot training. 
After completing his dissertation, he co-authored a paper with his dissertation 
committee published in the Pragmatics of Professional Discourse issue of Pragmatics and 
Society (2016), “Interventionist Applied Conversation Analysis: Collaborative 
Transcription and Repair Based Learning (CTRBL) in Aviation.”  Continuing his interest 
in CA, he attended Elizabeth Stokoe’s Conversation Analytic Role-play Method (CARM) 
affiliate workshop at Loughborough University, England, and then teamed up with Dr. 
Maurice Nevile to investigate using CARM to improve flight instructor effectiveness 
based upon voluntarily submitted video and audio recordings.  Bill continues to 
independently pursue CA education through attendance at workshops.  As a CARM 
affiliate, flight instructor, and FAASTeam Representative, Bill has delivered interactive 
CARM seminars to flight instructors. 
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Dr. Tuccio received his Bachelor of Science degree in Aeronautical Engineering 
from Rensselaer and his Master of Aviation Science degree from Embry-Riddle.  
Additional relevant publications include International Journal of Applied Aviation 
Studies (2011), Journal of Aviation Technology and Engineering (2012), Journal of 
Navigation (2012), Language and Social Interaction Working Group Annual Conference 
(2016), and Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research (2011, 2017). 
 
3. Peter A. LeVoci is an Adjunct Professor of Mechanical Engineering at Columbia 
University where he teaches aerodynamics.  In addition to having served in the U.S. 
Navy as an instructor pilot and operationally as an anti-submarine warfare pilot, he was 
also a naval test pilot conducting experimental flight testing on prototype V-22 tiltrotor 
aircraft.  After naval service, he entered his current occupation as a civilian test pilot 
where he conducts engineering flight tests for the certification of transport airplanes and 
helicopters, as well as small airplanes for the Federal Aviation Administration.  Dr. 
LeVoci received his BS in Aerospace Engineering from the United States Naval 
Academy in 1979, MS in Systems Analysis from the University of West Florida in 1983, 
and his PhD in Mechanical Engineering from Columbia University in 2004.  He is also a 
1988 graduate of the United States Naval Test Pilot School. 
 
4. Benjamin J.  Goodheart is an aviation professional with over 20 years of experience 
in the field.  His diverse career began in aviation line service and has expanded to roles in 
aviation safety and loss control, training, and professional flying.  He has worked in and 
with a variety of aviation organizations, including flight training organizations, business 
292 
 
and general aviation operators, and major airlines, and his varied experience affords him 
a wide variety of opportunities to practice within his passion.  Benjamin is an active 
author and researcher focused on novel applications within aviation safety management 
and organizational climate and culture.  He holds a Master of Science in Safety Science, 
and a Ph.D. from Embry Riddle Aeronautical University with a specialization in applied 
aviation safety.  Dr. Goodheart is a Certified Safety Professional as well as an Airline 
Transport Pilot and Flight Instructor.  Benjamin currently serves as the Managing 
Director of Versant, and international safety and risk advocacy firm, and he served as 
President of an aviation nonprofit organization, Mercy Wings Network through 2016.  In 
2014, Dr. Goodheart was named one of Aviation Week and Space Technology 

























1 5/24/1991 ACC 24015 ANC91LA061 91 AK DUSK FATL 
The pilot’s 
decision to 
continue VFR into 
IMC conditions 
and failure to 
maintain proper 
altitude.  
Contributing to the 
accident was the 
low ceiling and 
visibility.  
2 7/24/1991 ACC 24015 ANC91FA107 91 AK DAYL FATL 
The pilot’s loss of 
control in flight 
due to spatial 
disorientation 







visual flight rules 
while in instrument 
meteorological 
conditions. 
Contributing to the 
accident was the 
mountainous 
terrain.  
3 12/8/1999 ACC 24015 MIA00FA043 91 AL DUSK FATL 
The student pilot's 
decision to 
continue the visual 
flight rules flight 
into deteriorating 
visibility, and his 
failure to maintain 
altitude clearance 
with the terrain.  













with a riverbank. 
Factors were 
reduced visibility 
and dark night. 
5 12/7/2007 ACC 24015 MIA08FA026 91 AL NDRK FATL 
The flight 
instructor’s failure 
to maintain control 
of the airplane 
while attempting to 
conduct visual 
flight in reduced 
visibility 
conditions at night.  
Factors 






6 3/15/2003 ACC 24015 FTW03FA111 91 AR DAWN FATL 
The pilot's 






flight into IMC and 
his failure to 
maintain obstacle 
clearance.  Fog 
conditions and the 




7 2/4/2012 ACC 401 WPR12FA091 91 AZ NITE FATL 
The pilot’s 




the initial climb, 
which resulted in 
spatial 
disorientation and 
loss of airplane 
control. 
8 12/31/2014 ACC 401 
WPR15FA07












resulted in an 
inflight collision 
with terrain. 
Contributing to the 
accident was the 
pilot’s inadequate 
preflight planning. 
9 10/1/1994 ACC 24015 LAX95LA001 91 CA NDRK FATL 
The non-
instrument-rated 
pilot's failure to 
maintain aircraft 






conditions after the 
pilot decided to 







conditions.   








Factors were the 
low ceiling, 
drizzle, and fog.  
11 10/15/1999 ACC 24015 
LAX00FA01
7 91 CA NDRK FATL 
The pilot's 
continued VFR 
flight into IMC.  
Contributing 
factors were the 
pilot's self induced 
pressure to depart 
the airport before 
the weather 
worsened and the 

























conditions on top.   
13 9/30/2000 ACC 24015 LAX00FA354 91 CA NDRK FATL 















conditions.  A 
factor in the 
accident was the 




14 10/23/2000 ACC 24015 
LAX01FA02





flight into IMC, 










15 10/31/2001 ACC 24015 
LAX02FA01







resulted in a 
collision with trees 
and terrain. 










power lines.  A 
contributing factor 








17 8/25/2003 ACC 24015 LAX03FA282 91 CA DAYL FATL 




into the ocean 
while maneuvering 
to avoid inclement 
weather.  Also 
causal was the 
flight instructor's 
inadequate 
supervision due to 
his improper 
approval of his 
student's preflight 
preparation. 





by which he 
conducted VFR 










terrain, dark night 
conditions and the 
pilot's failure to 




19 12/15/2003 ACC 24015 
LAX04FA08
1 91 CA NITE FATL 





conditions, and his 
failure to maintain 
aircraft control as a 
result of spatial 
disorientation. 
20 12/23/2003 ACC 24015 
LAX04FA07





















conditions and a 
collision with 
ridgeline. 















clearance altitude.  
Also causal was 
the pilot's improper 
in-flight decision 
to return to the 
origin airport. 
22 2/27/2004 ACC 24015 LAX04FA139 91 CA DUSK FATL 
The pilot's 
continued visual 
flight into adverse 
weather conditions 
at night, which 
resulted in an in-
flight collision 
with mountainous 
terrain.  The pilot's 
failure to obtain 
preflight weather 
information for the 







23 11/13/2004 ACC 24015 
LAX05FA03









an in-flight loss of 
control. 



















factors were the 
pilots' delayed 
decision to reverse 
course. 





conditions, and his 
failure to maintain 
clearance from the 
rising hilly terrain.  
Contributing 
factors were the 
pilot's inexperience 
regarding flying 
during the dark, 
nighttime 
condition. 
26 4/23/2006 ACC 24015 LAX06FA148 91 CA DAYL FATL 
The pilot's 
improper decision 















27 12/10/2006 ACC 24015 
LAX07FA05








to maintain terrain 
clearance.   
Contributing to the 



















resulted in an in-
flight loss of 
aircraft control due 
to spatial 
disorientation. 
29 9/24/1995 ACC 24015 FTW95FA402 91 CO DUSK FATL 















terrain.  Factors 
relating to the 
accident were: the 
light condition at 
dusk and the 
adverse weather 
conditions. 
30 10/13/2004 ACC 24015 
DEN05FA01
1 91 CO DAWN FATL 
The pilot's failure 
to maintain 
clearance from 




resulting in VFR 
flight into IMC. 
Contributing 
factors include the 
pilot's self-induced 
pressure to arrive 
at his destination 







31 3/24/1991 ACC 24015 MIA91FA107 91 FL DAYL FATL 
The pilot in 
command 
continued VFR 
flight into IFR 
conditions 
resulting in an 
inflight loss of 
control and an 
inflight collision 
with the ground.  
32 6/7/1995 ACC 24015 MIA95FA145 91 FL NDRK FATL 
The pilot’s loss of 








relating to the 














by his continued 






advisory.  Also 
causal was his 
failure to maintain 
aircraft control. 












failure to maintain 
altitude/terrain 
clearance. 
35 4/26/2007 ACC 24015 ATL07FA081 91 GA DAYL FATL 
The pilot’s 
improper decision 
to continue visual 
flight rules flight 
into instrument 
meteorological 
conditions, with a 
low cloud ceiling, 
over mountainous 
terrain. 





planning and his 
improper decision 
to attempt a visual 













37 1/31/2004 ACC 24015 LAX04FA113 91 HI NITE FATL 
The pilot's 
disregard for an in-
flight weather 
advisory, his likely 
encounter with 




continue flight into 
those conditions, 




38 11/18/1995 ACC 24015 
SEA96FA02
1 91 ID DAYL FATL 
Improper 
planning/decision 











and his failure to 
maintain altitude 
and clearance from 
mountainous 
terrain.  Factors 
relating to the 
accident were: the 
adverse weather 
conditions. 
39 2/18/1996 ACC 24015 CHI96FA094 91 IL NDRK FATL 






loss of aircraft 
control, probably 







the pilot.  Factors 




due to the weather.  
40 4/14/1993 ACC 24015 CHI93FA137 91 IN NDRK FATL 
The pilot in 
command’s failure 
to maintain aircraft 
control.  Factors 
were fog and 
drizzle, and the 
pilot in command’s 
continuing VFR 
flight into IMC 
conditions. 
41 9/5/1992 ACC 24015 CHI92FA266 91 KS NDRK FATL 
The pilot in 
command’s (CFI) 
failure to maintain 
the airplane.  








to continue VFR 
flight into IMC 
conditions and his 
failure to maintain 
terrain clearance, 
which resulted in 
controlled flight 
into terrain.  
Factors were night, 
snow, and a low 
ceiling. 
43 9/1/1996 ACC 24015 FTW96FA368 91 LA NDRK FATL 




and failure of the 
pilot (PIC) to 
maintain control of 
the airplane after 
becoming spatially 
disorientation.  
Factors relating to 






darkness and the 
adverse weather 
condition. 
44 1/15/2001 ACC 24015 NYC01LA132 91 MA NITE FATL 
The pilot's 
improper decision 
to takeoff and 
attempt VFR flight 
in IMC conditions. 





resulted in an 
attempted landing 
in fog and 
subsequent impact 
with terrain. 












conditions and a 
subsequent loss of 
aircraft control.  
Factors to the 
accident were the 
pilot's lack of 
recent night 
experience and the 
low cloud ceiling. 








lack of instrument 
certification by the 
pilot.  Contributing 
factors were 










48 11/14/2004 ACC 24015 
MIA05FA02





conditions and his 
in-flight loss of 
control, resulting 




49 9/7/1995 ACC 24015 SEA95FA209 91 MT DAYL FATL 
Clearance from the 
ground was not 
maintained while 
attempting a VFR 
flight into IMC 
weather 
conditions.  A 
factor to the 













terrain by the non-
instrument rated 
pilot. 
51 10/16/1991 ACC 24015 
ATL92FA00
8 91 NC DAYL FATL 
The inadvertent 
flight from visual 




conditions by the 
non-instrument 
rated pilot, and his 
subsequent failure 
to maintain control 
of the aircraft.  
52 4/25/1992 ACC 24015 ATL92FA090 91 NC NDRK FATL 














resulted in a 
collision with high 
terrain. A factor 
was the dark night.  
53 11/14/2009 ACC 401 
ERA10FA06
2 91 NJ DAYL FATL 
The non-
instrument-rated 
pilot's decision to 




resulted in his 
spatial 
disorientation and 
overcontrol of the 















conditions and his 























Contributing to the 
accident were the 
pilot's recent usage 
of alcohol and his 
subsequent 
impairment. 
56 1/28/1992 ACC 24015 LAX92LA105 91 NV DAYL FATL 
The pilot’s delay in 
reversing direction, 









reverse direction.  
57 10/29/1992 ACC 24015 
LAX93FA04
5 91 NV DAYL FATL 
The pilot’s 












sever mixed icing, 
and his failure to 
maintain control of 
the aircraft due to a 
probable 
aerodynamic stall. 
58 6/4/1993 ACC 24015 LAX93FA246 91 NV DAYL FATL 
The pilot’s 
continuation of 





contributed to the 










59 6/6/1993 ACC 24015 LAX93LA244 91 NV DAYL FATL 
The pilot 
disregarding the 
advice that visual 











pilot’s loss of 
aircraft control. 











and his failure to 
maintain altitude 
(or clearance) from 
mountainous 
terrain.  Factors 
related to the 






61 12/24/1994 ACC 24015 
LAX95LA06





















resulted in his 
spatial 
disorientation and 
a loss of airplane 






63 10/29/1998 ACC 24015 
LAX99FA02
0 91 NV DAYL FATL 
The non-
instrument rated 
pilot's failure to 
maintain control of 
the airplane during 














64 10/23/2004 ACC 24015 
LAX05LA01
4 91 NV DAYL FATL 





by the rapidly 
changing cloud 
conditions that 





design loads while 
in a spiral dive. 
65 5/12/2005 ACC 24015 LAX05FA167 91 NV DAYL FATL 
The pilot's 
continued VFR 










terrain, and his 
failure to maintain 
clearance from 





66 5/28/2011 ACC 401 WPR11FA241 91 NV DAYL FATL 
The pilot's 
continued visual 




resulted in a 
controlled collision 
with terrain. 
67 7/24/2007 ACC 24015 NYC07FA173 91 NY NITE FATL 
The pilot's 















dark night, and 
poor weather 
conditions. 
68 8/24/2001 ACC 24015 NYC01FA215 91 OH DAWN FATL 
The pilot's 
improper decision 




conditions and his 
failure to maintain 
adequate 
altitude/clearance, 








trees.  A factor in 
this accident was 
the ground fog. 
69 11/17/1993 ACC 24015 
FTW94FA03
6 91 OK NBRT FATL 
The pilot in 
command’s 
continued VFR 
fight into IMC. A 
factor was fog. 
70 12/30/2006 ACC 24015 
SEA07LA04
0 91 OR DAYL FATL 
The loss of engine 
power during 
maneuvering flight 

















71 10/8/1996 ACC 24015 NYC97FA004 91 PA NDRK FATL 
Continued VFR 
flight by the pilot 
into instrument 
meteorological 
conditions, and his 
failure to maintain 
altitude and/or 
clearance from 
high terrain.  
Factors relating to 
the accident were: 
darkness, low 




72 6/7/1992 ACC 24015 ATL92GA121 91 SC NDRK FATL 
The pilot’s 
inadvertent flight 
into IMC, which 







with trees. Factors 
were the obscured 
sky and foggy 
weather 
conditions, and the 
night lighting 
conditions at the 
time of the 
accident. 
73 11/16/1998 ACC 24015 
ATL99FA01
9 91 SC DAYL FATL 
The pilot 
continued VFR 
flight into IMC 
conditions and lost 
control of the 
airplane due to 
spatial 
disorientation. 












continue the visual 
flight rules flight 




resulted in the 
pilot’s spatial 
disorientation and 
a loss of control of 
the helicopter.  
75 3/25/2010 ACC 401 ERA10MA188 91 TN NITE FATL 
The pilot’s 
decision to attempt 
the flight into 
approaching 
adverse weather, 
resulting in an 











rain, and severe 
turbulence that led 
to a loss of control. 
76 11/12/2013 ACC 401 
CEN14FA05





continue a visual 




resulted in the loss 
of airplane control. 
Contributing to the 
accident was the 
pilot’s failure to 
obtain a weather 
briefing. 
77 11/24/2002 ACC 24015 
FTW03FA04














resulted in his 
failure to maintain 
clearance from 
terrain while in 







78 2/26/2011 ACC 401 WPR11FA147 91 UT DAYL FATL 
The pilot's loss of 
control of the 












Contributing to the 






79 10/8/1992 ACC 24015 NYC93FA012 91 VA NDRK FATL 
The improper 
decision by the 
non-instrument-
rated pilot to 
continue VFR 




resulting in spatial 
disorientation and 
loss of control of 
the airplane.  























82 8/3/2004 ACC 24015 SEA04FA154 91 WA NDRK FATL 
The pilot's VFR 
flight into IMC and 
his failure to 
maintain clearance 
from trees.  Trees, 
mountainous 
terrain, dark night 
conditions, clouds 






into IMC were 
factors. 
83 6/7/2003 ACC 24015 CHI03FA151 91 WI NITE FATL 
The pilot failed to 
maintain control of 





takeoff.  Factors 
associated with the 
accident were the 
low ceiling, fog, 
and lack of 
instrument rating. 
84 3/20/2011 ACC 401 CEN11FA240 91 WI DAYL FATL 
The student pilot’s 
inadequate 
preflight planning 
and his decision to 









resulted in a 
subsequent loss of 
airplane control.  










resulted in spatial 
disorientation and 
subsequent in-
flight collision 
with mountainous 
terrain. 
 
